


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
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RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE





RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE

BY

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"THE REVOLT AGAINST CIVILIZATION"

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FOREWORD

THE scientific discoveries of the past generation have clearly revealed the vital importance of the racial factor in human affairs. Race, hitherto disregarded or minimized, is now seen to be the basic element in the destinies of peoples.

This momentous discovery makes necessary a re-interpretation of both history and current events. That does not mean neglecting traditional factors like soil, climate, ideals, and institutions. It does, however, mean a re-examination of Man's past and present in which the racial factor shall be duly recognized and its significance appreciated. Only thus can we attain the wider, clearer vision which our troubled times so urgently need.


This book attempts a brief survey of Europe along these lines. It makes no pretension to either completeness or finality. It is frankly a pioneering sketch. My hope is that others may be stimulated to enter and explore this largely uncharted field.

LOTHROP STODDARD.

BROOKLINE, MASSACHUSETTS

July 29, 1924.






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RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE

CHAPTER I

RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE

Not long ago a well-known British scientist was showing me his collection of Egyptian antiquities. Up and down the long museum hall we strolled, gazing at the innumerable relics of a remote past. Safely ensconced in glass-covered cases, these exiles from the sunny land of the Pharaohs looked strangely alien in the gray light of a London afternoon. Presently the scientist halted before a show-case.

"Here," said he, tapping the glass with his forefinger—"here is something which to a student of racial matters like yourself will be of peculiar interest."

I looked. The case was filled with little heads and busts made of burnt clay, or terra-cotta. There were more than a hundred of them, neatly arranged in long rows.

"These little busts," went on the scientist, "were made to represent the different types of foreigners residing in the city of Memphis shortly after the Persian conquest of Egypt, about 2,500 years ago. Apparently made for the purpose of being carried in some sacred procession, they were deposited in a shrine which was recently discovered by our excavators."

I looked closer—and was filled with astonishment. Those ancient busts, modelled after men in their graves these 2,500 years, were strangely familiar. Many of them looked exactly like men who walk the earth to-day. There were Arabs not at all different from the Arabs whom I had seen sitting beneath their black Bedouin tents or swaying upon camels crossing the desert sands.

There were Armenians indistinguishable from Armenians whom I had viewed by thousands in refugee camps throughout the Near East. There were negroes just like Georgia cotton-pickers, and there was a Jew who might have stepped in off Broadway.

Furthermore, there were busts representing historic racial types such as Greeks, Persians, and Babylonians—races which no longer exist, yet whose appearance is known to us from statuary and kindred relics come down to us from ancient times. Those old Greeks and Persians depicted in the busts were instantly recognizable as the same breeds of men sculptured on the friezes of the Athenian Parthenon and on the bas-reliefs of Persia's ruined capital, Persepolis. On the contrary, the busts did not in the least resemble modern Greeks and Persians—peoples which, though bearing the same names, have practically none of the ancient blood.

Lastly, there were a few busts depicting racial types which have perished without leaving even a historic memory, so that to-day we have no idea of who they were or whence they came.

To my mind that series of little heads and busts, fashioned by the deft fingers of old Egyptian craftsmen, is a most striking illustration of the mighty drama of man's

racial life athwart the ages. Just think of it! Here we have a series of statuettes showing the various types of foreigners who walked the streets of an ancient Egyptian city. Pass 2,500 years, and what do we find? We find that some of those race types still survive relatively unchanged; that others have perished, leaving their names but not their blood; and that still others have vanished so utterly that not even a memory of them remains.

And all this in 2,500 years! What rapid changes! Does that last remark sound strange? Let us, then, remember that man has probably existed for something like 500,000 years. Comparing man's race life with man's individual life, what signifies a couple of thousand years?

Yes, for 500,000 years men have walked the earth—men of all sorts and conditions, of the most varied appearance and capacity. And for untold ages men have been divided into sharply marked races, ranging all the way from types so primitive that they looked like apes up to types such as the ancient Greeks, who were certainly handsomer and probably much more intelligent than any human stock now alive. And the great drama of man's race life still unfolds, never more intensely than to-day.

More and more we are coming to realize the fundamental importance of race in human affairs. More and more we see that the racial factor lies behind most of the world's problems. This is not solely an academic matter, to be left for the consideration of scientists and historians; on the contrary, it is about the liveliest, most practical subject that can engage the attention of thinking

men and women to-day. A general understanding of racial matters is necessary for an intelligent appreciation of current events.

Would you understand what is happening in the world, why nations act as they do, what their relations are to America, and what our policy should be toward them? You cannot fully understand these things unless you have some general idea of the racial factors involved. And, unless you thus understand, you cannot act so successfully and efficiently in your own every-day activities, whether you be banker, manufacturer, politician, farmer, professional man or wage-earner. Directly or indirectly, these things touch us one and all, both in our common capacity as citizens and in our private capacity as individuals.

Especially do we need to regard the racial factor when considering Europe, because hitherto in considering European affairs that factor has been disregarded. When we look at other parts of the world, racial distinctions leap to the eye and the racial factor obtains proper recognition. Who can think of China, India, Mexico, Africa, without instantly sensing the significance of race? When we turn to Europe, however, we do not at first glance get any such clear-cut impression. Of course we may realize in a general way that inborn distinctions exist between the inhabitants of various European countries, that Swedes differ markedly from Spaniards, say, or Russians from Englishmen. Still, even then, we are apt to think of such differences not so much in terms of race as in terms of other things, like nationality, language, religion, and culture. We look at the political map of Europe

and there find a continent divided into a number of national states with sharply defined political frontiers, jealously independent of one another, emphasizing their respective policies, languages, manners, and customs. We see them engaged in bitter rivalries and fighting bloody wars over just such things. What wonder if we come to feel that those are the things which really matter, that by comparison other elements in Europe's problems may be relatively disregarded?

And yet, is this true? Are there not other factors, deep-seated but powerful, working behind the scenes? Assuredly there is one such—race. The discoveries of modern science reveal more and more clearly the fundamental importance of race in human affairs. Of course there are other basic factors to be considered, like climate and soil. Yet even these are not so universal in their effects as race, which subtly but inevitably influences every phase of human existence.


Whoever begins looking at Europe from the racial angle is astonished at the new light thrown upon its problems, at the apparent mysteries that are explained, at the former riddles that are solved. Europe's seemingly tangled history grows much simpler, while present-day conditions become more understandable.


Look at a race map of Europe. How it differs from the political maps we are accustomed to see! Gone are all those intricate national frontiers. Instead of a Europe split into many states, we see a Europe inhabited by three races. These races are known as the Nordic race, the Alpine race, and the Mediterranean race. They have all been in Europe for thousands of years, and to them

the great bulk of Europe's present inhabitants belong. Only in Eastern Europe do we find a perceptible admixture of Asiatic elements, while in Southern Europe we discover certain infusions of negroid African blood. Both these alien elements have, however, entered Europe in relatively recent historic times.

Roughly speaking, the European races spread horizontally in three broad bands across the European continent. To the north lie the Nordics, centring about the Baltic Sea and stretching from the British Isles to Western Russia. To the south lie the Mediterraneans, centring about the Mediterranean Sea as the Nordics do about the Baltic. Between the Nordics and Mediterraneans thrusts the Alpine race, stretching from Russia and the Near East clear across mid-Europe until its outposts reach the Atlantic Ocean in Western France and Northern Spain.

These three races differ markedly from one another, not merely in physical appearance but also in intellectual and emotional qualities. Although they have been in Europe for thousands of years, have been in constant contact with one another, and have widely intermarried, they have never really fused and remain essentially distinct to-day. Right here we must emphasize the basic quality of race—its great persistence. Although the European races are unquestionably closer to one another in origin than they are to more remote human stocks like the yellow Mongolians of Eastern Asia or the African negroes, they nevertheless separated ages ago, and for ages thereafter remained separate. During that immense period of isolation they developed their racial individu-





alities, so that when they met again in Europe they were clearly distinct both in physique and in character.

A glance is enough to distinguish full-blooded representatives of these European races. The true Nordic is tall and blond, with a long head, blue or gray eyes, and a fair skin. The true Mediterranean is short-statured, slenderly built, long-headed like the Nordic, but dark-complexioned, with black hair and eyes and a skin inclined to be more or less swarthy. The pure-blooded Alpine is also dark-complexioned, but differs from both the other races in being round-skulled. Of medium height, the Alpine is of a distinctly heavy build, bones and muscles being alike stockier and less gracefully proportioned than either the tall Nord or the slight Mediterranean. To visualize these race types, call to mind a typical Scandinavian for the Nordic, a Southern Italian or Spaniard for the Mediterranean, and an average peasant from Central or Eastern Europe for the Alpine. The illustrations speak for themselves.

Few things are more interesting and enlightening than a study of the movements of these races since their emergence upon the European scene long before the dawn of history, many thousands of years ago. The vast migrations, the brilliant conquests, the striking shifts of fortune from age to age, reveal a mighty drama of which the recent war was only a latest episode. For let us always remember that the play still goes on, with the actors much the same as they were in ancient times.

This is a fact of the greatest practical importance, because these races differ not merely in outward appearance but also in mind and in temperament. Thus the relative

strength and importance of the different racial elements in a nation will largely determine every phase of that nation's life, from its manners, customs, and ideals to its government and its relations with other nations. Furthermore, knowledge of its racial make-up will enable us to understand many of the changes in a nation's past and also to get a clearer idea of present tendencies, because we must not forget that, though races themselves change very slowly, the ratio between the racial elements in a nation is constantly changing. This occurs not only where the racial elements live distinct from one another; it is true even where extensive intermarriage has taken place. Racial characteristics are about the most persistent things that we know of. Developed and set by ages of isolation and inbreeding, they do not fuse when crossed with other characteristics of a different nature. On the contrary, they remain distinct in the mixed offspring, and the descendants of such mixed marriages tend to sort themselves out as belonging predominantly to one or other of the original types, in accordance with the hereditary laws applying to their particular cases.

Europe is a striking example of the persistence of race, because the three great European stocks all belong to the same main branch of the human species. They are all white men and, however remote their common origin may have been, they are more closely related to one another than they are to more distant branches of mankind like the yellow races of Eastern Asia or the black races of Africa. And yet during the long ages of their separation from their original source they so far diverged in type that when they met again in Europe they did so as

true races distinct from one another, and thousands of years of contact have not sufficed to fuse them again. On the contrary, even in those regions where racial mixture has been most prolonged and general we find populations not fused into new intermediate varieties with harmonious, stably blended qualities but composed of obviously mixed individuals most of whom can be classified as belonging mainly to one or other of the ancestral types.

Furthermore, in those parts of Europe where race mixture has not been general or recent, we find the inhabitants to be mostly of almost pure racial stock. This illustrates another law of races—the tendency to breed out alien strains when these are not too numerous, so that such strains ultimately vanish and never reappear in the stock. The racial persistence displayed by a long-settled, well-acclimated population of homogeneous stock is truly extraordinary. This may occur even with small communities, as shown by the so-called racial islets not infrequently found in various parts of Europe. In such cases small communities belonging to one stock have retained their racial identity for many generations, although surrounded by people of another stock.

A striking illustration of this is the racial islets to be found in Norway. The bulk of the Norwegian people are pure Nordics—tall, blond, long-skulled, and fair-skinned. Yet here and there, in out-of-the-way nooks of the Norwegian coast, are found communities most of whose inhabitants are relatively short, dark, and round-skulled. These people are obviously Alpines, and they have been clearly identified as the descendants of Alpines who settled along the coasts of Norway thousands of

years ago. Yet these people to-day still differ not only physically but also intellectually and temperamentally from the rest of the population. This is so evident that they have always been looked upon as different, almost alien, by their Nordic neighbors.

This illustration shows why the racial make-up of a nation is not merely of scientific interest but also of great practical importance; because, as already stated, races differ from one another as much mentally and temperamentally as they do physically, and because such mental and temperamental differences are precisely the factors which in great part determine national development. Thus, in order to understand a nation, we must find out its racial make-up. Lastly, we must remember that, except in a few cases where a people springs from only one race, the racial make-up of a people is not a fixed quantity but a highly unstable ratio, which is always changing and which may change very rapidly as one racial element is favored or penalized by a variety of circumstances like wars, revolutions, emigration, immigration, or social changes such as the growth of city life and the factory system.

Bearing these things in mind, let us see what are the broad mental and temperamental characteristics of the three European races. We have already observed their general physical appearance. Now let us examine their inner qualities.

The Mediterranean race is a distinctly southern type. Probably originating in South Central Asia, it entered Europe by way of the Mediterranean basin, which has ever since remained the centre of the race. The Medi-

terraneans dislike extreme cold and high mountains, and tend to keep fairly close to the sea. Their most northerly extension was through France to the British Isles, which they settled many thousand years ago and where they still form the bulk of the population in Ireland, Wales, and some parts of Scotland. It is to be remembered, however, that the British Isles have a climate much milder than most countries of the same latitude.

The Mediterranean temperament is emotional, often to a high degree. Passionate, excitable, loving and hating intensely, yet inclined to fickle changes, the Mediterranean is prone to lack stability and tenacity. He is social, yet individualistic within his group. Neither in politics nor in war has he a high sense of discipline. This, combined with his want of tenacity, has made him relatively weak in the competition of races. Mediterraneans have usually gone down before the attacks of both Nordics and Alpines, so that many parts of Europe once held by Mediterraneans are to-day inhabited by Nordic or Alpine stocks. Mediterraneans have rarely succeeded in founding strong, enduring governments.


Strong magnetic leaders can do great things with them, but the personal element is necessary, and naturally either dies with the leader or shifts to some other strong personality that captivates the fickle multitude.

The most attractive and certainly the most valuable traits of the Mediterranean stock are its artistic gifts—its keen sense of beauty, form, and color; its love of music, poetry, and other arts; and its general joy of life. The Mediterranean intellect is usually quick and often brilliant, though apt to be superficial. The race has, how-

ever, produced many men of high intellectual quality, particularly in the past. Unfortunately, some branches of the stock are racially impaired and impoverished to-day, both by a breeding out of the most intelligent strains and by the admixture of vast numbers of nondescript, inferior Asiatic and African elements. This is clearly the case with the populations of Southern Italy and Portugal. Matters are even worse in parts of the Near East, inhabited in ancient times by Mediterranean stocks who built up brilliant civilizations, but to-day inhabited by mongrel populations of a very poor quality.

The Alpine race originated on the high plateaus of West Central Asia, and it has never lost the imprint of its ancestral home. It is emphatically a continental stock, taking naturally to highlands or to inland plains and showing little liking for the sea. The Alpines are a sturdy, tenacious race, very stable, but apt to be stolid and unimaginative. They have a strong sense of group solidarity, stick together, cling to the land wherever they settle, and when they do migrate move in groups. This is the secret of their successful expansion in Europe. The Alpines are not individually so warlike as the Mediterraneans and are far less warlike than the Nordics. Their advances have usually been slow and their conquests seldom either rapid or spectacular. Nevertheless, these advances, once made, have rarely been lost, at least in the racial sense. The great Alpine advances have been like glaciers, in solid masses, expelling or overwhelming the peoples they encountered and thoroughly settling the new territories. Mediterraneans have seemed





unable to resist these mass advances. Accordingly, regions like Central France and Northern Italy, once Mediterranean lands, are to-day mainly Alpine in race. Furthermore, Mediterraneans have seldom subdued Alpine peoples and imposed themselves as conquerors. For these reasons there has been comparatively little mixture between the two races.

Far different have been the relations between the Alpine and Nordic races. Ever since the dawn of history the restless, energetic Nordics have been coming down upon the Alpines, overwhelming their territories and setting themselves up as masters. Wherever the odds have not been too great the Nordics have usually won the battles. Yet the fact remains that, racially speaking, the Alpines have not only held their own but have actually gained ground at the Nordics' expense. Both in Eastern and in Central Europe many regions once racially Nordic are to-day inhabited by predominantly Alpine populations.

This seeming paradox is explained by the Alpine qualities of tenacity, instinctive solidarity, and dogged endurance. Their very passiveness has helped to give them the ultimate victory. The Nordic might conquer them and set himself up as master. The Alpines might submit, become his loyal subjects, even accept his language and culture. Outwardly the land might be Nordicized. But racially it would mean merely a Nordic aristocracy laid like a thin top dressing on a solid Alpine soil. The Alpines would cling to the land, stick together, and gradually absorb their conquerors. Ultimately the region would be once more inhabited by an almost wholly Al-

pine population, perhaps showing some Nordic traits that would be slowly bred out of the stock.

On the other hand, where Alpines have peopled regions once racially Nordic, they have usually done so not by sudden conquest but by gradual infiltration. Often such regions were temporarily underpopulated, the Nordic inhabitants having been thinned by war or drained off by migration. Once in, however, the Alpines would take firm root. Perhaps the Nordics might conquer them and the Alpines cease to be independent political groups. Yet racially they could survive and prosper.

Germany is a striking example of all this. Down to the fall of the Roman Empire, Germany was almost wholly a Nordic land. To-day it is mainly Alpine in race. Only in Northwestern Germany is the population still predominantly Nordic in blood. This change has come about through a long series of wars, migrations, and other conditions that have favored the Alpines at the Nordics' expense. It has also profoundly changed the character of the German people. Compare the solid, well-disciplined, docile German masses of to-day with the restless, fiercely individualistic Teutonic tribes that surged across the Roman world and turned Britain into a Nordic Anglo-Saxon land!

The attitude of the present German people illustrates a trait characteristic of Alpines generally—the tendency to accept the rule of masterful minorities. Left to themselves, Alpines rarely build strong, enduring states, at least of any considerable size. Whether this is due to lack of initiative and imagination, or to still other defects, it is undoubtedly the case. The Alpine manages

his local affairs well enough. With his strong group feeling, he evolves village and regional organizations that work smoothly. But beyond that his political sense falters. The Alpines thus tend to form small political units, which unite with difficulty and are more likely to be at odds with one another. This is one of the chief reasons why the Balkan peoples, who are of course mainly Alpines, are always quarrelling and fighting among themselves.

On the other hand, where Alpines are under the guidance of strong masters they can be disciplined into powerful states. Russia is a notable example. The early Russians, who like the other Slav tribes, were practically pure-blooded Alpines, were divided into many groups at chronic odds with one another and thus an easy prey to their neighbors. So intolerable did this situation become that they actually invited in foreign rulers, sending the following message to some Nordic Scandinavian chiefs:

"Our land is great and has everything in abundance, but it lacks order and justice. Come and take possession and rule over us."

The Scandinavians came, established a strong government, and laid the foundations of the mighty Russian Empire. From that day to this Russia has been ruled mainly by persons of non-Alpine blood. The present Bolshevik government is no exception to the rule. Very few of its members spring from the Alpine peasant masses.

"Peasant" is in fact the term which best describes the typical Alpine. Whether in France, South Germany, Poland or Russia, the type is fundamentally the same. On the contrary, there are no such peasant masses in

Scandinavia or the British Isles. Why? Because there is no Alpine blood. Scandinavia is almost purely Nordic, and the British Isles are either Nordic or Mediterranean in race. The total absence of Alpine blood in the British Isles is undoubtedly one of the chief reasons for the high qualities of its inhabitants.

For despite the Alpine's many solid virtues, it seems to be the least gifted of the three European stocks. Its type, as already stated, is the peasant. In cities the Alpine tends to be lower middle class—what the French call *petit bourgeois*. The effect of Alpine blood upon a nation, though steadying, is also levelling, if not depressing. Compared with either Nordics or Mediterraneans, the Alpine is a passive element. The Alpine race has contributed little that is truly great to politics, art or ideas. Yet its tenacity, endurance, and vitality favor its steady growth, and wherever it has a foothold it appears to be increasing at the expense of the Nordic and Mediterranean elements.

Let us now consider the third great European stock—the Nordic race. The Nordics seem to have originated in Northeastern Europe, though the shores of the Baltic Sea have been the racial centre since very early times.

They are a distinctly northern stock, inured to cold and storm; but they do not thrive in hot, sunny southlands. They also seem to take naturally to the sea.

The outstanding characteristic of the Nordic race is its restless creative energy. In this peculiar quality it surpasses not only the other European stocks but also all the other branches of mankind. The Nordics are assuredly the most masterful breed that the world has

ever seen. For thousands of years they have poured forth from their northland homes in conquering waves over Europe and many parts of Asia as well. The Aryan invaders of India were Nordics; so were the ancient Persians; while the Greeks and Romans of classic times contained much Nordic blood, at least among the ruling classes.

Always and everywhere the Nordics have been a race of warriors, sailors, pioneers, and explorers. Unlike the Alpines, with their slow mass migrations and peaceful penetration, the Nordics have ranged far and wide, often in small numbers, but winning their way by their fierce energy and great fighting power. Conquering peoples sometimes vastly superior in numbers, the Nordics have settled down as an aristocratic ruling class, and they have usually known how to perpetuate their rule because of their high political ability. Political ability is one of the Nordics' chief gifts, which they display both in ruling others and in ruling themselves.

The Nordic is at once democratic and aristocratic. Among his own kind he is democratic. Profoundly individualistic and touchy about his personal rights, neither he nor his fellows will tolerate tyranny. None of the primitive Nordic tribes had despotic rulers, while modern constitutional government was developed by the Nordic English and has not been really successful except among peoples with a strong strain of Nordic blood.

Where the Nordic establishes himself among other races he is instinctively aristocratic. Feeling himself the ruler and the superior, he prides himself on his race and seeks to guard the purity of his blood. Throughout Eu-

rope to-day the old aristocratic class tends to be of Nordic origin. Even in countries where the Nordic element has been mainly bred out of the population what little Nordic blood remains is found chiefly concentrated in the old upper-class families.

Nothing better illustrates the persistence of race qualities than the way in which Nordics have everywhere shown the same striking traits. From the dawn of history to the present day they have acted very much the same. Look at the Nordic Aryan invaders of India as described in the old Sanscrit scriptures! Those first Nordics to appear upon the stage of history entered India nearly 4000 years ago. Yet the family likeness is unmistakable. Tall, fair; hard fighting, yet jovial; loving good food, drink, fresh air, and exercise; chivalrous toward their women; despising the little dark negroid aborigines as monkeys, and setting up a rigid color line—how like our Anglo-Saxon pioneers!

This description of the ancient Aryans shows us merely one of the many Nordic stocks that have racially perished. For not only in Asia but also in Southern and Eastern Europe, Nordic elements, once numerous and powerful, have either entirely disappeared or to-day survive as mere lingering traces with scant significance in the national life of the countries where they are found. Only where Nordics have thoroughly occupied a country, expelling or overwhelming the previous inhabitants, has the racial conquest been permanent. The best European examples of this are England and Scotland. (The Anglo-Saxon invaders turned both countries into Nordic lands, the former Mediterranean population almost dis-

appearing. In Wales and Ireland, on the contrary, the Nordics never became more than a conquering aristocracy, so that in those countries the old Mediterranean element still forms the mass of the population.

The greatest expansion of the Nordic race has in fact occurred outside Europe—in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Here the few aborigines of very primitive types were quickly eliminated and populations of practically pure Nordic type were established, since the pioneering settlers were overwhelmingly of Nordic stock. The only exception was the settlers of French Canada, who were mainly Alpine in race. Whether these Nordic conquests will be racially permanent is of course impossible to say. In the United States especially, recent immigration has brought in floods of Alpine and Mediterranean blood, and unless immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe is restricted and kept restricted the racial character of the American people will be rapidly and radically altered. In Canada the French element is showing the usual Alpine characteristics—clinging to the soil, sticking together, and slowly but surely enlarging its racial area. However, in all these lands the Nordic element still forms the bulk of the population and can, if it so elects, secure its racial future.

On the continent of Europe Nordic race prospects are not so bright. Everywhere save in Scandinavia—where it forms virtually the entire population—the Nordic element seems to be rapidly on the wane. Old handicaps, like war and migration, which have penalized the race in the past have been supplemented by new handicaps, like industrialism and city life, the upshot being a steady de-

cline of the Nordics in favor of the Alpine and Mediterranean elements.

It is really startling when one looks back into history and sees how the Nordics have diminished racially in Europe during the past 1000 years. Their heyday was the fall of the Roman Empire. At that time and for centuries thereafter, both Western and Central Europe were strongly Nordic. The Alpine and Mediterranean elements were either reduced to serfdom or driven into the more mountainous and infertile regions.

Since then, however, the tide has been running the other way. War has been a terrible scourge to the Nordic race. In the numberless wars that have raged in Europe the Nordics have done most of the fighting and suffered most of the losses, while the age of discovery and colonization that began with Columbus still further thinned their ranks in Europe, since it was adventurous Nordics who formed the overwhelming majority of explorers and pioneers to new lands. Perhaps even more serious blows have been dealt the race by the conditions of modern life.

A century ago Europe began to be transformed from an agricultural to an urbanized, industrial area. Countless cities and manufacturing centres grew up, where men were close packed and were subjected to all the evils of congested living. Of course, such conditions are not ideal for any stock. Nevertheless, the Nordic suffered more than any one else. The Nordic is essentially a high-standard man. He requires healthful living conditions, and pines when deprived of good food, fresh air, and exercise. So long as Europe was mainly agricultural the Nordic usually got these things. In fact, in cool North-

ern and Central Europe an agricultural environment actually favored the big blond Nordic as against the slighter, less muscular Mediterranean, while in the hotter south the Nordic upper class, being the rulers, were protected from field labor and thus survived as an aristocracy. Under modern conditions, however, the crowded city and the cramped factory weed out the Nordic much faster than they do the Alpine or the Mediterranean, both of which stocks seem to be able to stand such an environment with less damage to themselves. It is needless to add that the late war and its aftermath have been terrible blows to the Nordic race.

This rapid decline of the Nordic stock in Europe is a very serious matter. The Nordic's great energy, political ability, and high level of intelligence are vital to Europe's prosperity and progress. The peculiar qualities of the Nordic intellect are just the ones which to-day would be most missed. One of the Nordic's most valuable traits is his adventurous curiosity. This makes him preeminent not only as a pioneer and explorer but also as an inventor and scientific investigator. The Mediterranean probably excels the Nordic in music and the fine arts. But in the intellectual fields the Nordic excels the Mediterranean and vastly outstrips the Alpine. Our modern scientific age is mainly a product of Nordic genius. Deprived of that genius, it would rapidly decline. It therefore seems as though those nations which possess most Nordic blood will tend to be the most progressive as well as the most energetic and politically able. Important assets, these, for the future!

Let us now take a brief survey of the present racial

make-up of the European nations, based upon the latest scientific estimates that have been made. Our survey will shatter many old notions that used to prevail when race was confused with matters like language and culture. For example, it used to be thought that France, Italy, and Spain were all members of a Latin race. We now know that there never was any such race and that these three nations differ widely in racial make-up.

Beginning our survey with the British Isles, the first important point to be noted is the total absence of Alpine blood. England and Scotland are predominantly Nordic, while Wales and Ireland are predominantly Mediterranean. Scotland is the most Nordic, over four-fifths of the population being of that blood. England is about four-fifths Nordic and one-fifth Mediterranean. In England the Mediterranean element seems to be increasing. A century or two ago it was probably insignificant. Since then the growth of city and factory life, emigration of Nordics, and immigration of Welsh and Irish laborers have combined to make the Mediterranean element a growing factor. Wales seems to be about three-fifths Mediterranean, while Ireland is over two-thirds Mediterranean in blood.

Crossing to the Continent, we find that France is racially a composite nation, all three European races being strongly represented in its population. The Alpine element is the largest, being slightly more numerous than the two other stocks put together. Roughly speaking, the Nordics are clustered in the north and the Mediterraneans in the south, the Alpines forming a broad band between. There are, however, many exceptions to this, the

race map of France being quite complicated. There is also a distinct connection between race and social status. The upper classes and the city populations tend to be Nordic or Mediterranean, while the peasantry tend to be Alpine in blood. The solid French peasant is certainly a good Alpine type.

Spain is predominantly a Mediterranean nation, most of the Spanish people belonging to that race. Nordic blood is mainly confined to the upper classes. The Spanish Alpines are tucked away in the extreme north of the country. They are the descendants of Alpines who entered Spain many thousand years ago; but the racial traits still persist, and the inhabitants of these districts are recognized to-day as being unusually solid, tenacious, and hard-working.

As for Portugal, it is overwhelmingly Mediterranean in race. There are no Alpines and very few Nordics. In Southern Portugal the population is distinctly tinged with negro blood. Some centuries ago large numbers of negroes were brought in as slaves to work on the great estates of the south, which has an almost semitropical climate. Furthermore, a certain amount of negro blood seeps in continually from Portugal's African colonies. The result is that the populations both of the southern countryside and of the port towns show many negroid types. The effect of this African infusion upon the Portuguese stock has undoubtedly been a depressing one.

Italy, though politically united, is racially divided into two very different peoples. The north is inhabited by a sturdy Alpine stock, considerably leavened with Nordic blood. The south is almost purely Mediterranean in race,

tinctured in the extreme south—especially in Sicily—by African and Asiatic strains. The racial difference between north and south is so evident that it strikes even the casual tourist. The Italians recognize it frankly. It is well known that the north runs Italy and looks down on the backward south.

Turning now to Northern Europe, we find the Scandinavian nations overwhelmingly of Nordic blood. In Norway and Denmark there is a small Alpine element, descended, as already stated, from migrations in prehistoric times. Sweden, however, is 100 per cent Nordic—the only purely Nordic nation in the world.

Holland is predominantly Nordic, with a small Alpine element. Belgium, on the other hand, is sharply divided on race lines. The open plains of Northern and Western Belgium are inhabited by a strongly Nordic stock—the Flemings. The hilly, wooded regions of Southeastern Belgium are inhabited by a strongly Alpine stock—the Walloons. The two stocks differ markedly in temperament, speak different languages, and instinctively dislike each other. Common fear of powerful neighbors alone keeps them politically together, and it is very possible that Belgium may some day split up.

The racial situation in Germany is decidedly complicated. Taken as a whole, Germany is Alpine rather than Nordic in race, nearly two-thirds of its population being classifiable as Alpines, while the remainder are predominantly Nordic in blood. This, however, is by no means the whole story. To begin with, in Germany, perhaps more than anywhere else in Europe, the two races have intermarried wholesale. It is probable that a clear ma-

jority of the German people are of mixed blood. This is particularly true of Central Germany, where one sees great numbers of what scientists call disharmonic types—persons, say, with blondish hair and light eyes, yet with round Alpine heads and thick-set bodies. In North-western Germany, however, the population is almost purely Nordic, while in the southern highlands and the eastern provinces the peasantry is practically pure Alpine. Yet here again we get a fresh complication, because in both Southern and Eastern Germany race runs strongly with social status. Even in the most Alpine parts of Germany the aristocracy tends to be Nordic, while the towns are more Nordic than the countryside. This seems to be one of the chief reasons for the marked class distinctions that prevail in German social life. Again, racial differences have much to do with the contrasts in temperament and the latent dislike that exists between north and south.

As already remarked, Germany has for centuries been getting more Alpine in blood. The terrible wars that ravaged Germany in the past were immensely destructive of Nordic life. The late war continued this process, while Germany's present economic situation bears much harder on its Nordic than on its Alpine elements. The Alpinization of Germany is proceeding rapidly to-day.

Switzerland and German Austria are racially much the same as Southern Germany. Both countries are predominantly Alpine in blood, but with a strong Nordic element, much intermarriage between the races, and a tendency of Nordic blood to prevail in the upper classes and the town populations. The racial make-up of Switzerland is about

two-thirds Alpine and one-third Nordic. In German Austria the Nordic element is probably not quite so numerous.

When we touch Eastern Europe we find racial conditions very different from those in the countries to the west. In Western Europe the racial elements have been long established and are more or less adjusted to one another. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, racial movements have been more violent and recent, and racial adjustments are not well established. The whole situation is at once less stable and more complex.

Over the greater part of this immense area, stretching from Russia to the Balkan Peninsula, Alpine stocks tend to form the most numerous racial element. This is especially true of the various Slav peoples. Of course, there is no such thing as a Slav race, any more than there is such a thing as a Latin race. In each case the phrase really means a group of peoples with similar languages and cultures. With the Slavs, the fact that they belong mainly to the same race has made a more or less instinctive bond of sympathy between them. Yet this sympathy has not produced the profound political consequences that might offhand be assumed. It has not produced any general political union between the Slav peoples. That would have been dead against the Alpine racial temperament, which, as we have already seen, tends to relatively small political groups more apt to quarrel than to fuse.

The Alpines are, however, merely the most numerous element in the East European racial situation. There is considerable Nordic blood in Northwestern Russia and a good deal of Mediterranean blood in the Balkans, especially in Greece, which is mainly a Mediterranean nation.

Besides these familiar stocks, however, there are in Eastern Europe powerful Asiatic elements that make fresh difficulties. For the past 1500 years Eastern Europe has experienced a long series of Asiatic invasions. These Asiatic elements—Huns, Mongols, Tartars, Turks, Jews, Gypsies, and many others—have left their mark on the various East European populations. In some parts they have widely intermarried; in other parts they have remained largely distinct, forming separate castes or communities. But in both cases the general effect has been to confuse and complicate the situation.

So ends our preliminary survey. In subsequent chapters we will view present-day conditions in the various parts of Europe, discussing many things, but not forgetting that racial factor, which, though often overlooked in human affairs, is perhaps the most fundamental of all.

CHAPTER II

KINDRED BRITAIN

FOR America the word "Britain" is of profound significance. It evokes a multitude of thoughts. Whether the word be taken in its narrowest sense as meaning merely England, or extended to the British Isles, or broadened to include those self-governing dominions which go to make up the English-speaking commonwealth of nations, or, finally, widened to signify the vast assemblage of lands and peoples known as the British Empire, we Americans instinctively realize that here is something which to us is of deep concern.

This is true of Americans generally, whatever their origin, because the United States is an English-speaking country, settled mainly by people of British stock, who built up a civilization, fundamentally Anglo-Saxon in character, that has set its stamp upon all who have reached our shores. For most Americans the significance of Britain is not merely a matter of cultural acquirement but also of racial inheritance—in other words, something in the blood. Despite recent immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, the population of the United States is still basically Anglo-Saxon, while a decided majority of its inhabitants are of British or kindred North European stocks.

The essentially Anglo-Saxon character of our stock and

civilization makes a study of things British at once peculiarly interesting and peculiarly important. Since race is unquestionably the basic factor in human affairs, we have weighty reasons for observing our British kin. This will aid us not only in our relations with them but also in our own domestic problems. For with folk so similar, a knowledge of what sort of people the British really are, and of what they are thinking and doing, will throw much light on what sort of people we ourselves are and what is the significance of our thoughts and actions.

It is a narrow and short-sighted view which holds that the parallel development of the British and American peoples is due chiefly to ease and frequency of intellectual intercourse—that we are so much alike because we can read each other's books and newspapers and can talk without an interpreter. That is rather putting the cart before the horse. It ignores the much more fundamental query as to how we both got that way. You can realize the significance of this point by a very simple test. Compare a conversation you have had with an Englishman and a conversation you have had with a person of some other nationality. The chances are ten to one that in analyzing those conversations you will discover a very significant distinction between them—the fact that you met your Englishman on a footing of more instinctive comprehension. As you look back you will probably remember that there were a lot of rather subtle things like viewpoints, ideals, prejudices even, which you could more or less take for granted with the Englishman, but which you could not thus tacitly assume with the other.

I am not here referring to knowledge of facts; your

Englishman may have been ignorant, while the other man may have been learned in the topics you discussed. Likewise, I am not concerned with the outcome of those conversations; you may have disagreed violently with the Englishman and have agreed fully with the other. Yet even that violent controversy between yourself and the Englishman had an intimate note; that is to say, in all probability it was not a clash between absolutely antagonistic ideals, but rather a family row over details—a magnifying of differences, perhaps just because you two had started with so much in common.

All this is of great practical importance, because it furnishes a clew to the understanding not merely of personal contacts between individual Englishmen and Americans but also of the relations between the American and British peoples. We two peoples cannot be really indifferent to each other, any more than members of the same family can be really indifferent to one another. Anglo-American relations must be characterized by a peculiar family quality which contains great possibilities for good and for ill. Things which between other nations might not make a ripple can, as between Americans and Englishmen, promote warm sympathy or provoke bitter resentment.

That is why the fullest possible understanding is so necessary between the two peoples. Here, if ever, "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing." Englishmen and Americans who know each other just well enough to see their differences are apt to quarrel. Englishmen and Americans who know each other intimately realize that such differences are far outweighed by common likenesses and

usually succeed in maintaining friendly harmony in outlook and action.

Such friendship was never more needed than it is to-day. The American and British peoples are unquestionably the strongest and stablest elements in a very troubled world, and their friendly co-operation is the best hope of the future. Probably no reflective American or Englishman thinks otherwise. And yet, desirable though this may be, it need not necessarily come about. Minor points of friction exist and misunderstandings are always liable to arise. The best way to better Anglo-American relations is to know each other better, thereby gaining that broader vision and deeper insight that can sense the relative importance of things and act accordingly.

Who and what, then, are these British kin of ours?

Racially speaking, the British people are at once a blend and a mixture. That fact gives the key to their national character, and explains both their past history and their present tendencies. An English writer once called his country Teutonic with a Celtic fringe. Translating this into modern racial terms, we can say that the population of Britain is predominantly Nordic, with a Mediterranean element that varies widely in strength in different parts of the island.

Britain's racial destiny was fixed about 1500 years ago, after the fall of the Roman Empire. Down to that time the British Isles had been inhabited almost entirely by the slender, dark-complexioned race called Mediterranean, which still inhabits most of the lands about the Mediterranean Sea and which settled the British Isles long before the dawn of history. After the fall of Rome swarms of

tall blond Nordics, coming from Germany and Scandinavia, invaded Britain and ultimately transformed the island's racial character.

This Nordic influx was, however, of a peculiar nature and had peculiar results. If the Nordics had come all at once in vast numbers they would have quickly overrun the whole island, would have subdued the Mediterraneans at a stroke, and would ultimately have intermarried and formed a generally mixed population. But just the reverse of this took place. The Nordics came in relatively small numbers, settling first on the eastern coasts and gradually working inland. Also, the Mediterraneans put up a stiff fight and gave ground slowly. In other words, a situation arose very much like that which occurred during the settlement of America—an invading frontier pushing slowly westward, with fierce hatred between invaders and natives, little intermarriage, and therefore a thorough racial replacement. For this reason Eastern England is to-day almost purely Nordic in race.

Yet Britain was not destined to become a purely Nordic land. The western fringe of the island is rugged and relatively infertile. In these wild lands the Mediterraneans found refuge, while the pursuing Nordics had no special temptation to conquer them. For a long while Britain was divided between two sharply contrasted races, the Nordics occupying most of the island, while the western fringes, especially Wales, Cornwall, and the Scotch Highlands, were solidly Mediterranean. In time these race lines became somewhat blurred by intermarriage; yet even to-day England and Scotland are four-fifths Nordic, while Wales is mainly Mediterranean in blood.

Meanwhile the Nordics were undergoing an important development among themselves. Instead of coming all at once, the Nordic invaders came at different times and from different places. The first invaders, who were Angles, Saxons, and Jutes, came from Northwestern Germany. Later came Danes and Norwegians, and finally the Normans, who were also Scandinavians, settled for a short time on French soil and with just a dash of French blood. These different sorts of Nordics ultimately intermarried and fused into a new English type.

They fused. That is the important thing to remember. When different varieties of the same race intermarry there is a real blend, from which springs a new stock, harmonious and stable in character. On the other hand, when different races intermarry, there is no blend, but a mixture, the children tending to belong mainly to one or other of the parent stocks. In England, therefore, we get a new Nordic type. In Scotland we also get a new type, differing slightly from the English owing to a somewhat different blend of Nordic elements. Lastly, both these new Nordic types mix lightly but continuously with the old Mediterranean stock.

In other words, we have that combination of racial blend and mixture which is the key to English history and English character. Predominantly Nordic as it is, the English stock shows those traits of creative intelligence, political ability, and great energy steadied by common sense that are displayed by all branches of the Nordic race. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the English stock has received slight but continuous infusions of Mediterranean blood that have tinted many Eng-

lishmen with Mediterranean qualities like heightened temperament, quick imagination, and artistic feeling. This Mediterranean dash has been too slight to upset English stability and poise, but it has been enough to give England many brilliant individuals and partially to correct the tendency to heavy seriousness common among pure-blooded Nordics, whether in England or elsewhere.

Despite the valuable contributions that the Mediterranean element has made, it is unquestionably the Nordic stock that is mainly responsible for Britain's greatness. To Nordic energy, intelligence, and common sense are due both England's political development at home and that extraordinary achievement, the British Empire, which today covers nearly one-fourth of the entire land surface of the globe and contains fully one-fourth of the world's total population. Nordic, likewise, is the combination of inventive genius and business ability which made Britain the industrial and financial centre of the world. It is often said that Britain's present wealth is due to the fortunate accident of rich coal and iron deposits beneath her soil. That is true, in a sense. But it is also true that these deposits would not have been developed without a remarkable combination of English and Scotch inventors, manufacturers, financiers, and workers, who first realized the possibilities of coal and iron, got the jump on the rest of the world, and thereby gave Britain the economic position which she has ever since retained.

Because Britain's progress has been so consistently successful, some observers have been tempted to think that it just happened—in other words, that it was due to good fortune or fatality. Nothing, however, could be more

untrue. The closer we study English history, the more we realize what immense problems Britain has had to face, and what intelligence, determination, hard work, and common sense the British people have shown in their solution.

During the past century Britain has gone through one of the most tremendous transformations that the world has ever seen. A hundred years ago Britain was still mainly an agricultural country, capable of feeding its relatively small population, which then numbered only about 14,000,000. To-day the same area—England, Scotland, and Wales—has a population of 43,000,000, four-fifths of whom live in cities or towns. Instead of being self-feeding, Britain grows only enough foodstuffs to nourish its people ninety days in the year. The rest of its food has to be imported, together with all sorts of other raw materials and manufactured products. This, in turn, means that the only way the British people can pay for these things is by exporting to foreign countries a corresponding amount of goods or services. Accordingly, Britain's very life to-day depends upon a complex and delicately adjusted system of manufacturing, commerce, shipping, and banking, which she has slowly built up and which at all costs she must maintain.

And yet, as already remarked, the very building up of this system has involved a transformation of Britain's economic, social, and political life so profound that most other countries would probably have fallen into civil war or revolution. The British have, however, succeeded in avoiding these evils and adjusting themselves peacefully to new conditions.

How? Primarily because of their national character—in other words, because of their racial make-up.

No one can be long in England without being struck with the basic unity of the English people. Of course, there are extremes of wealth and poverty, of education and ignorance; and these produce a wide variety of manners, ideas, and opinions. Yet beneath all such differences we somehow sense the fact that these people are fundamentally of the same stuff. Englishmen who have lived abroad get this impression as sharply as observant foreigners.

Not long ago an English friend of mine who lives in New York City was telling me his impressions of a trip home—the first in several years.

My friend goes to his New York office daily in the subway and is thus accustomed to rub elbows with about every racial and national type on earth.

"Do you know," he said, "the first time I rode in a London tube I had the queerest feeling! I couldn't place it at first, but I soon found that I was looking at the people in the car and comparing them with the people in the New York subway. And then I realized that all the people in that tube car were very much alike—and very much like me! I can't tell you how queerly it hit me; I just can't forget it."

In that simple anecdote lies the secret of Britain's stability. In other words, even when Englishmen talk and think differently they feel alike. That is why foreign students of English politics are always going wrong in their prophecies. How many times have we heard the statement from some foreign observer that England was

standing on the verge of revolution? Our observer may have made a careful study of the facts, have read all the speeches, analyzed all the arguments, and proved quite logically that such irreconcilable standpoints could not be compromised.

And yet the revolution just didn't come off! After everybody had had his say and had blown off steam, those angry Englishmen instinctively realized that every one of them was "very much alike—and very much like me." Whereupon a compromise adjustment was somehow evolved, the crisis was ended, and the country went on its way.

The stable, evolutionary character of English political life is well illustrated by the present situation. The advent of a Labor government to power—the first in British history—is certainly a momentous event. But there is nothing revolutionary about it. When I was last in England I made a careful study of British political conditions, and I was interested to observe the quiet, temperate way in which political possibilities were discussed and discounted.

Talking informally with representative spokesmen of all the political parties, I found that, when not talking for publication, they differed singularly little in their estimates and judgments.

Although the election which swept the Conservatives from power and resulted in a Labor cabinet was not yet on the political horizon, most persons with whom I talked considered a Labor government a distinct possibility within a relatively short period. Yet neither Conservatives nor Liberals were really alarmed at the prospect. A

few die-hard Tories and one or two Liberals did express frank pessimism, but the more general view was that the Laborites weren't such a bad lot after all; that they might make some foolish mistakes at the start, but would quickly learn by experience; and that they would be held in check by all sorts of moderating forces like the Liberal elements within their own ranks, the permanent officials of the government services, and the criticism of an alert and intelligent public opinion.

Equally instructive was the attitude of the Laborites themselves. In the first place, it must be remembered that a large proportion of the leaders of the British Labor Party are not workingmen in the ordinary sense of the word, many of them being highly educated intellectuals drawn from the upper and middle social classes. But whether intellectuals or hand workers, and however sharp their criticisms of existing institutions, very few of them had even a theoretical leaning toward violent revolutionary methods.

I well remember a talk I had with one of the so-called wild men of the Glasgow group—the most radical wing of the Labor Party in the last Parliament. This radical M. P. was a picturesque person—a live wire, with keen gray eyes, a great shock of hair, hat cocked aggressively to one side of his head, and a Glasgow burr that you could cut with a knife. He was scathing in his criticism of the existing economic order and eloquent concerning the “intolerable” condition of the British working classes. I broached the possibility of revolutionary action. He shook his head emphatically.

“No, no,” he answered gravely; “I’m fundamentally opposed to revolutionary methods; they defeat their

own ends. Violence, once employed wholesale, can't be stopped. Ye need ever more and more of it, and ruin is the final result. Of course," he added with a twinkle in his eye, "I'm not saying I object to a bit o' rough stuff now and then to throw a scare into the opposition. But—no real violence; no revolution."

Perhaps even more significant was a talk I had with one of the few Labor intellectuals who sympathize with the Bolshevik doctrine of the revolutionary dictatorship of a militant minority imposing its proletarian will on a nation. Despite his intellectual leanings, however, he was as convinced as every one else that a revolution in England was impossible. Not only were the upper and middle classes too powerful, but the working classes were not inclined to such action. Leaders and masses alike, he said regretfully, were too much imbued with what he rather scornfully termed Liberal maxims like the will of the majority and the rights of minorities to make a revolution even a remote possibility.

This I believe to be an accurate statement of the case. The British workingman is about the poorest material for a red revolution that can be imagined. Generally speaking, he is a slow, steady fellow, content with moderate comforts and averse to getting excited, especially over matters like abstract theories and principles. He might raise a riot if you suddenly clapped an extra penny on his beer, but he isn't a bit interested in fighting for a phrase like the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Of course there are occasional exceptions to the rule, but I doubt if there are more than a few thousand genuine revolutionists in the whole of Great Britain.

Among both Conservatives and Liberals the chief anx-

ety over what a Labor government may do lies, not in the sphere of domestic politics but concerning the non-white portions of the empire. The importance of this matter can be appreciated when we remember that the entire white population of the empire, including the British Isles and all the self-governing dominions, is only about 60,000,000, whereas the non-white population of the empire is over 400,000,000. Some of the non-white portions of the empire and its dependencies, like India and Egypt, to-day are restless and difficult to govern. Furthermore, the relations between the non-white colonies and the white self-governing dominions present a problem of increasing seriousness. The demand of the Indians to migrate freely throughout the empire—a demand absolutely rejected by the white dominions—is an especially ticklish matter. It is most emphatically loaded with dynamite and if roughly handled might cause an explosion that would literally blow the British Empire to bits.

On these thorny problems Conservatives and Liberals hold opinions which, however they may differ in details, are basically the same. The Labor Party, however, has in the past taken quite another attitude, and has favored much wider concessions to Indian and other demands for self-government than the older British parties have thought wise or possible. Accordingly in both Conservative and Liberal circles there exists a widespread apprehension that a Labor government may make mistakes in imperial policy that can never be rectified. As a prominent Conservative said to me: "My chief fear is that Labor in power may light a fire in India that neither they nor we can afterward put out." Whether this pessimism is justi-

fied remains to be seen. It shows, however, the gravity of Britain's imperial problems and the necessity for continuous statesmanship in their handling if irreparable damage is to be averted.

More pressing even than imperial questions are the problems arising from Britain's industrial situation. We have already seen how during the past century England made herself the industrial heart of the world, thereby gaining great wealth and increasing her population nearly 300 per cent. But we also saw that this vast population was dependent for its very life upon precisely that same complex and nicely adjusted system of manufacturing, commerce, shipping, and banking which had brought it into being.

We Americans can hardly realize what such a situation means. Our country is so large, our natural resources are so vast, and our climates are so varied that we could get along fairly well if all the rest of the world were to sink beneath the ocean. For Britain, however, such an event would be the most frightful catastrophe. Left to herself, more than half her present population would literally have to starve. Britain's economic situation is thus fundamentally artificial. It is not a natural but a man-made creation, which can be maintained only by tireless foresight, energy, and skill.

Furthermore, for many years past it has been getting harder for Britain to keep up the pace. There are two main reasons for this: the increasing severity of foreign competition and the steady growth of her own population. When Britain became an industrial nation, about a century ago, she had the field almost to herself, and for a

long time she made something like monopoly profits. But little by little other nations began to take a hand in the game, so that to keep her foreign trade against competition Britain had to work harder, produce more efficiently, and sell more cheaply. That was the only way that she could support her population. Also, that population was rapidly growing. In other words, it was getting harder to feed British mouths, and there were ever more British mouths to feed.

Britain's present economic difficulties are no recent development. They are of long standing. As far back as the year 1872 the balance of trade began to run against her; that is, her exports fell below her imports. And the balance of trade has continued to run pretty steadily against her ever since. Of course, Britain has covered the balance by "invisible exports" like shipping services, banking profits, and returns of capital invested abroad. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it became increasingly difficult to support her population.

As a matter of fact, not all her population was properly supported. The widespread poverty in England's great cities and industrial centres has long been proverbial, and England's poor consisted not merely of her degenerate pauper elements, who were practically unemployable, but also of many persons able and willing to work yet unable to find work, or able to find it only part of the time. The result was a vast mass of people underfed, living from hand to mouth, and dependent upon public or private charity. Their numbers were disclosed during the war, when Britain's man power was systematically examined by draft boards to determine their physical fitness for military

service. The amount of physical unfitness due, not to in-born degeneracy, but to poor living conditions, which those examinations disclosed was far greater than had been previously imagined.

Of course, during the war living conditions among the poor were much improved. Millions of men went off to fight, while every able-bodied man and woman left at home was sure of a job to keep Britain's war machine supplied. The problem of unemployment virtually disappeared. But this was an artificial, unhealthy situation which could not last and which was bound to be followed by an acute reaction. Britain was mortgaging her future by huge taxes and loans which would have to be repaid. The war once over, back came the millions of soldiers demanding jobs, while at the same time the war boom collapsed in that great industrial depression which hit not only England but the whole world as well. With markets everywhere disorganized, and with some of her best customers, like Germany and Russia, more or less out of business, Britain's foreign trade was hit a body blow and her whole industrial life slowed down. Once more the spectre of unemployment raised its ugly head. To avert wholesale semistarvation, the British Government supplemented existing measures of poor relief by a great system of unemployment insurance. The need for such action is shown by the numbers of persons applying for assistance. Since the year 1920, when the system went into effect, averages of from 1,000,000 to 1,800,000 persons have been assisted as totally unemployed, while the number of persons assisted as being only partially employed has averaged about 500,000. These people, be it remembered, are

genuine employables, able to work if work can be found. In addition to them is the host of unemployables—the physically unfit, mentally defective and degenerate elements who are supported by public or private charity.

Such is Britain's unemployment problem, and it is difficult to see how any political action can really solve it. Wise measures can better it somewhat, while unwise measures can make it much worse. But the cure—if cure there be—lies outside Britain, in the general world situation. The hard fact is that, as things now are, Britain's industry and trade cannot support her population, which continues to grow and thus makes the problem more and more difficult.

Britain's population is increasing between 300,000 and 400,000 a year. How are these new mouths to be fed? Many Englishmen advocate wholesale emigration to the dominions. Great efforts have been made and much money spent to this end. And yet the annual quota of British emigrants to all parts of the world averages less than 200,000. Thus not even the annual increase of population is taken care of. But under present world conditions Britain probably has at least 5,000,000 more people than can be supported in reasonable comfort. Here, truly, is a problem that will test British statesmanship to the full.

It is assuredly one of the great motives in British foreign policy. Determined as she is to build up her foreign trade, Britain feels it absolutely necessary to restore stability and prosperity to the Continent of Europe. This explains British policy toward Germany and Russia.

It likewise explains in great measure her policy toward France, which most Englishmen regard as blocking the road to Europe's economic recovery.

It is useless for Frenchmen to talk to Englishmen about the possible future political dangers that British policy may evolve. The present economic motive is so pressing that most Englishmen are willing to take the political risks that may be involved. A prominent French politician hit this off very well when he told me about a conversation he had had with a British cabinet minister not long after the war. The Frenchman asked the minister if he did not think England was playing a dangerous game in trying to build up Germany and Russia—the two powers which she had most feared in the past—and pointed out several unpleasant political possibilities.

"Well," replied the Englishman, "all you say may be true, and if it turns out that way we may have to fight 'em ten years hence. But now we must trade and make money."

It is very easy to label this sort of thing as short-sighted and to call the English a nation of shopkeepers and similar unpleasant things. That, in fact, was the way my French acquaintance felt, and he told the anecdote I have just narrated to prove his point. To me, however, it proved something quite different—namely, British coolness and common sense. Englishmen rarely waste time spinning elaborate logical theories of what may happen in the future. Instead, they look at what is happening in the present, see what is amiss, get after it, and keep their eye on the ball. That is why, in the long run, they usually come out on top.

It is just these qualities of practical common sense and dislike of theorizing that cause the English to be so persistently misjudged by their more logical and argumentative Continental neighbors. Except when really stirred, the Englishman is apt to draw into his shell and to become aloof and inarticulate. Not realizing how Englishmen are thinking and working beneath the casual exterior of British life, Continentals frequently underrate them and may even come to think England decadent. That is what happened with the Germans before the war, and when I was recently in Europe I found a distinct tendency of the same sort among Frenchmen and Italians. I discussed this point at length with one of the most thoughtful of England's publicists, having specially in mind the growing misunderstanding between French and British public opinion. My friend considered that the way many Frenchmen were belittling England was perhaps the most serious aspect of the whole situation.

"The British people," said he, "are grappling with their problems and are bearing their burdens with unflinching grit and determination. This indomitable spirit is the basic trait of the English people. It also shows what great reserves of energy and poise are latent within them, though this is never visible except in crises, because the English are ordinarily so inarticulate and so self-repressed. That is why Continentals are continually coming to believe England decadent. Germany made that mistake a short time ago. Well, perhaps that is not surprising, because England had not been put to the test for one hundred years. But here is the extraordinary fact: people on the Continent are beginning to say just

the same things to-day, despite the lesson of the late war. And therein lies a real danger, because it may lead such people—notably in France—to despise England and challenge her in what she regards as life-and-death matters. And then Britain will give the Continent another surprise."

Grit and determination are, indeed, the underlying traits of the British people. Those traits do not reveal themselves fully to the passing traveller, for the Englishman is at once reserved and casual before strangers. But after you have been in England a while and have got a bit below the surface, you will be impressed by the calm resolution with which the English are facing their problems and bearing their burdens. The problems are many; the burdens are heavy. England was hard hit by the war. Her people are frightfully taxed and her industrial life is still somewhat out of gear. The working classes are haunted by the spectre of unemployment, while the upper and middle classes have lost much of their old prosperity. Britain is, in fact, going through a period of profound readjustment—never a pleasant experience—and Englishmen admit frankly that the process will be hard and long. Yet practically all Englishmen are firmly convinced that Britain will win through.

One of the points on which British public opinion is unusually solid is the necessity of good relations with America. That does not mean that the English all cordially like us. Of course many Englishmen do, but others cordially dislike us, while still others know almost nothing about us, their chief acquaintance with things American being derived from the omnipresent American moving

picture, which usually presents either a distortion or a caricature of American life.

And yet, in the larger sense, all this matters very little. To judge Anglo-American relations on a basis of individual likes and dislikes—as is too often done—is a short-sighted and rather silly attitude that quite overlooks the basic realities of the case. The really important thing is that, though some Englishmen may like and others may dislike Americans, practically all Englishmen are convinced that Britain must be on good terms with America. That is one of the corner-stones of British foreign policy.

Anglo-American relations are, indeed, inspired by a happy blend of sentiment and self-interest, which is the best guaranty for their stability. As peoples, we may sometimes rub each other the wrong way; but we both feel instinctively that we are kindred in blood and basic ideals. As nations, we may develop differences in policy; yet we both know that such differences are vastly outweighed by the interests we have in common. We both realize profoundly that real enmity between us would be a hideous disaster which might well spell our common undoing. This feeling is particularly keen in the dominions of the British Empire—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the rest. The dominions know that conflict in the English-speaking world would be for them the worst of disasters. They are thus added links in the chain of friendship between Britain and America.

All signs, therefore, point to lasting concord and growing co-operation between the English-speaking peoples. Disagreements may arise, but they will be settled by the good sense and temperate reasonableness which charac-

terize both stocks. Not for nothing are we both mainly Nordic in blood ! The intelligence and self-control inborn in the Nordic race can be trusted to give us sober second thoughts and to guard us against being swept off our feet by gusts of passion which might blind us to our larger interests. America and Britain will never again be foes ; and so far as anything can be predicted, they seem destined to become steadily better friends.

CHAPTER III

THE NORDIC NORTH

No part of Europe is more truly interesting than Scandinavia, the home of the three northern nations, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The closer we observe them the greater becomes their significance. This is not, perhaps, apparent to the casual eye. These nations do not often appear in the limelight. Their doings are seldom good newspaper copy. Foreign press despatches tend to deal with the sensational and the ominous—political crises, falling currencies, threats of revolution, war rumors, and the like.

Europe is a troubled place these days, and, taken as a whole, the outlook is far from bright. Yet here and there we do find bright spots, and the brightest of these is undoubtedly Scandinavia. On the northern rim of a Europe rent by political and social dissensions, threatened with economic collapse, and menaced by next wars, there stands a group of peoples who are strikingly free from such troubles. Stable, moderately but consistently prosperous, threatened neither by domestic convulsions nor by foreign foes, here are countries worth investigating.

And the closer we look the more interesting do they become. We find the Scandinavian countries what they are to-day, not through sheer good luck, but through wise policy and intelligent action. These countries have

had to face many of the difficulties and temptations that have beset their European fellows. The difference is that instead of making a mess of things, as has happened elsewhere, the Scandinavian peoples have dealt with their troubles coolly and constructively, and are solving them in peaceful, satisfactory fashion.

Intelligence is, in fact, the key to Scandinavia's present good fortune. The Scandinavian peoples to-day stand admittedly on a high plane. They are well to the forefront among the truly progressive, civilized nations of the earth. In every field of human endeavor they are active, and they are keenly alive to all the intellectual, social, and artistic movements of our time.

Now, how does all this come about? How do the Scandinavians get that way? The answer is: not by luck, but by using their brains. Nature certainly did not endow the Scandinavian countries with the resources that we are apt to think of as necessary to highly flourishing peoples. Scandinavia is naturally poor, with a cold climate and comparatively little fertile soil. Without unusually intelligent, energetic inhabitants, Scandinavia would have been backward, thinly populated, and generally insignificant.

Yet just the opposite has happened. Small though these countries are compared with the big nations of the world, they are universally respected and their independence is secure. They are solidly prosperous. Placed though they are in a semibankrupt, distracted Europe, they are stable and peaceful. Faced though they are by serious problems, they are learning by past errors and are in a fair way to solve them.

This last fact is the most important point of the whole matter. The Scandinavian peoples have in the past made bad blunders, for which they have paid dearly. But they have profited by their mistakes and they are learning to avoid such mistakes in the future. That is where they happily differ from other peoples, who either continue to make the same old mistakes without any serious effort to stop or, grown impatient at their consequent misfortunes, try to cure these by quack remedies and short cuts to some emotional millennium.

The Scandinavian peoples, however, rarely let their emotions run away with them. They usually keep their feet on the ground, stick to their common sense, and think things through. The result is that they usually evolve a method of dealing with the particular difficulty in question which proves to be a real step forward. It may not look especially brilliant and it does not get big newspaper headlines. But it stays put and doesn't have to be undone.

Take one notable instance of the way in which the Scandinavian peoples have dealt constructively with a great problem—the problem of war. War is undoubtedly one of the chief perils to modern civilization. The last war almost ruined Europe, yet already the next war hangs like a thundercloud on the political horizon. And Europe is not the only continent thus threatened. Other parts of the world are menaced by strife between nations or are scourged with those internal wars known as revolutions. It is one of our proudest boasts that we English-speaking peoples of the United States and the British Empire are a unique exception to the rule; that we stand

forth as a group of peoples between whom war has become not merely unlikely but impossible.

Yet when we turn to Scandinavia we discover another group of peoples between whom war has become practically unthinkable. And this is a noteworthy triumph of conscious intelligence, because neither by temperament, tradition, nor outward circumstances has such a state of affairs automatically come about. The Scandinavians are certainly not pacifists by nature. On the contrary, the old viking blood runs strongly in their veins. Several times during their history the Scandinavians were the terror of Europe. Furthermore, they have never fought so fiercely as when fighting among themselves. Scandinavia's past history has been largely a record of bloody internecine wars. In fact, these wars have been Scandinavia's chief stumbling-block to political power. Had the Scandinavians united instead of wasting their strength in fratricidal conflicts, they would probably to-day form one of the great nations of the earth. Instead of this, the Scandinavian peoples by their disunion not only lost to more powerful neighbors many lands once belonging to them but also raised between themselves barriers of hatred that tended to drive them still further asunder and made common action extremely difficult.

Among less intelligent peoples this state of things might have gone on indefinitely. That is precisely what has happened among the Balkan peoples, for example, who, having fought each other for centuries, hate each other ferociously and are quite ready to fight again. Not so the Scandinavian peoples. Profiting by the lessons of the past, they have buried old feuds and have learned

to settle their differences without war, and even without bitterness. The task has not been easy, for during the past twenty years alone they have been divided by differences so serious that among other peoples war, or at least lasting rancor, would have been inevitable. It is a true triumph of Scandinavian intelligence that not only has war been avoided but the way in which these disputes have been settled has actually led to increased sympathy and closer co-operation. When we come to view in detail events like the separation of Norway and Sweden and the grant by Denmark of practical independence to Iceland, we can better appreciate their deep significance.

In this connection let us further note that these problems have been solved spontaneously as they arose. No elaborate machinery of conciliation had been erected beforehand to deal with them. No arbitration tribunal, no league, no loss of sovereignty was involved. When the dispute arose, the disputants met one another frankly and decided to sit down and talk matters over. They conducted the discussion like well-bred gentlemen, kept their tempers, avoided rows, and ultimately agreed on a settlement that was lasting and that formed the basis of increasing friendship for the future. How many other nations in this troubled world of ours can say the same?

With such a record of constructive achievement, it is clear that the Scandinavian peoples well merit our close attention. Let us, then, see more in detail what are these Scandinavian lands and what sort of people are their inhabitants.

Scandinavia consists of two peninsulas that almost

touch, one reaching down from the far north, the other jutting up from the mass of Central Europe to the south. The northern peninsula, which is very much the larger in size, is the home of the Norwegians and Swedes. The relatively small southern peninsula, together with its adjacent islands, is peopled by the Danish nation.

Denmark has an area of about 16,000 square miles and a population of a trifle under 3,300,000 souls. Its capital is Copenhagen, a city of nearly 600,000 inhabitants, with a fine port, which is a centre of Baltic commerce. The climate of Denmark is damp and fairly mild, being not unlike that of England. Much of its soil is fertile, and the Danes have made the most of this by building up a remarkable system of dairying and other specialized agricultural pursuits. Denmark has, however, neither mineral wealth nor water-power, and thus lacks the essentials of industrial development. This, together with her small size, sets close limits to her further growth in wealth and population.

Norway and Sweden are each much larger than Denmark, though less fertile, much of their territory being barren plateau or rugged mountains. They are separated from each other by a high mountain range. This is the reason why Norway and Sweden are separate nations. Even to-day, with good roads and railways, there is little land communication between them. Nature has in fact placed them like two men back to back and looking in opposite directions, Norway gazing westward out into the Atlantic Ocean, Sweden gazing eastward over the Baltic Sea. With their cold climates and scarcity of fertile land, neither country has been able to develop a

flourishing agriculture. However, Sweden has considerable mineral wealth, especially iron, while both countries have an abundance of water-power. With the development of hydroelectricity, this water power has been a great source of prosperity and has formed the basis for an important and rapidly growing industrial life. Furthermore, since only a small part of these natural resources has as yet been developed, both countries have great possibilities for future growth in wealth and population. Norway has an area of 125,000 square miles with a population of about 2,700,000. Sweden's area is 173,000 square miles with just under 6,000,000 population.

Such are the three Scandinavian nations. Taken together, they are a group of some importance, covering a considerable area and with a combined population of 12,000,000. Furthermore, there is the adjacent country of Finland, which is so intimately related to Sweden in both blood and culture that, in the broader sense, it may be counted as belonging to the Scandinavian family. If that be done, the population of the Scandinavian group is raised to more than 15,000,000. Lastly, considering the Scandinavian stock in its world aspect, we must remember the immense emigration of Scandinavians to various parts of the world, especially to the United States and Canada. It is probable that something like 3,000,000 of the inhabitants of the United States are of Scandinavian birth or descent.

Here, then, is a group of peoples numbering from 12,000,000 to 15,000,000 souls, solidly planted in the north-west corner of Europe. These peoples are connected by close ties of language and culture. They are also bound

together by the even closer tie of blood, for they are near kin. The Scandinavians are almost all pure-blooded members of the Nordic race—that tall, blond stock which forms the predominant element in the British Isles, the United States, and the self-governing dominions of the British Empire, together with many parts of Europe, like northern Germany, northern France, the Netherlands, and northwestern Russia. The Scandinavians are thus blood brothers of the Anglo-Saxons, and both stocks show to the full those striking qualities of creative energy, political ability, self-reliance, self-control, and common sense that have everywhere distinguished the Nordic race.

Scandinavia is in fact an old Nordic brood land, a reservoir and breeding-ground of Nordic stock, sending forth for ages wave after wave of Nordic migration. Many of the Nordic tribes that overran the Roman Empire and settled the British Isles came from Scandinavia. Pure Scandinavians were the vikings, who not only ranged Europe from Spain to Russia but also fared forth in their tiny ships across the trackless northern ocean, settling Iceland and Greenland, and actually discovering North America, thus anticipating Columbus by 500 years. Strange accident of history! If Leif Ericsen and his Norse rovers had voyaged a little farther southward and had planted a colony that could well have prospered, North America might centuries ago have become a Greater Scandinavia and the whole history of the world would have been changed.

It was not to be. Scandinavia missed her great opportunity overseas. She also lost her European opportunity.

Instead of uniting, the Scandinavian peoples wasted their abounding energies in fratricidal wars that were their common undoing. When we look back on the mediæval might of Denmark and on the power of Sweden from Gustavus Adolphus to Charles XII, it is not too much to say that a united Scandinavia might have forged a Baltic empire that would have endured to this day. Instead of this, the rising empires of Russia and Germany broke Scandinavia's resistance piecemeal, cut away its borderlands, and confined it to its ancient bounds. A century ago the world had practically forgotten the Scandinavian peoples, regarding them as little nations whose day was over and whose very existence would henceforth depend upon the mutual jealousies of powerful neighbors, tempered perhaps by sentimental consideration for a heroic past.

This attitude was not strange, because a century ago the Scandinavian nations seemed to have no future worth speaking of. Their present prosperity is in striking contrast to their past misfortunes. A century ago the Scandinavian countries were profoundly poor, most of their present sources of wealth being either unknown or undeveloped. This poverty was reflected by the sparseness of population, Scandinavia at that time being able to support less than a third of its present inhabitants. And the prospects did not look bright. Sweden, with her cold, frostbound soil, could never hope greatly to extend her cultivable area. Denmark, though possessed of rich farmland, was very small. Norway was but a strip of barren mountains.

Nevertheless, despite all these handicaps, the Scandinavian peoples turned to and showed the stuff that was

in them. Putting behind them the bitter memories of their defeats and their lost provinces, they resolved to make the most of what was left. Applying their inborn energy and intelligence to an intensive development of their natural resources, they soon laid the foundations of their present prosperity.

In all three countries it is the same story of grit, thrift, hard work, and intelligent insight making much of little and turning every new development to full account. Take Denmark, for example. Lacking, as she does, minerals, coal, and water-power, Denmark's one real asset was some good farmland. But there was so little of it that, cultivated in the ordinary way, it would never support a large population. The Danes therefore determined to specialize on high-grade lines for export. Accordingly, they went in for scientific dairying, pedigreed live stock, and certain high-class agricultural specialties. Gradually they built up a marvellous system of production, distribution, and marketing on co-operative lines. It is not too much to say that the Danes have industrialized agriculture. As time passed and western Europe became covered with cities and factories the Danes found an ever-increasing market for their products. The development of cold storage and cheap long-distance ocean transportation threatened to hit them for a while by bringing in competition from distant parts of the world, like North America, Siberia, and China. But the Danes triumphed over this also by concentrating on quality. More and more, Danish butter, Danish eggs, and Danish agricultural specialties got the reputation for being the best on the European markets and thus fetched fancy prices. Danish agricul-

ture is thus the solid foundation of Denmark's economic life, and it is all a triumph of intelligent, skilful planning. Besides her agriculture, Denmark has a large merchant marine and a prosperous fishing fleet, while her industries, though relatively less important, are profitable and high-grade.

Another point that should be noted is Denmark's social soundness and the wide diffusion of prosperity. The Danish countryside is inhabited, not by peasants in the ordinary European sense, but by intelligent, well-educated, prosperous yeomen, owning and loving their land—in other words, farmers in the true American sense of the word. Even in the towns there are not the contrasts between great wealth and grinding poverty observable in many other lands. Furthermore, taxation statistics show that the national wealth is becoming more generally distributed; and this, be it noted, is due to natural economic processes—the Danes are too intelligent to tinker with crank legislation.

Thus Denmark advances steadily despite all the troubles of her European neighbors. It is estimated that the national wealth of Denmark has doubled in the last twenty years. As might be imagined under such circumstances, the health and vigor of the Danish people are excellent. The average expectation of life is fifty-six years for men and fifty-nine years for women. A century ago it was only forty years for men and forty-three for women. This clearly shows the great advance of health and vigor that has taken place during that period. As might be expected, the population shows an increase healthily adjusted to the rate of economic and social progress. At present the

net increase in population is a trifle more than one per cent a year.

The economic development of Norway and Sweden, though different in direction from that of Denmark, is equally striking and equally due to energetic, intelligent foresight. At first this development was largely maritime, both countries building up flourishing merchant marines and fishing fleets. The perfecting of the steamship, for instance, enabled Norway to develop fully possibilities like the Arctic fisheries. Later, Norway began to capitalize her scenery, becoming one of the chief tourist resorts of the world. Every year great floating hotels bring multitudes of travellers to enjoy the beauties of Norway's magnificent fiords and to gaze at the midnight sun. Meanwhile Sweden was fast developing her mineral wealth. Until the age of railroads, steam, and electricity this had been but little exploited, because most of Sweden's minerals, particularly her iron deposits, lie in the far north. To-day Sweden is an important iron-and-steel-producing country, specializing in high-grade lines.

The greatest single factor in the prosperity of Norway and Sweden is, however, the development of water-power. Its importance is comparatively recent. Both these mountainous lands have a multitude of waterfalls and rushing streams; but formerly these, though things of beauty, were of little practical use. The development of electricity, however, entirely changed the situation. Hydro-electric power was now seen to be available in almost limitless quantities, and this white coal, as it has been aptly named, has been increasingly harnessed to a myriad industrial activities, so that both Norway and Sweden

to-day possess a flourishing industrial life. And this may perhaps be still in its infancy, because neither country is at present using more than one-tenth of the total hydro-electric power that is available. The perfecting of long-distance electric-power transmission promises soon to open up a great new source of wealth, since Norway and Sweden will be capable of supplying the power needs of all North-Central Europe.

Economic and social conditions in Norway and Sweden bear a general resemblance to those of Denmark. In both countries the standard of living, health, and education is high. In both countries the national wealth is rapidly increasing and is well distributed, while the rural population consists, as in Denmark, of sturdy, free-spirited yeoman farmers. The population shows a steady, healthy increase of about one per cent a year, and, should the development of natural resources continue at its present rate, large further increases of population can be supported in the future.

Such are the economic and social achievements of the Scandinavian peoples. Let us now examine their political achievements, which have insured their stability and have saved them both from tragic quarrels among themselves and from dangerous feuds with their neighbors. As we have already remarked, these political achievements have been of a high order. During the past twenty years the Scandinavian peoples have to their credit a whole series of successful political settlements that rank among the finest examples of human intelligence, foresight, and self-control.

The first of these political tests was the crisis that arose

between Norway and Sweden, resulting in the separation of the two countries in the year 1905. Though occupying the same peninsula, the Swedes and Norwegians have never been one people. Sundered by a barrier of lofty mountains, they had slight physical contact and accordingly went their respective ways. Such contact as they did have was usually of a hostile nature. For centuries Norway was politically united to Denmark, and loyally supported it in the long series of Dano-Swedish wars. When the Vienna Congress of 1814 remade the map of Europe after the Napoleonic wars, it took Norway away from Denmark and assigned it to Sweden as compensation for Finland, conquered by Russia a few years before. But this diplomatic transfer did not result in a union of hearts. Though Sweden granted the Norwegians practically full autonomy, they remained dissatisfied and chafed at political union with their Swedish neighbors. Chronic disputes culminated in the year 1905, when Norway seceded and proclaimed its independence.

This was rebellion. Sweden was aflame with wrath, especially since most Swedes believed that Norway was guilty of nothing short of treason in face of a common foe—Russia. For Czarist Russia was at that very moment destroying the liberties of Finland, hitherto an autonomous dependency of Russia, but now being brutally transformed into a Russian intrenched camp that threatened all Scandinavia with the shadow of the Russian bear.

For a moment war between Norway and Sweden seemed inevitable. Swedish voices demanded the punishment and subjection of the "traitorous rebels." Norwegian voices

answered bold defiance. Both sides mobilized and made ready for a war that would inevitably have been of a most stubborn and sanguinary character.

But the war did not take place. Intelligent, sober second thought—the inborn heritage of the race—warned instinctively against fatal disaster. Both sides began to figure out the consequences. Cool-headed Swedes soon realized that to hold down Norway against the fixed determination of its people was in the long run impossible. Furthermore, both peoples came to see that such a war, whatever its outcome, would leave them alike at Russia's mercy. Accordingly, the crisis was settled without shedding a drop of blood. Sweden recognized Norway's independence, and Norway gladly accepted Sweden's demand for the total disarmament of their common frontier.

The results of this peaceful settlement were of the happiest nature. Within a few years all traces of mutual bitterness had vanished. On the contrary, since causes of friction had been removed, the two peoples began looking at their common interests. The Russian peril was a powerful promoter of kindred feeling. When the Great War broke out in 1914 both countries made haste to affirm their friendship, for, simultaneously with their declarations of neutrality, they formally agreed that under no circumstances should one country take hostile action against the other.

An even more remarkable example of intelligent forbearance was shown in the settlement of the Danish-Icelandic controversy. Iceland, that strange land of snow-fields and volcanoes lying in the remote recesses of the Arctic Ocean, was settled more than 1,000 years ago by

rebel vikings refusing obedience to the first Norwegian kings. Eventually brought under Norwegian control, Iceland passed with Norway under Danish rule; but when Norway was joined to Sweden in 1814, Iceland remained under the Danish crown. It may seem strange that the sparse population of this forbidding land—only 90,000 souls—should have cherished separatist feelings; yet such was the case. The old Norse love of freedom was in the blood, and as time passed the Icelanders, despite wide autonomy, chafed under Danish overlordship, precisely as their Norwegian brethren did at political union with the Swedes.

Here, if ever, was a test of Scandinavian forbearance and self-control. A handful of people scattered along the shores of a distant and barren island were asserting their claim to independence against a wealthy nation of 3,000,000. Denmark could have crushed Iceland at a stroke. In fact, dependent as the island is on imported food-stuffs, a mere blockade of its ports would have starved the Icelanders into submission.

Yet the Danes never even considered such measures. The dispute was temperately argued out, and a solution was finally arrived at satisfactory to both sides. By the Act of Union of November 30, 1918, Iceland was declared to be a free sovereign state, united with Denmark by a personal bond of union under the same king. Certain matters, especially foreign affairs, are conducted by Denmark; but the act may be revised in the year 1940 at the option of the contracting parties.

This settlement, like that between Norway and Sweden, is producing the happiest results, both Danes and Ice-

landers experiencing an increase in mutual regard and common aspiration toward larger Scandinavian interests.

These two examples show how Scandinavia has solved her internal problems of political readjustment. They certainly merit the attention of thinking people everywhere. Yet no less worthy of the world's attention is Scandinavia's attitude toward her neighbors, particularly regarding lost or unredeemed territories. One of the most disquieting and discouraging aspects of present-day Europe is the fierce clash of imperialistic appetites displayed by most of the European nations. This is not a matter of size; some of the small nations are more greedy and reckless than the larger ones. In certain cases the claims advanced by nationalistic propagandas are based on the most absurd perversions of history, or even upon the brazen argument of strategic frontiers. Some of the arguments would be laughable if they were not so tragic. Territories lost centuries ago are to be redeemed, ancient defeats are to be avenged, long-established borders must be rectified. The Versailles Peace Conference, at the end of the Great War, was turned into a perfect bedlam by the wild cries of greedy propagandists after all they could get regardless of consequences, and too many of these unsound claims were, alas, allowed; the upshot being that Europe is to-day cursed by a whole crop of nationalistic troubles threatening new wars.

In striking contrast to all this stands the attitude of Scandinavia. Not that Scandinavia lacks such claims if she cared to raise them. The Scandinavian nations have lost many territories to neighboring states. In two cases the loss was comparatively recent and still keenly felt.

These were Sweden's loss of Finland to Russia in 1809 and Denmark's loss of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia in 1864. At the close of the late war Denmark and Sweden both had opportunities to regain at least portions of these lost territories. Let us see how they conducted themselves. Their attitude is in such refreshing contrast to that of most other European nations that it well merits our attention.

Consider first the case of Schleswig-Holstein. This borderland between Denmark and Germany was conquered by Prussia in the year 1864. The southern province—Holstein—is thoroughly German in blood and speech. The northern province—Schleswig—is predominately German in its southern part but the northern portion, adjoining Denmark, is mostly Danish in blood and language, while there is a considerable Danish element in the central portion as well. By the peace of 1864 it was agreed that a plebiscite should be held in north Schleswig in order that the inhabitants might themselves decide their political allegiance. Prussia, however, disregarded this proviso. The plebiscite was never held and the Danish districts were ruthlessly Germanized.

Denmark thus had a first-class grievance, which was recognized by the Versailles Conference. Indeed, a considerable body of public opinion in the Allied countries, particularly in France, urged the Danes to assert their historic rights to all Schleswig-Holstein. If Denmark had said the word she could probably have had both provinces for the asking. Imagine what would have happened if such an opportunity had been offered most European nations! But not the sane, far-seeing Scandinavians! The

bulk of Danish public opinion rejected such suggestions without a moment's hesitation. To poison their national life by annexing more than 1,000,000 recalcitrant Germans and to hang about Denmark's neck the millstone of a German war of revenge was clean against Danish common sense. Danish feeling crystallized in a popular slogan: All that is Danish. No More and No Less!

That was the watchword, and thus was it settled. The destiny of Schleswig was determined by the free vote of its inhabitants. The province was divided into three zones, each zone to vote separately. In fact, before the vote was held, the Danish Government voluntarily ruled the southern zone out of consideration as being clearly German, thus avoiding the unnecessary friction that the holding of a vote might have caused. Ultimately the northern zone voted for union with Denmark by a vote of three to one. The middle zone, on the contrary, voted to remain German by more than two to one. This result was, of course, disappointing to Denmark. There was even some talk of disregarding the vote and annexing the territory. But the bulk of Danish public opinion refused to be stampeded: All that is Danish. No More and No Less! That was what the Danish people had promised, and they kept their word.

The next notable instance of Scandinavian moderation was the attitude of Sweden in the Åland Islands controversy. This rocky archipelago lies in the Baltic Sea midway between Sweden and Finland. Sweden ceded the Ålands to Russia along with Finland in 1809, but always regretted their loss, since they virtually dominate Sweden's capital, Stockholm. When Finland declared its

independence after the Russian revolution of 1917, the inhabitants of the Åland Islands, who are of pure Swedish blood, declared that they wanted to go back to Sweden rather than to form part of the new Finnish state. Naturally, Swedish public opinion warmly favored the recovery of the Ålands. But the Finns strongly objected, declaring that the islands formed part of their country. The question was warmly debated on both sides, considerable bitterness developed, and there was even talk of war. Sweden was so much stronger than Finland that she could have seized the islands at will. But Sweden resisted the temptation.

Here again Scandinavian common sense and far-sightedness prevailed. Sweden's true policy was to make fast friends with Finland and bind Finland to the Scandinavian family of nations, where she really belonged, thus banishing the Russian peril. To seize the Ålands would embitter Finland and perhaps drive her back into Russia's arms. Accordingly, Sweden offered to submit the matter to arbitration, and the case was tried by the League of Nations. The League awarded the Ålands to Finland on condition that they be permanently neutralized and that their inhabitants be granted full autonomy. Another victory for peace and sanity had been won.

Such is the record of the Scandinavian peoples in their dealings both with one another and with their neighbors. It is a brilliant record that may well be pondered not merely by Europe but by the whole world. It is also a striking display of those inborn qualities of intelligent foresight, high political ability, self-control, and common sense that are the birthright of the great Nordic race, to

which the Scandinavians belong. These things did not happen by chance; they happened because they were thought out and carried out by well-bred brains. Once again the fundamental importance of race in human affairs is clearly shown.

It is interesting to note that this basic fact is consciously appreciated in Scandinavia, perhaps more generally than anywhere else. More and more, Scandinavian public opinion is realizing the true significance of race, as distinguished from other factors, like language and nationality, which elsewhere are apt to confuse the issue.

This growing appreciation of the racial idea is producing excellent results.

It is drawing the Scandinavian blood brothers into a closer and more intimate association. It is also inspiring them with a heightened desire to do their utmost in saving the threatened fabric of European civilization.

And surely the Scandinavian peoples are capable of playing a part in Europe's reconstruction far greater than might appear from their mere size and population. One of the things that the whole world needs to learn is the fact that quality is much more important than quantity. In Scandinavia we surely have quality. Here are fully 12,000,000 people, racially homogeneous and of an unusually high grade; intelligent, progressive, and prosperous; with no serious internal differences and no external foes. Certainly, Scandinavia is to-day the brightest spot on the Continent of Europe.

CHAPTER IV

COMPOSITE FRANCE

FRANCE is in many ways a land of paradox. Viewed from afar or seen by the passing traveller, she presents a surface appearance that is deceptive. Things are frequently not what they seem and outward semblance does not correspond to inner reality. More perhaps than in any other European country, one must get below the surface to understand the true trend of affairs.

The first impression which France gives the stranger is that of intense unity. A compact country, with a centralized government, an old civilization, and a special culture, both land and people have a marked French stamp which is unmistakable wherever you cross the French frontier.

And when you come to meet Frenchmen this impression of unity is deepened. In manners, habits, and ordinary conversation Frenchmen seem alike. Above all, they are strongly nationalistic. Almost without exception, Frenchmen profess an ardent national patriotism. They are forever talking and writing about it. "La France" and "la Patrie"—the Fatherland—are words continually on French lips. Furthermore, Frenchmen emphasize the unity of their country. "France, one and indivisible," is a stock phrase. Lastly, this unitary doctrine is reflected in the centralization that characterizes every phase of French national life. Government, finance,

education, art, and literature—all are centred in Paris, the mighty capital. Seeing these things, what wonder if most foreign observers come to think of the French as a homogeneous people, essentially of one stock?

That, at least, is the prevailing idea concerning France and the French. And yet it is very far from being the case. The truth of the matter is that the French are a nation but not a race. France is in fact a good example of national, as distinguished from racial, unity. This does not mean that the French nation is likely to break up. But it does mean that French unity lacks the racial element. And this lack the French instinctively feel to be a weakness and a possible source of danger to their national life. That is just the reason why they are always stressing their unity and why they favor extreme centralization. When people keep emphasizing something as supremely desirable it is a pretty good sign that they are not quite sure of it. We do not congratulate ourselves on the air we breathe; we just breathe it and take it for granted.

Compare France with its neighbor England. Both are strongly marked nations. The chief difference is that England has racial unity while France has not. Englishmen are overwhelmingly of one stock—the Nordic race. The population of France, on the other hand, is highly composite; it is made up of all three of the European races. This difference in the racial make-up of France and England explains in great part why the two peoples are so different in past history and present outlook. England's development has been at once more stable and more consistent; English party quarrels have been less bitter, while there has never been a violent breach with the past like that

of the French Revolution. Also, English nationality has been mainly a spontaneous growth, a natural evolution; whereas French nationality has been largely due to external causes like foreign invasion, combined with conscious efforts of the French ruling classes to weld the country into a strong political unity. England was a nation long before France, yet the process was so normal and imperceptible that Englishmen have never thought or talked much about it. In France, however, national unity was attained only after great difficulties, so that in France nationality became a conscious principle, inspiring passionate zeal of an almost religious character. It was revolutionary France that proclaimed the doctrine of nationality, which asserts that national feeling is more powerful than blood in binding men together.

This doctrine has profoundly affected the thought not merely of France but of the whole world, and is still widely believed. However, the discoveries of modern science are undermining its authority. We now know that nationality is at bottom merely a state of mind, which may conceal but cannot really abolish those profound differences of instinct, temperament, and intelligence that are inborn in persons of different racial stocks.

France herself is the best proof of this. Despite the fact that for generations everything has been done to break down local distinctions and to unify her population, the inhabitants of various parts of France differ from one another in many important ways. French investigators of racial matters admit this frankly. Says the well-known French writer, Gustave Le Bon:

"In France, the Provençal is very different from the

Breton, the inhabitant of Auvergne from the inhabitant of Normandy. Unfortunately, these types are very distinct as regards their ideas and character. It is difficult in consequence to devise institutions which shall suit them all equally well, and it is only by dint of energetic concentration that it is possible to lend them some community of thought. Our profound divergences of sentiment and belief, and the political upheavals which result therefrom, are due, in the main, to differences of mental constitution."

As a matter of fact, the policy of centralizing everything in Paris has produced grave disadvantages, which have led some Frenchmen to advocate granting local self-government and encouraging intellectual life in the provinces instead of draining it all to the capital. This is the movement known as regionalism. But regionalism is viewed with disfavor verging on alarm both by the bulk of French public opinion and by the government. Clemenceau voiced this uneasiness very well when he said of regionalism:

"It might correct those evils of excessive centralization from which we have suffered and still suffer so cruelly. And yet, somehow, we feel that if we relaxed our unifying bonds, France might well be lost."

It is interesting to note that the French dislike to admit the importance of race in human affairs. Most Frenchmen still cling to the old doctrine of nationality, and even deny that racial differences amount to much. Leading French students of racial matters like De Lapouge and Le Bon have told me personally that their writings are not only unpopular but have often been condemned as down-

right unpatriotic in official circles. This reveals a state of mind in the French people which is of unquestionable importance to the world at large. France's insistence upon nationalism and minimizing of race, though due primarily to her internal political situation, affects strongly her attitude toward her vast colonial empire in Africa and accounts largely for policies like the creation of her Black Army for service in Europe, which we will later examine more in detail.

Although the three races which make up France's population have been settled there for ages, they have not intermarried to the extent which might be imagined, but still remain largely segregated in different regions. The reason for this is found in the geography of the country. Geographically speaking, France divides into three parallel zones, running east and west. Northern France is mainly plain and valley country, open and fertile. Southern France is of somewhat similar character. Between these two well-favored regions thrusts an intermediate zone of relatively barren mountains, highlands, and plateaus, stretching clear across Central France from the Alps to Brittany. However, this barrier is not absolute; it is broken by two corridors of fertile lowland, which form natural highways between north and south. The broader of these corridors runs down through France from the open valleys and wide plains around Paris until it reaches the plain country about Bordeaux. The second corridor cuts down through Eastern France, narrowing to the valley of the River Rhone and then broadening out into the coastal plains that fringe the Mediterranean Sea.

These corridors through the upland belt together form

one of the keys to French history. If they had not existed, if the upland zone had been unbroken, there would have been no France, but rather two, or even three, separate nations. Along those two natural highways invading hosts have passed easily northward or southward, as the case might be, conquering the whole of France and thus bringing north and south under the same sway. But on the other hand, the presence of that intermediate upland belt has broken the full sweep of these invasions, restricted the numbers of the invaders, and thus prevented a general mixture of conquerors and conquered. Race lines have in fact always tended to follow geographical lines.

Both racially and geographically, present-day France can be described much as Cæsar described ancient Gaul—divided into three parts.

It is really extraordinary when we observe how closely the racial make-up of Gaul—the ancient name for France—corresponds to the racial make-up of France to-day. Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterraneans were then grouped geographically much as they are now. When Cæsar conquered Gaul, and thus brought it out of the twilight of barbarism into the light of world history, he found the south inhabited mainly by the slender, dark-complexioned race known as Mediterranean, the north mainly inhabited by the tall, blond race known as Nordic, while the intermediate uplands were occupied by the stocky, round-headed Alpine race, living in subjection to a Nordic aristocracy which had conquered the uplands a short time before and were beginning to push down through the fertile corridors between the uplands to the conquest of the Mediterranean south.

Cæsar's conquest of Gaul illustrates another striking feature of French history—the sudden shifts of fortune suffered by its various racial elements. Cæsar's conquest is in fact merely one of a long series of changes in the balance of power from the hands of one racial element to those of another which is still going on. To-day, for example, the Alpine element in the French population is gaining so rapidly at the expense of both Nordics and Mediterraneans that the process must, unless speedily checked, produce profound changes in every phase of French national life.

This rapid rise of the Alpine element in present-day France is all the more interesting because it is the first time since the dawn of history that such a thing has happened. For ages the French Alpines have been continuously dominated by either the Nordic or Mediterranean elements. This Alpine stock, relatively passive and unintelligent, but extremely tenacious, has hitherto formed the solid yet humble base of the French social system. Hard-working, thrifty, clinging to the soil, caring little for politics, and contributing little to either art or ideas, the French Alpine has been the typical peasant, the man with the hoe, accepting stolidly the rule of more active and intelligent stocks, yet surviving doggedly the worst misfortunes and increasing rapidly in numbers whenever conditions have not been too unfavorable. More than once the Alpine element has been crowded back upon the poor and infertile uplands which from time immemorial have been its strongholds. But there it has stood its ground, multiplied, and spread out again when circumstances changed in its favor. Now for the past century a

number of causes have favored the Alpines as never before, the result being that to-day this element is more numerous than the Nordic and Mediterranean put together, and bids fair to turn France within a few generations into a land overwhelmingly Alpine in race.

The full significance of this racial change will be better appreciated if we glance backward at the racial changes of the past. When Cæsar and his legions invaded Gaul the Nordics were the dominant element. The Roman conquest, however, radically altered the situation. The Nordic Gauls put up a furious resistance, were slaughtered or enslaved wholesale, and were permanently broken. On the other hand, their Alpine subjects did little fighting, submitted to Roman rule, and continued to be the peasantry under the new order as they had been under the old. The real gainers were the Mediterranean elements. Welcoming the Romans, who were blood kin, they took naturally to Roman civilization. During the five centuries of Roman rule Gaul became increasingly Mediterraneanized. The many cities and towns which sprang up were inhabited mainly by Mediterraneans, drawn not only from Gaul but from other parts of the Roman world. Then came another dramatic shift of fortune. Roman civilization decayed and finally collapsed beneath a flood of Nordic barbarians pouring down from Germany. The cities and towns were ravaged, and with them perished most of their Mediterranean inhabitants. The Mediterranean element in France was again confined to the south. The north was once more stocked with a Nordic population, which spread as a conquering aristocracy over the central uplands and even into the southern plains. As

for the Alpine peasantry, they bowed their heads to the storm and again became the serfs of Nordic masters, just as they had been before Cæsar's day.

For a thousand years France was a predominantly Nordic land. The ruling classes were everywhere mainly Nordic in blood and set the tone to French life. It is striking to note how different the French spirit was in the Middle Ages from what it is now. There was then an individualistic energy, a fierce self-assertiveness, and a richness of local life which are rare in the centralized, regulated France of to-day. That was the Nordic spirit, stimulated by a dash of Mediterranean blood. In all this the Alpine peasant had practically no share.

Nordic ascendancy in France continued down to the French Revolution, a little more than a century ago. And yet long before the revolution France had been getting steadily less Nordic and more Alpine, this racial shift being revealed by subtle changes in both spirit and institutions. The main reason for Nordic decline was the endless series of foreign, civil, and religious wars which raged for centuries. In France, as elsewhere, war proved to be the Nordic's worst enemy. A born soldier, the Nordic always does most of the fighting and suffers most of the losses. Another reason for Nordic decline was the establishment of despotic monarchy. It is a significant fact that in their struggle for power the French kings found their staunchest allies among the largely Alpine middle classes, while their bitterest enemies were the free-spirited, individualistic Nordic aristocracy. To be sure, when the king had broken their resistance he did not destroy the aristocrats, but turned them into idle courtiers loaded

with honors and privileges. Yet this was merely a subtle way of ruining them, because they thereby became social parasites hated by the people.

Then the monarchy itself decayed, and after that came the revolution. Although political in form, the French Revolution had a racial aspect far more important than is usually realized. It was largely a revolt of the Alpine and Mediterranean elements against the Nordic ruling class. The revolutionary leaders openly boasted that they were avenging themselves on the descendants of the Nordic Franks, who had dominated them since the fall of Rome. As a revolutionary orator shouted in a memorable speech against the aristocrats, "Let us send them back to their German marshes, whence they came!" Eye-witnesses of the Reign of Terror have left us vivid pictures of how the dark-haired mob surging around the guillotine yelled with special delight whenever the executioner would hold up the head of some French lady, swinging the head by its long blond tresses for the amusement of the crowd.

The revolution marks, indeed, a turning-point in the racial history of France. It started that rapid decline of the Nordic element which is still in full swing. Not only was the Nordic aristocracy hopelessly broken but the Nordic strain in the general population was weeded out faster than ever. The revolution caused a series of terrible wars, which were continued under Napoleon. For twenty-three years France was fighting most of Europe. Millions of Frenchmen perished on the battle-field, and, as usual, the Nordics were the worst sufferers. It has been shown that at the end of this war period the average stature of French

army recruits had been lowered nearly four inches. This is striking proof of how the tall Nordics had been weeded out of the population in favor of the shorter Alpine and Mediterranean elements.

Although a clear majority of the French population is to-day Alpine in race the minority elements still play a greater part in the national life than their mere numbers would indicate. This is particularly true in certain fields. Nordics contribute most to science and invention, while in literature and art honors are shared between Nordics and Mediterraneans. On the other hand, politics and government are falling more and more into Alpine hands, as is natural for a majority under democratic political institutions. In fact, the general tone of French national life is becoming increasingly Alpine in character. This unquestionably makes for solidity. Yet many French writers deplore the lack of individual initiative and the reliance upon the state which the average Frenchman displays.

Both the virtues and the shortcomings of the Alpine temperament come out most clearly in the French peasantry, which is mainly Alpine in blood. Hard-working, thrifty, solid, but limited in imaginative vision and creative intelligence, the French peasant remains what he has always been. The difference lies not in himself but in the fact that modern political and economic conditions have made him a greater power in the nation than was formerly the case. The French peasantry was never so prosperous as it is to-day. Furthermore, it is the most numerous occupational group in the nation. We must remember that France never industrialized herself like England and Germany, where the bulk of the population now lives in cities

and towns. In France a majority of the population still lives in the country. According to the last census, of France's 39,000,000 inhabitants only 18,000,000 live under urban conditions, while 21,000,000 live on the land.

This means that France grows enough foodstuffs to feed her own population, and that, unlike England and Germany, she is not dependent for her very life upon selling the products of her industry in foreign markets. Indeed, France's whole economic system is very different from that of her more industrialized neighbors. British and German industry is based upon the principle of mass production for foreign markets. French industry, so far as staple manufactures are concerned, is based upon limited production behind a high tariff wall primarily for the home market. And French production is further limited by the home demand for high quality coupled with long wear. This is where the French view-point differs radically from ours. The Frenchman hates to scrap anything. Whether it be a single machine or a whole factory, his idea is to buy a well-made article and then use it until it is absolutely worn out. Even if it gets behind the times, he cannot bear to throw it away. Under such circumstances French manufactured staples have not been able to compete in the world market with British, German, or American staples, and France's typical exports have remained high-grade specialties such as ladies' fashions, silks, perfumes, wines, and other articles in which France has more or less of a monopoly advantage.

French business and finance have much the same character as French industry. The French merchant and the French investor do not like to take risks. They prefer

safety to chances of big profits—and big losses. Frenchmen like to salt down their thrifty savings in gilt-edged securities like government bonds. The recent decline of the French franc, threatening as it does the value of all investments, has been a great shock to the French people; and if anything like a collapse of the franc should take place, the political and social consequences might be nothing short of catastrophic.

This profound uneasiness among the great French investing public—and it must be remembered that in proportion to her population France has a greater number of small investors than any other country—is only part of the general shaking up which the war has caused. The casual observer may not see much of this, but the truth is that below the well-ordered surface of French national life important developments are taking place.

France to-day stands at a momentous parting of the ways. Before the late war her national life was, so to speak, geared low. Refraining from thoroughly industrializing herself like England and Germany, maintaining a balance between town and country, and with a stationary population, France led a stable, well-balanced existence. This balance the war and the peace combined to shatter in two different ways. France is to-day both much weaker and much stronger than she was in 1914. She is much weaker in blood and wealth; she is much stronger in political and military power. Let us cast our eyes over this singular balance sheet and note the possible results.

The late war was a frightful blood-letting for France. At the beginning of 1914 the population of France was

39,700,000. From this population nearly 8,000,000 men were mobilized during the war years. Of these 1,400,000 were killed and 3,000,000 were wounded. Of the wounded, more than 800,000 were left permanent physical wrecks. Thus fully 2,000,000 men—mostly drawn from the flower of French manhood—were killed or hopelessly incapacitated. In addition to this the civilian population suffered heavy losses. The result is that the last census—1921—showed a net decrease of over 2,000,000 inhabitants. Of course, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine brought in 1,700,000 people. Nevertheless, even including Alsace-Lorraine, the population of France is 500,000 below what it was when the war broke out.

And, of course, the mere numbers of the dead are no test of the seriousness of the losses, because, as already stated, the killed included so large a proportion of the very flower of France. The drain on French vitality and ability has been simply incalculable. Frenchmen continually stress this melancholy fact. A leading French university professor said to me sadly:

"Nine-tenths of the rising generation of intellectuals who should now be coming to the fore—that is, men in the early thirties—are dead. Old men like myself feel as though we were in an intellectual desert. We look about in vain for successors to whom we may hand on the torch of learning."

And one of France's best-known political figures remarked to me grimly:

"You see, our surviving generations are seeking to bridge the gulf of death. I, an old man of seventy, am working like a man of forty; and I tell my grandson, aged

fourteen, that he must jump into his profession five years ahead of normal."

The most serious aspect of the situation is that, owing to France's low birth-rate, her vital losses will take a very long time to be repaired. In fast-breeding countries the ravages of war can be effaced, so far as numbers are concerned, in a generation. In France, however, population has long been practically stationary, and there are no signs of any marked betterment in the situation. It took France more than a century to increase her population 40 per cent. In fact the total number of births per year has actually fallen. In the year 1801, 904,000 babies were born in France. In the year 1901, the number of births had fallen to 857,000, although the population was 40 per cent greater than it had been a century before, and the number of births at the old rate should thus have been 1,266,000. The reason why France's population had increased notwithstanding the falling birth-rate was due mainly to a corresponding fall in the death-rate. It was also due to the growing number of foreigners who had entered the country. The foreign element in France is much larger than is usually imagined. In the year 1861 the foreign element numbered less than 400,000; in 1911 it had risen to 1,100,000; in 1921 it was nearly 1,600,000. Nearly one-third of these are Italians, with Belgians and Spaniards also contributing large quotas. Many Frenchmen are decidedly uneasy over this large foreign element, which they consider a possible danger to French national and cultural unity.

Such is France's population problem. And when we turn to her financial situation we find it likewise in serious

shape. Even before the war the French Government was not paying its way. Every year saw considerable deficits in the budget, which were covered by floating bonds that were readily absorbed by the French investing public, which, as we have already seen, has a strong liking for safe securities. The French have always hated high taxation, particularly direct taxes—before the war France had no income tax—and the government naturally took the easier way of issuing bonds rather than rousing unpopularity by imposing new taxes. This was all very well for a while, but it could not go on forever. At the beginning of 1914, the French national debt was 34,000,000,000 francs, the largest per capita debt in Europe, which swallowed almost three-fourths of the annual revenue to pay interest charges.

Then came the war, and France's financial condition, which had already been dubious, became infinitely worse. In contrast to Britain, which promptly imposed tremendous taxes and partly paid for the war as she went along, France financed herself almost entirely by new loans coupled with a partial inflation of her currency. The proportion of war expenses paid out of current revenue was infinitesimal—less than one-tenth of 1 per cent. The result was that at the end of the war France's national debt had grown to 147,000,000,000 francs. Still France made no real effort to balance her budget by drastic taxation on the English scale, and her debt grew even faster than during the war. To-day France's national debt stands at about 330,000,000,000 francs—practically ten times her debt in 1914, while her currency has been inflated to nearly seven times the amount in circulation in 1914.

No wonder that the franc has fallen! To be sure, this fall of the franc has so alarmed the French people that it is getting ready to stand really drastic taxation. Nevertheless, even the new taxation programme which has been proposed will cover only a little more than half of France's annual expenses; so the national debt will continue to mount and the financial situation will get still worse.

Such is the debit side of France's national balance sheet. With a decimated stationary population, and with a debt so crushing as to threaten possible national bankruptcy, it is clear that the war has drained France of blood and treasure so terribly that in both respects she is much weaker than she was ten years ago.

However, there is a credit side to the ledger. Whatever her losses, the fact remains that France won the war and that the peace treaties gave her such political and military power that she stands to-day the strongest nation on the European Continent. Her army is the finest war machine in existence, while the system of alliances that she has built up, stretching from Belgium to Poland, dominates the Continent, at least for the time being. Lastily, it must not be forgotten that France possesses a great colonial empire, second only to Britain's, including as it does vast areas in Africa, rich portions of Asia, and desirable bits in other parts of the world.

Present-day France is thus a strange combination of great weakness and great strength. And this, as already remarked, means for France a momentous parting of the ways. Two roads lie open to her. On the one hand lies the path of conservative foreign policy and domestic reconstruction along traditional lines. On the other hand

lies the path of expansive policy, both foreign and domestic, which if successful would make France politically and industrially a great world power, as Germany was before the war and as Britain is to-day. If France follows the conservative path she will endeavor to become once more the rather self-centred but stable and moderately prosperous nation that she was before the war. If France decides to tread the ambitious path, this will mean not only a great change in her political relations with other nations but also a profound transformation of her own internal economic and social life. We have seen that hitherto France's economic system has been characterized by a balance between manufacturing and agriculture, between town and country; that she has refrained from extreme industrialization and consequent vital dependence upon exports to foreign markets. If France abandons this system for that of mass production of industrial staples for the world market, she will have to do precisely what England did a century ago and what Germany did half a century ago. The outstanding features of such a policy would be retention at all risks of her present political and military dominance on the Continent of Europe, and competition, sharp and general, in the world market with great industrial nations like Britain and America, not to mention rising industrial nations like Italy and Japan—and Germany, if she recovers her former industrial strength.

All this plays a great part in producing the mood of uncertainty and uneasiness which is so evident in French public opinion to-day. Consciously or instinctively, most Frenchmen feel that they are passing through a highly critical transition period and that decisions now taken

may involve momentous consequences for good or for ill. Foreign observers make a mistake in fixing their attention upon particular issues like reparations and security. Important though these matters undoubtedly are, they form merely part of a larger whole.

It is interesting to talk with Frenchmen these days and to observe the sharp contrasts of opinion and of mood. Paradoxical though it may seem, such contrasting ideas and sentiments are often held by the same individual. I have heard a Frenchman start conversation with expressions of high confidence in France's position and prospects and a few minutes later fall into deep pessimism. This, of course, arises from the unusual combination of strength and weakness which we have already seen to be the basic feature of France's situation.

Another point insufficiently appreciated outside France is the extent to which its colonial empire figures in French calculations. France possesses the second-largest colonial empire in the world, Britain alone surpassing her in this respect. Indeed, in some ways France's colonial possessions constitute more of an empire than do Britain's. The vast assemblage of lands and peoples under the British flag are rapidly evolving into a loose-knit association of semi-independent nations. The territories and populations under the French flag, on the other hand, form a colonial empire in the old-fashioned sense, closely subordinated to the home government and surrounded by a high tariff wall which makes them frankly a preserve for French trade and commerce. Another point of difference between the French and British colonial empires is that none of the French colonies contain large populations

of French blood. Algeria alone possesses a considerable French element—about 500,000—yet even this is only one-tenth of the total population. Most of France's colonial possessions are tropical or semi-tropical lands inhabited by non-white races. These possessions are, however, very extensive. In Southeastern Asia—Indo-China—France has a rich and populous group of colonies, while in Africa she owns a vast domain. Practically the whole northwestern quarter of the African continent is under the French flag—a region nearly twice as large as the United States and with fully 35,000,000 inhabitants. The total population of France's colonial empire is a trifle more than 62,000,000.

For a long time France regarded her colonial possessions chiefly in an economic sense, the idea being that they would form a close economic unit which might ultimately be self-sufficing, the colonies absorbing France's exports and capital while furnishing France in return with the bulk of her imported raw materials and tropical products. But about a generation ago France woke up to the potential value of her colonies in the political and military sense—as reservoirs of soldiers which would increase French power both at the diplomatic council table and upon the battle-field. For the past twenty years France has been raising larger and larger contingents of colonial troops, especially in Africa, where both the brown-skinned Arab and Berber populations of the northern regions and the negro tribes to the south contain much excellent fighting material. The process was accelerated by the late war, when France raised hundreds of thousands of soldiers in Africa and Indo-China, shipping them to Europe, where

they did good service. And this was not a mere war measure; it has been established as a fixed principle of French policy. In the present French military system nearly 200,000 African and Asiatic troops are included, part of whom are quartered in France, while in time of war their numbers could be expanded to something like 1,000,000. A large section of French public opinion frankly admits that they intend to exploit their colonial man-power to the uttermost and to make it the corner-stone of French military strength. Not long ago General Mangin, one of the pioneers in the creation of France's African army, asserted that "our colonial empire may be welded into one whole with France herself, and our power of expansion in the whole world thus increased." And about the same time Premier Poincaré stated that France was no longer a nation of 40,000,000, but a nation of 100,000,000.

From a strictly military view-point these calculations are justified. But from the political view-point there are serious disadvantages. France's avowed intention of exploiting her colored colonial man-power for use in Europe is rousing fear and antagonism in Europe and is cooling friendly feeling for France in other parts of the world.

In England and Italy hostility to France's colonial military policy is widespread. Prominent Englishmen and Italians have assured me that neither country would long tolerate a policy which they considered a menace to the very heart of European civilization. The recent understanding between Italy and Spain was undoubtedly furthered by common dislike of France's African policies. As for Britain, this is one more count in the serious differences which exist between her and France. Typical of

British feeling is this comment on General Mangin's speech by a leading English newspaper, the *Manchester Guardian*:

"It does not need much imagination to understand the horrors that would be brought upon Europe if European nations came to rely on the weapon that General Mangin brandishes before the world. A Europe with black garri-sons would symbolize a civilization even more desperately retrograde and despairing than a Europe armed to the teeth. White conscription would mean a Europe without hope, but black conscription would mean a Europe without self-respect."

Here again we come back to the truth which we have already observed—the striking contrast of strength and weakness that characterizes France's present situation. I have never heard it expressed better than it was by a clever French diplomat, who said to me: "You want to know what I think of my country's position to-day? I'll tell you. It's just about what it was at the height of Napoleon's power—outwardly brilliant, inwardly dangerous."

One of the most serious miscalculations which many Frenchmen make is in regarding their country as precisely what it was in the past. That, of course, is an error of which other nations are guilty, notably the Germans; but it is a mistake which, wherever made, is apt to be very costly. The fact is that neither outwardly nor inwardly is France what she was in the days of her greatest power under Louis XIV and Napoleon. In those days France was in every respect the strongest nation in Europe. Take the factor of population alone. Under Louis XIV,

France had three times the population of Britain, twice the population of Germany, and almost twice the population of Russia. To-day Britain and Germany have much larger populations than France, while Russia outnumbers her nearly five to one. Of course, Frenchmen see this and are mobilizing Africa to redress the balance, yet in so doing they may be also adding such counterweights of fear and hatred that in the end the scales will run still more heavily against them than they do now.

And even more important, though less evident, is the question of the internal make-up of the French people to-day as compared with past times. We have already noted the striking racial changes which have been going on in France, and which have resulted in the rapid rise of the Alpine at the expense of the Nordic and Mediterranean elements. For the first time in French history power is definitely passing into Alpine hands, backed by a clear majority of the population. This rise of the Alpine element has already produced distinct changes in the national life.

How will the Nordic and Mediterranean minorities accommodate themselves to these increasing changes? Already many of the internal strains in French national life are unquestionably due to this subtle yet powerful factor of racial readjustment. Can an Alpinized France be a world power? However solid their qualities, the Alpines have never shone as empire builders. Again, will the highly centralized French national fabric remain unaltered? Such are some of the questions which the France of to-morrow will have to face.

CHAPTER V

THE MEDITERRANEAN SOUTH

ONE of the most wide-spread errors which exist to-day is the belief in a Latin race. The traditional idea is that southwestern Europe is Latin; that France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal are sister nations inhabited by peoples of kindred blood. This idea has, to be sure, strongly influenced the course of European politics on many occasions; and yet it is a delusion. The truth of the matter is that there is no such thing as a Latin race, but that, on the contrary, the so-called Latin peoples differ widely from one another in racial make-up. In a previous chapter we observed the racially composite character of France. In the present chapter we shall examine the racial make-ups of Italy, Spain, and Portugal and shall note the practical consequences.

Viewing these countries from the racial angle, the first thing that strikes our notice is the fact that in all three countries a large proportion of the population belongs to the Mediterranean race—the slender, dark-complexioned stock which thousands of years ago occupied the lands bordering the Mediterranean Sea and has ever since remained the most numerous element in those regions. However, we should note two things: in the first place, we must not confuse the terms “Mediterranean” and “Latin”; in the second place, we must realize that the original Mediterranean stock has been greatly modified

during its long history, so that it has come to vary widely at different times and in different places.

Loose usage of the words "Mediterranean" and "Latin" has caused endless confusion, and the distinction between the meaning of the two terms must be clearly understood before the actual state of affairs in southwestern Europe can be appreciated. The term "Mediterranean" has a purely racial meaning and refers, as already stated, to the slender, dark-complexioned stock which, in very ancient times, settled the lands about the Mediterranean Sea and also pushed northward across France to the British Isles, where it still survives, especially in Wales and Ireland. The word "Latin," on the other hand, is not a racial but a historical and cultural term harking back to Roman days. Central Italy was the Roman homeland, and with the growth of Roman power the Latin language and Latin culture spread over southwestern Europe. Not merely all Italy, but also France, Spain, and Portugal were thoroughly Latinized, and to-day the peoples of those countries speak tongues and possess cultures alike derived from the old Latin source.

Unquestionably these similar languages and cultures are ties making for sympathetic understanding among the southwest European peoples. And yet their significance must not be overestimated. History proves conclusively that such ties do not bind beyond a certain degree unless reinforced by the subtler yet closer tie of kindred blood. That is the reason why observers who disregard the racial factor are so continually fooled. Judged merely by speech and culture, the peoples of Southwestern Europe seem well fitted for close and harmonious association. Accord-

ingly, political prophets have often preached the doctrine of Latin fraternity and have advocated Pan-Latinism—in other words, a league of Latin peoples.

And yet despite all such eloquent preaching Pan-Latinism just doesn't take place. The reason, of course, is that the doctrine is based on a delusion—the delusion of confusing likeness in speech and manners with kinship in blood. The peoples of Southwestern Europe differ from one another in racial make-up far more widely than is usually imagined, and these racial differences largely counteract the ties of culture and speech.

Whoever gets to know the Latin peoples well discovers one thing as curious as it is significant. This is the fact that the more these peoples are thrown together, the less they like one another. So long as their contacts are merely superficial, so long as they exchange courtesies or read one another's books, a feeling of friendly similarity tends to arise. But let them come into intimate contact, and the chances are that they will quickly and instinctively discover marked temperamental differences which will be more apt to drive them apart than to draw them together. This is particularly the case with Frenchmen and their southern neighbors. But it is also true in lesser degree as between Italians and Spaniards, and even as between Spaniards and Portuguese. In every case a study of the facts will bring to light differences in racial make-up which account for the temperamental differences that exist between the so-called Latin peoples.

Of course, the presence of a large Mediterranean element in the populations of Italy, Spain, and Portugal creates between those peoples a blood relationship which

is almost wholly absent as between them and the French, who are mainly Alpine or Nordic in race, with very little Mediterranean blood. In this basic sense, therefore, Italy, Spain, and Portugal can be considered as forming a block of kindred peoples which may be classed together as the Mediterranean south of Europe. However, as already remarked, these three peoples are racially much less alike than they superficially appear, and a just estimate of their respective situations can be gained only by viewing them separately, as we will now undertake to do.

Italy is by far the most important nation in southern Europe. The mediæval might of Spain has long passed, while the short-lived glory of Portugal is but a dim memory. Italy, however, recently emerged from centuries of eclipse, has forged her political unity, increased her material prosperity, and to-day displays a spontaneous vigor which augurs well for her future.

The long peninsula of Italy juts out from the mass of Continental Europe far to the southward, bestriding the waters of the Mediterranean Sea and through its island appendage of Sicily almost touching North Africa. Italy is long and narrow in shape, its fancied resemblance to a jack-boot being a geographical commonplace. Including its island dependencies, Sicily and Sardinia, Italy's area is about 118,000 square miles. On this area lives a population of nearly 40,000,000, rapidly increasing in numbers.

Italy is a well-defined geographical unit. Sundered from the European land mass by the massive rampart of the Alps, and washed elsewhere by the sea, Italy's boundaries are clearly traced by nature. This natural isolation

has been enough to insure the impress of a common language and culture upon all the inhabitants of the peninsula. It has not, however, been enough to keep out numerous foreign influences. The mountain chain of the Alps is broken by passes through which invading hosts have often poured. Also, the seas which bound Italy are narrow and easily crossed from the opposite shores. In fact Italy has for ages been racially modified by two contrasted streams of incoming population, one entering the country through the Alpine passes of the north, the other descending upon its southern coasts from lands to the eastward or from North Africa. This is the basic reason for those pronounced racial distinctions which characterize the Italian people to-day.

Another factor making for racial diversity is Italy's internal geography. The peninsula itself is mainly mountainous, thus breaking up the land surface into many small districts separated from one another. Only in the north is there a really large stretch of plain country—the broad valley of the Po. These two geographical factors together give the key to Italy's racial history.

To-day, as in the past, Italy is divided into two sharply contrasted regions, inhabited by populations of a very different character. To the north lies the rich Po valley, a natural magnet for invaders from beyond the Alps. To the southward stretches the narrow and mountainous peninsula, becoming ever more rugged and broken, relatively unattractive and inaccessible to landward penetration from the north, yet open to landings from the sea.

We are now able to understand Italy's racial history, which has followed closely the lines traced by nature.

The earliest inhabitants of any lasting significance were the Mediterraneans, the slender, dark-complexioned people who entered the peninsula many thousands of years ago, coming apparently both from the eastward through the Balkans and from the southward by way of Northern Africa. Settling the entire peninsula, together with its island appendages, Sicily and Sardinia, they made Italy for a while a solidly Mediterranean land.

Presently, however, their title to sole ownership was challenged. Through the Alpine passes to the north began to flow that succession of invasions which has so profoundly modified Italy's destiny. At first these invaders were men of the round-headed, thick-set Alpine race, who gradually conquered the Po valley, expelling or absorbing the Mediterraneans and turning Northern Italy into the predominantly Alpine land which it has ever since remained. Later on, tall, blond Nordics crossed the Alps, conquering the mixed Alpine and Mediterranean populations of Northern Italy, and establishing themselves as ruling aristocracies. In time these mixed tribes under Nordic leadership pushed southward, modifying the racial make-up of Central Italy, but rarely penetrating to the extreme south, which remained almost solidly Mediterranean in blood.

Rome is the leading example of the peoples which arose as the outcome of these prehistoric migrations. The Roman people in its early days was clearly of diverse racial origin. Like most of the great peoples of antiquity, it was composed of a ruling aristocracy differing sharply in race from the mass of the population. The Roman patricians, the ruling class, were apparently Nor-

dies with a perceptible dash of Alpine blood. This is clear from the busts which have come down to us, most of which show plainly Nordic—sometimes startlingly Anglo-Saxon—features, combined with a broadish head betraying an Alpine strain.

The predominantly Nordic racial make-up of the Roman ruling class is made equally clear by a study of the Roman temperament, which was plainly Nordic in its political and military ability, love of order and stern devotion to duty; yet also showed an Alpine cross by its rigidity, limited vision, and lack of creative imagination. The Roman plebeians seem to have been mainly Mediterraneans, steadied by a fairly strong Alpine infusion and with a few Nordic traces.

It is interesting to observe how sharp was the consciousness of racial differences between the two orders of society in early Rome. The patricians—as Nordic aristocracies have always done—long kept the purity of their blood by stern prohibition of intermarriage with the plebeians, thus maintaining their hold upon the state and impressing their spirit so deeply upon Roman institutions and customs that their ideals persisted long after the patrician class had lost its Nordic character.

This nature of the old Roman spirit needs to be emphasized because it has been so widely misunderstood. The prevailing idea is that the early Romans were small, dark people—in other words, Mediterraneans. This is a serious error, because it misinterprets the very source of Latin civilization. As a matter of fact, a glance at Roman ideals and institutions shows that these were patently Nordic with Alpine modifications. The truth is that down

to the fall of the republic—when Rome ceased to be racially Roman—the spirit of Roman society was emphatically un-Mediterranean. To think of the stern, practical, unimaginative Roman patrician as a typical Mediterranean is nothing short of ludicrous. It would have been clean against the Mediterranean race soul, which, wherever found in anything like racial purity, whether in ancient Greece or in modern Ireland, is always basically the same.

To find the Mediterranean spirit in ancient Italy we must look, not to Rome, but to those states of southern Italy and Sicily which were Rome's early rivals. Here, indeed, we discover the Mediterranean soul at its best—its artistic gifts, its hot emotions, its quick imagination, its love of form, color, and life; here also we find that extreme individualism and political instability which have ever been Mediterranean weaknesses and which brought southern Italy under Roman rule.

The Roman period needs to be examined not only because it set an indelible stamp upon Italian ideals and culture, but also because it produced important racial changes in the Italian population. Modern Italy can, in fact, be understood only in connection with the Roman past.

The legacy of Rome was both good and evil. Rome made Italy for centuries the centre of the world and bequeathed a wealth of glorious memories which must ever stir Italian hearts. To-day, as in other days, Italians are steeped in the Roman tradition, and Italian leaders from Rienzi to Mussolini turn naturally to ancient Rome for inspiration. The Fascisti, with their legions, their classic

salute, and their symbol of the fasces—the ax bound with rods—are indulging in no vain theatricalities; these things are the instinctive expressions of a people with whom old Rome is still a burning memory.

Such is the bright side of Rome's legacy to modern Italy. Yet there is a darker side. Rome, though mistress of the world, dealt the Italian homeland wounds which fester through the ages. The evil aspects of Roman society, the drain of foreign conquests and civil strife, the curse of slavery—these and other baneful factors impoverished and degenerated the population not only of Rome itself but of all Italy, so that when the Roman Empire finally fell it left behind an exhausted, enfeebled stock, unable either to carry on the traditions of Roman civilization or to defend itself against its enemies. For centuries Italy became a mere geographical expression, the helpless prey of foreign invaders.

Particularly deep and lasting was the racial damage suffered by the south. Northern and Central Italy gradually recovered energy and ability, owing both to the vitality surviving in the native stock and to the incoming of superior new blood. But the population of southern Italy and Sicily was so thoroughly drained and degenerated during Roman times that it has ever since been inferior in quality. Here, as in some other parts of the Mediterranean basin, the Mediterranean stock to-day ranks below its level in ancient times. The early Mediterranean inhabitants of Southern Italy and Sicily were vigorous, gifted peoples, who produced gracious, colorful civilizations.

These civilizations, however, faded out in a cycle of

strife ending in Roman rule. The south fell on evil days. The countryside passed into the hands of Roman land speculators who parcelled it out into great estates—*latifundia*—worked by gangs of slaves mostly drawn from inferior Asiatic and African stocks. The dwindling remnants of the native population crowded into the cities, became pauperized proletarians, and intermarried with freed slaves and nondescript immigrants, also largely drawn from the Levant and North Africa. It is from this population of later Roman times that the modern South Italians and Sicilians mainly descend. In them the presence of Asiatic and North African strains is to-day plainly visible, these strains having been not only implanted in Roman times but further reinforced during the Middle Ages, especially in the period when Southern Italy and Sicily fell under Saracen rule.

Far happier was the course of events in Northern and Central Italy. To begin with, these regions were not racially impoverished during the Roman period to anything like the same extent as the south, while comparatively little admixture of inferior Levantine and North African elements took place. Furthermore, the fall of Rome was accompanied by a series of barbarian invasions, which, however destructive at the time, brought in much good new blood. These invaders were mostly Nordics, and the Nordic stream from beyond the Alps continued to flow for centuries, leavening the populations of Northern and Central Italy with Nordic energy and creative ability.

The growing vigor of the Northern Italian stock presently displayed itself by the rise of strong city states like Venice and Florence, and by a splendid outburst of ar-

tistic and literary ability crowned by geniuses like Dante, Michelangelo, and Raphael. It is true that the constant civil wars and foreign invasions which afflicted Italy down to recent times killed out much of the best stock, so that the population of Northern and Central Italy to-day is not the equal of the population five centuries ago. Still, the present population of these regions is unquestionably a good stock, physically sound and revealing its latent qualities by its ability to produce strong, gifted personalities.

The rise of modern Italy to political unity and material prosperity during the past century was made possible largely by a series of remarkable leaders like Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour; while the present Fascist movement has brought to the front a number of distinctly able men, culminating in the extraordinary dynamic figure of Mussolini.

In all these Italian movements, from the Middle Ages to the present day, one basic fact is strikingly clear—the startling difference between north and south. Almost everything worth while comes from Northern and Central Italy. The south contributes practically nothing of value. Of the few men of ability which the south has given to modern Italy, the majority were descended from Northern ancestry.

Any one who has travelled in Italy realizes the sudden change which takes place south of Rome. Rome is, indeed, the dividing line between two sharply contrasted regions. Northward are progress and prosperity; southward lie backwardness and poverty. This is precisely what the racial situation would lead us to expect. The

two halves of Italy are inhabited by very different breeds of men. The northern half contains the best of the old Mediterranean stock, plus a strong Alpine element and a considerable leavening of Nordic blood. The southern half is peopled by a racially impoverished Mediterranean stock, long since drained of its best strains and in places mongrelized by inferior Levantine and African elements.

By recognizing the peculiarities in Italy's racial make-up, by realizing the wide differences which exist not merely between specific racial elements in the population but also between the characters of similar racial stocks in different regions, we can get a far clearer idea of the course of Italian national life than would otherwise be possible, while much that at first sight seems strange becomes understandable.

When Italy at last became a united nation half a century ago, she was faced by a multitude of problems requiring delicate handling and special treatment. In the economic field Italy has been distinctly successful. Although primarily an agricultural country, Italy has, nevertheless, built up a prosperous industrial system—of course, in the north—despite the handicaps imposed by lack of coal and other raw materials. Socially, Italy has also progressed, the general level of well-being, education, and other social factors being markedly higher in the north and distinctly better even in the backward south.

Italy's most serious difficulties have been in the field of politics. To forge a real national state out of such diverse and long-sundered elements was a herculean task. Particularly difficult was the creation of political institutions congenial to the Italian character. Certainly the course

of Italian political life has hitherto left much to be desired.

Italy started out with a set of political institutions modelled on the parliamentary, democratic ideals of England and France. But this borrowed system did not prove a brilliant success. Once the patriotic fervor of the first days had died away, Italian political life was controlled by a caste of professional politicians who gradually evolved a system known as *trasformismo*—a sublimated “pork barrel” which ate the heart out of Italian political life. Behind resounding party platforms and fine phrases the professional politicians framed deals and made elections, keeping one eye on the people and the other on the treasury. When public opinion got too much aroused there would be an election and a change of government; but this really meant little more than a shuffle of political offices among different gangs of the same professional crowd. The situation was further complicated by the fact that there were, not two well-defined political parties as in America, but a number of political groups, so that ministries were usually formed from blocs, bound together more by the desire to get office than to do anything constructive once they were in power. The upshot was that Italian political life was wasteful, inefficient, and, above all, purposeless. As for the general public, continually duped as it was by this political shell game, it became increasingly bored and disgusted with the whole business—which was just what the professional politicians wanted, as lack of public interest left them a freer hand to play their political games.

In the years just preceding the Great War, to be sure,

signs of vigorous popular discontent began to appear. This was best shown by the rise of several new political groups which stood frankly outside the old political system, and possessed genuine programmes of action instead of mere party phrases. The most forceful of these new groups were: the Syndicalists, who wanted a social revolution, and the Nationalists, who demanded a strong, imperialistic foreign policy which should make Italy a greater power in the world. Bitterly hostile to each other though they were, Syndicalists and Nationalists alike condemned *trasformismo* and preached the need of political realities. However, they were but minorities controlling few electoral seats, and so had little direct effect on Italian parliamentary life.

Then came the war. After grave setbacks, Italy emerged victorious, only to have her aspirations disappointed at the peace settlement. Exhausted, disillusioned, and exasperated, Italy fell a prey to internal disorders which threatened civil war or revolution. The old political caste, which had badly mismanaged the war, proved quite unable to face the crisis at home. Things went from bad to worse. A succession of weak governments did nothing but temporize and play petty politics. Italy seemed on the verge of chaos.

Then came—Fascismo! A small but determined minority headed by able leaders, chief among them Mussolini, banded themselves together, fought and defeated the Bolshevik elements who were planning a social revolution, then turned upon the government—which had been supinely looking on—overthrew it and established a frank dictatorship. For nearly two years Mussolini and his

Fascist Blackshirts have been the undisputed masters of Italy.

With the material results of Fascist rule the world is passably acquainted. The order, efficiency, and prosperity which it has brought to Italy are well known. What is not so well known, however, is the spirit of Fascismo and the exact character of its ideals. Fully to appreciate Fascismo's significance one must go to Italy and meet personally the Fascist leaders. To do so is a rare and stimulating experience. In present-day Italy one immediately gets a sense of freshness and vitality. People are thinking frankly and acting boldly. Theory and precedent are disregarded in favor of natural impulse and common sense.

To think of Fascismo as a mere reaction against Bolshevik plots and governmental weakness is to miss utterly its real spirit and its larger meaning. Fascismo goes much deeper than that. It is nothing less than a vivid and vital outpouring of the Italian spirit, seeking to forge new institutions and new ideals in harmony with the mind and soul of the Italian people. That is what gives it both its present strength and its lasting significance. Specific acts of the Fascist government may be wise or unwise; the whole Fascist régime may be but a pioneering venture, destined soon to evolve into something quite different; nevertheless, all this does not touch the basic fact that Fascismo has set a stamp upon Italian life and thought which will endure.

The kernel of Fascist philosophy is realism. Probably the Fascist spokesmen will object to my use of the word "philosophy"; because so sternly realistic are the Fasci-

sti that they deny having any such thing. Hating theories as they do, they strive to keep their minds from crystallizing around general ideas. Instead, they seek to face specific situations as these arise, to judge them from the observed facts of the case and to deal with them in the light of common sense. Precedent, consistency, logic—these things are, in Fascist eyes, mere nonsense. In fact, the Fascisti claim that it is just because of undue reverence for such things that not merely Italy but the world in general is where it is to-day. According to the Fascisti, the world has long been going on a wrong tack. For the past century or more, say the Fascisti, we have become increasingly obsessed by theoretical abstractions condensed into phrases or single words which we have set up like idols and to which we have superstitiously bowed down.

Consider some of our present-day idols. Their names are Democracy, Liberty, Equality, Rights, Parliamentary Government, and more besides. Look at them closely. What do they really mean? In themselves, they mean nothing. Theoretical abstractions that they are, they have no concrete significance. Yet there they sit, like gods in a heathen temple, paralyzing the creative thought and energy of mankind! Before them we meekly lay our problems.

Is this not so? Look you! A situation confronts us. What do we do? Do we study the special facts of the case and then act according to those facts in the light of our common sense? We may do this in our private lives, but we rarely do so in public matters. Instead, we seek the will of our idols! In other words, we try to find a

solution which shall be "democratic" or which may not offend such "sacred principles" as liberty and equality.

"What arrant nonsense!" cries Fascismo. "And what dangerous nonsense, too! Such idolatrous blindness gets us nowhere; or, rather, lands us in a bog of troubles. Therefore, down with our idols! Down with Democracy! Down with Equality! Out with the word 'Rights'—save, perchance, when coupled with the word 'Duties'! Sweep these false gods into the dust-bin along with the other fallen idols of the past! Thus, and thus only, may we clear our vision, free our common sense and regain the path of true progress."

Such is the uncompromising realism of Fascismo. The Fascisti have, indeed, the courage of their convictions. No "established institutions" for them. Relentlessly they ask: "Does it work? Is it efficient? Is it suited to our people?" And if the answer is no—out it goes.

The same is true of ideas. Mussolini's special publication is called *Gerarchia*. Significant name! "*Gerarchia*" is the Italian word for "hierarchy," and in its pages we find a theory of society which flouts the doctrines of democracy and equality in no uncertain fashion. Instead of preaching men's equality, *Gerarchia* stresses their inequality. Men being thus unequal, democracy, in the ordinary sense of the word, is an absurdity. Mussolini's ideal social structure takes the form, not of a level plain, but of a towering pyramid. He glimpses a society in which individuals will be ranked according to their natural capacities and limitations.

For even their most cherished ideals the Fascisti insist upon a realistic basis. For example, the Fascisti are noth-

ing if not patriotic; the power and glory of Italy are ever in their minds. And yet their patriotism is neither mystic nor sentimental; on the contrary, it is rooted in realism. I well recall a discussion I had on this point with one of the Fascist leaders. The talk turned on the nature of Italian nationalism.

"I will explain to you," said the Fascist leader, "how our nationalism differs from the nationalism of most other peoples. Elsewhere you will find nationalism largely based upon abstract rights and historical precedents. We Fascisti disregard all this as beside the point. For us there are no abstract rights—not even the right of a nation to bare existence. A nation, like an individual, must deserve its existence—and must continue to deserve it. For example, we Fascisti do not claim that our Italy acquires any special rights because, on this geographical area, there was a Rome, a *Cinquecento*, a *Risorgimento*; because its soil nourished a Dante or a Julius Cæsar. No, our belief in Italy's present and future greatness rests upon what we living Italians are, do, and will do."

Bold words, these—and very refreshing to one who, like myself, had recently been in Central Europe and the Balkans, where I had listened to long, labored nationalist arguments often based upon a conquest by King So-and-So or a victory of General What's-His-Name, gained perhaps many generations before.

This bold spirit and confident optimism of the Fascisti undoubtedly spring in great part from the fact that Fascismo is emphatically a young man's movement. Not for nothing does Fascismo's inspiring marching song begin with the words, "Giovanezza! Giovanezza!"—"Youth!

Youth!" Fascismo has swept old-line politicians and bureaucrats wholesale into the discard. Mussolini himself is only forty, while few of the Fascisti leaders are more than forty-five.

As already remarked, Fascismo is clearly a spontaneous Italian product. Its methods and ideals are precisely what a study of Italy's history and racial make-up might lead us to expect. Mediterraneans everywhere instinctively crave strong, dynamic personalities to lead them, while Alpine stocks seem to do best under the guidance of able ruling minorities. Mussolini and his lieutenants therefore appear well fitted to accomplish much for Italy, and to lead their people along paths suited to the national character.

Perhaps we may even be about to witness the creation of new political institutions better suited to a mixed people of Mediterranean-Alpine origin like the Italians than were the parliamentary, democratic forms borrowed from England when Italian political unity was attained half a century ago. The fact is that democratic parliamentary institutions have been a real success only among peoples largely Nordic in blood. The idea that they can be applied indiscriminately to peoples of all races is precisely an example of that abstract theorizing against which Fascismo is to-day voicing so healthy a protest.

From Italy let us now turn to consider Spain and Portugal. These two nations together occupy the Iberian Peninsula, the great land block which forms the southwestern corner of Europe, washed by the waters of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, and almost touching Africa at the Straits of Gibraltar.

The Iberian Peninsula differs widely from Italy in form, climate, and internal structure. In the first place, it is much larger. This greater size, together with its square shape and higher average elevation, produces natural conditions very unlike those prevailing in Italy. The Iberian Peninsula consists mostly of an immense plateau bordered by mountain ranges which rise sharply from the sea. Only in a few places are there considerable coastal plains. Cut off from the moist sea winds by its mountain ranges, the interior plateau tends to be dry and barren, so that population has always been concentrated along the fertile seaboard. This is one reason why the Iberian Peninsula has rarely attained political unity. Grouped along the coasts, its inhabitants have lived with their backs to one another, looking outward over the sea rather than inward toward their neighbors. In fact, on the western coast, where isolation is most pronounced, a separate nation, Portugal, arose with a distinct language and culture of its own. The rest of the peninsula kept more together and in time formed the Spanish nation; but even in Spain we find marked distinctions between different regions which have never been obliterated.

If the Iberian Peninsula had been more open to foreign penetration it might have been the seat of several distinct nations instead of merely two. This, however, has been prevented by its isolation. Lying off the main line of European land migrations, and separated from the rest of the European Continent by the almost unbroken mountain wall of the Pyrenees, the Iberian Peninsula has tended to live a life apart. For this reason it has undergone relatively few invasions and few racial changes, and its popu-

lation is to-day more homogeneous in blood than any other part of the European Continent except Scandinavia—likewise a region of geographical isolation.

The Iberian Peninsula is racially a distinctly Mediterranean land. In both Spain and Portugal the population is mainly of Mediterranean blood. Nevertheless, the two peoples differ from each other to a considerable extent both in racial make-up and in the innate quality of their Mediterranean stock. For this reason, as well as from considerations of language and historic pasts, separate consideration is desirable.

Of the two nations, Spain is very much the larger and more important. Occupying nearly seven-eighths of the entire Iberian Peninsula, Spain has an area of more than 190,000 square miles and a population of a trifle more than 21,000,000 souls. The Spanish people is and always has been mainly of Mediterranean stock. At various times, to be sure, Alpine and Nordic invaders have entered Spain by way of the Pyrenees, but these elements have never greatly changed the racial make-up of the general population. What Alpine blood there is in Spain is confined to the mountainous regions of the northwest. Here the local population differs from the rest of Spain both in physical type and in temperament, being more stolid, tenacious, and laborious than elsewhere.

Nordic blood is not concentrated in any one locality, but is mainly scattered through the upper and middle social classes, though Nordic traits are found more frequently in the north than in the south. Pure blond types are, however, nowhere common. In Southern Spain there are many evidences of North African blood, with occa-

sional negroid traces. These North African and negroid traits are mainly due to the long Moorish occupation of Southern Spain.

Formerly Spain possessed a much larger proportion of Nordic blood. This Nordic element was most numerous after the fall of the Roman Empire, when Spain was overrun by a number of Teutonic tribes such as the Suevi, Vandals, and Visigoths, who established themselves as ruling aristocracies and for a time turned Spain into a superficially Nordic land. Though greatly diminished by the Moorish invasions, Nordic blood remained relatively abundant among the upper classes, especially in the north, down to comparatively recent times.

The Nordic spirit played a part during Spain's period of greatness, which lasted for nearly two centuries after Columbus's discovery of America. During that period Spain was far and away the greatest power on earth, being at once the owner of most of the New World and the master of a large part of Europe.

Yet those two centuries of power and glory proved to be Spain's undoing. The flower of the nation was drained away to subdue a savage continent or to die on European battle-fields. The bold *conquistadores* in America, the dauntless Spanish infantry in Europe alike represented the pick of both the Nordic and Mediterranean elements. Generation after generation these men went forth by hundreds of thousands—to return no more. As a melancholy Castilian proverb of those days well put it, "Spain makes men—and wastes them!"

And while Spain's bravest and boldest were dying abroad, the most intelligent who remained at home were

being weeded out by a number of unfavorable social factors. The monastic ideal became so wide-spread that vast numbers of men and women, representing on the average the superior elements of the population, entered celibate orders, died childless, and thus deprived the race of their valuable inheritances. Furthermore, the intolerant spirit of the times ruthlessly killed out all who ventured to differ from orthodox ideas. During this period the number of persons imprisoned, burned alive, or driven into exile by the Spanish Inquisition was fully 300,000.

The combined result of all these drains upon Spain's energy and intelligence was the dramatic collapse of Spanish power in the middle of the seventeenth century. From her proud rank of the world's leading nation, Spain sank almost to the position of a third-rate power—a position in which she has ever since remained. This sudden collapse from grandeur to obscurity long puzzled historians. To-day, with our knowledge of racial matters, the reason is perfectly plain. Like a prodigal spendthrift, Spain drew recklessly upon her racial reserves for tasks beyond her strength. When the last reserves had been spent, Spain fell into hopeless weakness—because she had mortgaged her racial future.

Modern Spain is, indeed, a striking example of racial impoverishment. Racial impoverishment should be clearly distinguished from other biological ills like degeneracy and mongrelization. The Spanish people of to-day is not degenerate, while there is little admixture of inferior alien strains except in certain portions of the South. What is wrong with modern Spain is that its population has been so drained of creative energy and intelligence that

it produces little except mediocrity. Very rarely does Spain produce strong, gifted leaders. Herein Spain differs markedly from Italy, which has retained the power to breed such commanding personalities.

Lack of able leaders is especially serious in a racially Mediterranean country like Spain, because Mediterranean peoples always need strong, dynamic personalities to awaken their enthusiasm and bring out the best that is in them. No people to-day displays more typically Mediterranean characteristics than does the Spanish. In fact, the population of present-day Spain is racially far more Mediterranean than it was some centuries ago, owing to the virtual disappearance of its once numerous Nordic element. The Spanish people is probably the purest Mediterranean stock now in existence, as is well shown by the Spanish temperament, which is just about what we might expect from a study of Spain's racial make-up—bearing in mind, of course, the fact that Spain has been drained of much of the intelligence and artistic gifts which are normally found in unimpoverished Mediterranean stocks.

Mediterranean temperament comes out most clearly in Spain's political life. The key-note of the Spanish national spirit is an almost boundless individualism. Ideas and principles, as such, are at a discount; they must be *personalized*. That is why Spanish political parties crystallize about some magnetic leader who knows how to win the personal loyalty and devotion of his followers. Furthermore, Spain has not yet evolved a governmental system suited to the character of its people. Even more than in Italy, the centralized bureaucracy borrowed from France

and the parliamentary institutions borrowed from England have alike failed to work successfully.

Spanish parliamentarism in particular was from the first a sickly growth. Despite high-sounding constitutional forms and phrases, all real power soon came to be lodged with a caste of professional politicians who invented a system even more corrupt and oppressive than Italian *trasformismo*. This Spanish political system is known as *caciquism*. *Caciquism* is a magnified and nationwide Tammany Hall. The system is worked by a knot of big bosses—*caudillos*—at the capital, Madrid, and is enforced by a swarm of local bosses known as *caciques*, who make the elections as Madrid commands and take their pay in local offices, power, and plunder. When the country cries too loud, a safety-valve is found in an electoral change of government; but the relief is a sham, for the Spanish political parties play the game of rotation in office to perfection and hand over the treasury to one another at the precise psychological moment. The chief result of a Spanish election, therefore, is the coming to power of an alternate gang of *caudillos* and *caciques* zealously imbued with the Jacksonian maxim, "To the victors belong the spoils." Their personal loyalty to their chief may be strong, but their devotion to the public welfare is usually conspicuous by its absence. All this is well known to the Spanish people, which accordingly takes little interest in politics, and views the kaleidoscopic shifts of ins and outs with a cynical and sullen indifference.

This deplorable state of affairs has led to the recent breakdown of Spanish parliamentarism, when the government was overthrown by a revolt headed by General

Primo de Rivera, who established a dictatorship. On the surface, this looks like another Fascist movement, and General Rivera has been hailed as the Spanish Mussolini.

Closer inspection, however, reveals wide differences between the Spanish and Italian movements. Fascismo was a spontaneous, popular growth, backed by a large part of the youth and brains of Italy and headed by a remarkable personality associated with a considerable group of able leaders. It displayed from the first not only boldness and determination but also creative energy and original ideas. The Spanish movement, on the other hand, was primarily the work of discontented army officers. It was a military rather than a popular revolt, and it bears a close resemblance to other military revolts which have occurred in Spanish history. Although the Directory, as the new government is called, has been in power many months, it has done nothing comparable to what Fascismo has achieved, and it has not succeeded in gaining a like measure of public confidence and support. As for General Rivera himself, he is obviously no Mussolini.

What will happen in Spain is, of course, highly uncertain. Perhaps if Italy succeeds in working out a constructive solution of her problems, Spain may profitably adopt this solution, adapted to her somewhat similar circumstances. But so far as present indications go, Spain does not seem to be originating a constructive programme, as Fascist Italy appears to be doing.

From Spain let us pass to Portugal. This small country, with an area of 34,000 square miles and a population of 5,600,000, has neither a prosperous present nor a hope-

ful future. Like Spain, Portugal enjoyed a time of greatness, but the time was short and was purchased at the expense of an even more pronounced decline. The reasons were similar. Portugal, like Spain, was suddenly thrust into a position for which she was not fitted, consumed her strength and vitality in tasks too heavy for her to bear, and sank exhausted into lasting impotence.

Both countries rose to greatness at the same time. At the very moment when Columbus was discovering America for Spain, the Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, was starting on his memorable voyage around Africa to India. This gave Portugal a great colonial empire in the East, while other Portuguese explorers soon gave their country an American colonial empire in Brazil. From her colonies Portugal rapidly drew such wealth that she became a great power, her capital, Lisbon, being one of the most splendid cities in Europe.

This wealth and power was, however, literally squeezed out of Portuguese blood. To conquer and hold Portugal's vast colonial empires required great fleets and armies which took the very cream of the Portuguese stock. At the beginning of their heroic period the Portuguese were an almost purely Mediterranean stock, energetic, intelligent, and with marked literary and artistic qualities. The great days of Portugal produced not only bold sailors and brave soldiers but also poets and artists whose names will live long in history.

And then, in a trifle over a hundred years—it was all over! Portugal collapsed, as Spain was to collapse a little later. The only difference was that in Portugal's case the collapse was far more complete. The drain on the Portu-

guese stock had been frightful and the resulting racial impoverishment was therefore even more lamentable. The peasantry had largely abandoned the countryside. Drawn to the cities and to the colonies by the lure of gold and adventure, or conscripted wholesale into the fleets and armies, they had sailed overseas, to die or to settle as fate might decree, but rarely to return.

Furthermore, upon this racially impoverished people there fell a fresh misfortune—the incoming of inferior alien blood. The half-deserted countryside passed into the hands of great landowners who imported gangs of negro slaves drawn from Portugal's African colonies. This was particularly true of Southern Portugal, where a semi-tropical climate and a fertile soil made negro slavery highly profitable. In time the population of Southern Portugal became distinctly tinged with negro blood, which produced a depressing and degrading effect upon the national character.

The history of modern Portugal has not been a happy one. Misgovernment and turbulence have been the outstanding features of its political life. Attempts to apply democratic parliamentary institutions have been melancholy failures. Fourteen years ago monarchy was overthrown and a republic was set up, but this appeared to increase rather than diminish political instability. The Portuguese Republic has been one long story of disorders, cabinet crises and revolutions suggesting Central America, and no signs of improvement are in sight. From present-day Portugal the world has apparently little either to expect or to hope.

CHAPTER VI

ALPINIZED GERMANY

MODERN Germany is the victim of a tragic delusion: the delusion of believing that she still is what she was in the past. The terrible spectacle of post-war Germany should teach people everywhere that exact knowledge and clear thinking on racial problems is a vital necessity, while ignorance or self-deception in such matters may mean a people's undoing.

Germany's fundamental mistake during the generation before the Great War lay in misreading history and perverting biology—the science of race. On this basic error the Germans built up a gigantic delusion which in some sections of German public opinion came to amount almost to what insanity experts call a “mania of grandeur.” That phrase just fits the extreme “Pan-German” propaganda so many German professors and publicists spread broadcast before and during the war, and which most Germans swallowed as gospel truth. Describing past glories as present realities and juggling racial facts to fit nationalistic hopes, these propagandists preached the doctrine that the modern Germans were a “chosen people,” vastly superior to everybody else in every respect. The effect of this doctrine upon German public opinion was as dangerous as it was deplorable. Germans tended more and more to overrate themselves and to underrate their neighbors. Losing their sense of reality and proportion,

anything that they keenly desired seemed to be within their power to attain.

Of course, Germany had no monopoly of such feelings. Pre-war Europe seethed with fanatical nationalist propagandas and imperialistic foreign policies. But pre-war Germany seems to have evolved a peculiarly high-flown jingoism, and to have mixed nationalistic and racial ideas into a specially explosive compound. One of the most hopeful aspects of the present situation is that post-war Germany appears to be getting into a much saner frame of mind. The old false doctrines are largely discredited, while an influential body of scholars and popular writers are educating their public to a truer knowledge of race and history, emphasizing German shortcomings and preaching a frank facing of facts, no matter how distasteful these may be. Indeed, if this realistic movement continues at its present rate, the Germans may soon come to have a far clearer outlook than some of their neighbors, notably the French, who, as we observed in a previous article, to-day show a disregard for historic facts and racial truths which if continued will cost them dear.

Despite all that has been written about pre-war Germany's state of mind, its exact nature has seldom been realized, and can be realized only by getting a clear idea of Germany's history together with the racial changes which have taken place in its population. No country has had a more checkered past than Germany, while few countries have undergone greater shifts in racial make-up. Unhappily for Germany, its history has been full of ill-fortune, while most of the racial changes that have occurred have been unfavorable ones. Even at the height of her power

and prosperity in the period just before the late war, modern Germany occupied no such commanding position in Europe as had the Germany of a thousand years before. As for the modern German population, it cannot compare in quality with the population of former times. In her early days, Germany was inhabited by a very high-grade Nordic population. To-day, throughout the greater part of Germany, the tall, blond Nordics have been largely replaced by members of the thick-set, round-headed Alpine race, which ranks below the Nordic in both energy and intelligence. Furthermore, both the Nordic and Alpine elements in modern Germany seem to have been somewhat racially impoverished—drained of many of their ablest strains owing to the misfortunes which have afflicted Germany at various times in her troubled history.

When Germany emerged into the light of history about 2,000 years ago, she appeared as a land of dense forest and marsh inhabited by a great number of tribes of pure Nordic blood. Such was the "Germania" of the Romans, and such were the original Germans or "Teutons." These early Germans were barbarians—but "noble" barbarians. The Romans recognized the Germans as their most formidable foes. After suffering one or two terrible defeats among the German forests, Rome gave up all thought of conquering Germany, building elaborate fortifications manned by her best legions to keep the dreaded barbarians out of the empire. Even in their prime the Romans regarded the Germans with respect, not unmixed with fear. Tacitus and other Roman writers frankly praised the Germans' high qualities. In Roman eyes this strange



numerous native populations, the Nordic element in Italy and Spain rapidly diminished, except among the upper classes, which, protected from field labor by their rank, and guarded against frequent intermarriage with the native masses by race-pride or caste laws, retained a larger proportion of Nordic blood.

All over Western Europe, however, the chief reason for Nordic decline seems to have been war—the great scourge of the Nordic race. Energetic and warlike by nature, Nordics never fight so fiercely as when fighting each other. The fall of Rome heralded a perfect welter of inter-Nordic wars. Overrunning Western Europe not as a united people but as independent tribes, the Teutonic invaders fought endlessly over the spoils, slaughtering each other wholesale, and thus reducing their numbers as against the subject Alpine and Mediterranean populations, who took almost no part in the fighting and, therefore, increased in numerical strength.

Finally one of these Germanic tribes, the Franks, gained the ascendancy and, under a great leader, Charlemagne, temporarily united most of Western and Central Europe beneath his sway. Reviving the Imperial tradition, he assumed the title of Roman Emperor, and called his state the Roman Empire. Charlemagne's experiment is one of the most fascinating of historical "might-have-beens." If it had succeeded, a great new civilization might have arisen, Nordic in character and anticipating modern civilization by nearly a thousand years. The materials for a new civilization were there. The Nordic masters of Europe were no longer the rude barbarians who had overrun the decayed Roman Empire. They had shown their

intelligence and capacity by the rapidity with which they had assimilated the remnants of classic civilization and were creatively adapting it to their own temperaments and times. If peace and political stability could have been maintained, the germs of culture which were beginning to sprout would probably have soon come to brilliant bloom.

And, as already remarked, the new civilization would have been essentially Nordic in character. Despite its "Latin" trappings, Nordic blood and the Nordic spirit were the driving forces in Charlemagne's Empire. This fact is too often misunderstood. The term "Roman" has a southern ring, while the name "Charlemagne" suggests a Latin-French personality. As a matter of fact, nothing could be further from the truth. "Charlemagne" is merely Old French for "Charles the Great." And Charles the Great was a Teutonic Nordic to the very marrow of his bones. This mighty monarch, with his blue eyes and long golden beard, spoke Old German and held his court at Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle), a city of western Germany. His empire was a thoroughly Nordic creation.

Charlemagne's experiment, however, was not destined to endure. His successors did not inherit his greatness, and his empire rapidly fell to pieces, plunging Europe into the gloomy welter of the Dark Ages. The Teutonic Nordics not only continued to weaken each other by fratricidal wars, but became divided by such differences in language and culture that they lost practically all sense of racial solidarity. Hitherto, the Nordic conquerors of Western Europe had retained a certain kindred feeling. Fiercely though they quarrelled, they had yet felt them-

selves nearer to one another than to their Latin subjects, and they had been proud of their Teutonic customs, speech, and free ideals. Now, however, the Nordics of Western Europe, diminished in numbers and alienated from their eastern kinsmen by constant wars, adopted the language and culture of their subjects, and thus became Latinized. Such was the germ of the modern French, Spanish, and Italian nationalities. This, however, not only made henceforth impossible the creation of a great "Pan-Nordic" state and civilization like that foreshadowed in Charlemagne's Empire, but also hastened the decline of the Nordic element in Western Europe by breaking down Nordic race-consciousness, and thus increasing intermarriage with the subject Alpine and Mediterranean elements.

Meanwhile the Nordics of Central Europe retained their language and racial consciousness, and began to build up a separate political organization which was the foreshadowing of German nationality. This nucleus of later Germany was almost purely Nordic in race, but its political frontiers differed widely from the borders of either the ancient Germania or modern Germany. The Germania of Roman times had included all of Central Europe north of the Rhine and the Danube, and had stretched eastward through what is now Poland to Western Russia. The fall of Rome, however, had caused a great change in the situation. The Germanic tribes which had been piling up for centuries against the Roman frontiers along the Rhine and Danube burst over Europe like a dammed-up flood set free. But this had left the Germanic homeland half depopulated, and into the half-

empty territories came new peoples—the Slavs. The Slavs were racially of Alpine stock. Their homeland was in Southeastern Europe, centring about the Carpathian Mountains. The westward migrations of the Teutonic Nordics gave the Slavs their opportunity, and they rapidly overran the whole eastern portion of ancient Germany.

These Slavs were very different folk from the Nordic Teutons. Almost pure Alpines in blood, they displayed typical Alpine race-qualities. For example, their occupation of Eastern Germany was not so much a conquest as an infiltration. Much less warlike than the Teutons, they entered Germany, not as large organized tribes but as loose hordes, settling here and there upon the lands which had been abandoned by the Teutonic tribes who had migrated into the Roman Empire. What gave the Slavs success was their vast numbers. There seems to have been comparatively little fighting between the two races. Like a slowly rising tide, the Slavs simply engulfed the remnants of the Teutonic inhabitants. The racial result was, however, none the less decisive, because Eastern Germany was transformed from a solidly Nordic into an almost solidly Alpine land. And for a long period this process went steadily on. In time the Slav tide flowed so far westward that it reached the line of the river Elbe. In other words, of the ancient Germania, only the extreme western portion lying between the rivers Elbe and Rhine remained Nordic in blood. This was the situation when Charlemagne united the Teutonic Nordics and founded his short-lived empire about the year 800 A. D.

When Charlemagne's Empire broke up and the Nordic

elements of Western Europe became Latinized, the remaining Nordics who had retained their old language and racial consciousness began (as already remarked) to form a separate state of their own. Although they retained only that part of their German homeland which lay between the Rhine and the Elbe, they had become possessed of much former Roman soil. A broad band of territory west of the Rhine (including not only Germany's present Rhine provinces but also most of Belgium and much of Northern France) had been so thoroughly overrun at the fall of the Roman Empire that the old Latinized population had disappeared, replaced by the Teutonic invaders. Therefore, the inhabitants of these regions did not become Latinized like their kinsmen further west, but kept their Germanic speech and united politically with their eastern brethren. Such was the political grouping which was the nucleus of German nationality. Its frontiers were obviously very different from those of modern Germany, since it included much of what is now France, Belgium, and Holland, while on the other hand, it did not include Germany's present eastern provinces. It is precisely these wide shifts of frontiers at different periods which have caused so many of Germany's troubles.

However, this nucleus of modern Germany made a good start. Rapidly growing in power, it turned its attention chiefly eastward toward the lost homelands. A mighty movement of conquest and colonization began, known in German history as the *Drang nach Osten*—"The March to the East." Falling upon the barbarous and ill-organized Slav tribes, the Germans rapidly conquered them and soon brought most of what is now known as Eastern Ger-

many and Austria under their sway. Politically and culturally, these conquests were permanent. Racially, however, they were far from complete. The Slavs submitted to their German conquerors, who settled down as masters. The racial situation was thus like that in Western Europe after the fall of Rome. The Teutonic Nordics everywhere formed the ruling aristocracy. Also, the free peasants and the townsfolk were mostly Nordic in blood. As for the Slavs, reduced to serfdom, they adopted the German language and in time came to think of themselves as "Germans." But change of speech did not change their blood. Racially they remained what they had always been—Alpines. Thus Eastern Germany became what it still is—a land of mixed racial stocks. At first, however, these stocks remained distinct. There was little intermarriage, the Teutonic Nordics looking down on the Alpine Slavs as an inferior race. Therefore, although Germany came to include many Alpine elements within its borders, the German spirit and culture long remained purely that of the ruling Nordic stock.

So rapidly did this early Germany progress that it presently became the most powerful state in Europe. Indeed, it soon revived the memory of Charlemagne's Empire. Invading Italy, then in a condition of turbulent weakness, the German monarch had himself crowned at Rome, proclaiming his combined realms "The Holy Roman Empire."

This, however, was a fatal mistake. The annexation of Italy proved to be mediæval Germany's undoing. Rapidly though Germany had grown, it still lacked political cohesion. If the early German monarchs had devoted

their energies to that task, Germany might have become a unified nation which would have been the most powerful state in Europe and the centre of European civilization. Instead of this, the German rulers wasted their strength on imperial dreams and costly foreign adventures. Italy, in particular, was a never-ending drain. Continually rebelling against German rule, it had to be continually reconquered. In these expeditions the power of Germany was consumed. Time after time a German monarch would lead a glittering host across the Alps, fight his way to Rome, and there be crowned emperor. But to do this he usually had to bankrupt his treasury, while of the splendid knights and stalwart men-at-arms who followed his standard the majority would find Italian graves through battle or disease, comparatively few ever returning to their German homes. Meanwhile, back in Germany, ambitious nobles would be undermining the royal authority and building up their local power. As time passed, Germany fell into disunion and disorder. Instead of growing together, it fell apart. Outlying regions like Holland and Switzerland gradually ceased to feel themselves "German," and finally split off as independent states. The main body of Germany sank into a loose confederation troubled by endless domestic quarrels. Once more, as in Charlemagne's day, the Teutonic Nordics had lost their chance of political power and security.

However, despite its political shortcomings, mediæval Germany produced a brilliant civilization. In numberless noble castles and fine cities, chivalrous knights and fair ladies, poets, thinkers, artists, and craftsmen combined to make a society of peculiar variety and charm. Mediæval

Germany was indeed rich in the fruits of the Nordic spirit. For it was the Nordic spirit which pulsed through this virile civilization. Germany was still mainly Nordic in blood, and this blood was mainly of high quality.

Then came the darkest time in Germany's history: the Thirty Years' War (1618 to 1648). This frightful catastrophe dealt Germany a blow from which she has never recovered. The Thirty Years' War was the climax of centuries of political disunion envenomed by religious fanaticism. It quickly developed into a horrible butchery in which the Germans slaughtered each other wholesale. For thirty long years the flower of the German race was sacrificed. As the war went on, neighboring nations took a hand in the grim game and fought out their quarrels on German soil. When the war at last ended, Germany was completely ruined. Her civilization had been trampled into the mud and blood of her battle-fields, while her racial stock was hideously mutilated. Germany had lost nearly two-thirds of her entire population. In some regions the loss of life was almost unbelievable: in Wuertemberg, for example, over nine-tenths of the population had perished, while the city of Berlin contained but 300 residents. And far more serious than the loss in numbers was the loss in quality. Perhaps never in the world's history has so much superior human stock been destroyed in so short a time. In those thirty years the German stock had been changed almost beyond recognition. Gone were nearly all those fine strains which had been Old Germany's strength and glory. This was particularly true of Germany's "gentle blood." The type that we call the "gentleman" had been numerous in mediæval Germany.

After the Thirty Years' War it was almost extinct in Germany, and is still comparatively rare. The tactlessness and lack of innate courtesy characteristic of modern Germans seems mainly due to this scarcity of "gentle" blood. When the Thirty Years' War was over, about all that was left alive in Germany was a brutalized soldiery and the toughest of the peasantry. It was this hard, coarse-grained remnant that sired modern Germany. The fact that so much intelligence and ability should nevertheless have been passed on to succeeding generations proves the soundness of Old Germany's human stock.

Besides a general lowering of quality, the Thirty Years' War produced marked changes in Germany's racial make-up. The outstanding fact was a sweeping replacement of the Nordic by the Alpine element. In this, as in other wars, the fighting Nordics were the worst sufferers. Also, the post-war period continued the process of racial displacement. The Thirty Years' War was followed by a generation of squalid poverty. In these wretched conditions the Alpines, more stolid and coarser fibred than the Nordics and with lower living-standards, had a better chance of survival. The upshot was that when Germany emerged into better times she was racially much changed. Instead of being predominantly Nordic, as she had been hitherto, Germany had become mainly Alpine in blood. And the race-lines which were then laid down were substantially those which exist to-day. The Nordic elements of Southern and Eastern Germany had been largely destroyed, the peasantry being practically pure Alpines, while such Nordic blood as did remain was confined chiefly

to the upper classes. Only in Northern Germany, particularly in the northwest (where the Slav tide had never penetrated), did the population remain essentially Nordic in type.

Another important point which should be noted is that it was during this period that there took place the extensive racial intermixture which characterizes modern Germany. Before the Thirty Years' War there seems to have been comparatively little intermarriage between Germany's racial stocks. The Alpines were mostly serfs bound to the soil, while the Nordics of all classes—nobles, burghers, and free peasants alike—appear to have possessed a strong racial consciousness and pride of ancestry. Society in Old Germany was decidedly aristocratic, and intermarriage between classes was therefore relatively infrequent. The Thirty Years' War, however, shattered the old social fabric and greatly mixed the population. In time, to be sure, society re-formed, largely along racial lines, the superior intelligence and energy of Nordic blood rising naturally into the upper and middle social classes. But the old clearness of race-lines was blurred. Even the upper classes now contained much Alpine blood, while the general population, especially in Central Germany, became the mixed stock which it so evidently is to-day.

This general "Alpinization" of German blood produced corresponding changes in German ideals and institutions. The spirit of Old Germany had been a Nordic spirit. Its strong individualism and energetic originality in thought and action was like that of other Nordic lands such as England and the Scandinavian nations. After the Thirty Years' War, however, the German spirit became largely

Alpine in character. The mass-nature of German public opinion, its reliance upon authority, and its submissiveness to strong, masterful minorities are all typically Alpine traits.

The Thirty Years' War is thus the key to a correct understanding of modern Germany. It is also the key which locks an iron door between modern Germany and its mediæval past. Those two Germanys are profoundly different in character—and unfortunately Old Germany was by far the superior. Modern Germany was born in the Thirty Years' War; its destiny was irrevocably determined in the fatal year 1618, more than three centuries ago, when Old Germany committed suicide. Thenceforth Germany's position in Europe was immensely weakened, while her future in the world at large was gravely compromised. For two centuries Germany remained a mere geographical expression, racked by internal disunion and preyed upon by ambitious neighbors. Not until the year 1871 did Germany attain political unity and gain a position of power and security comparable to that which she had enjoyed hundreds of years before.

The German Empire founded in 1871 was largely the work of a commanding personality—Bismarck. Bismarck is a much misunderstood figure. Though often denounced as a brutal militarist, Bismarck was in reality a great statesman with keen vision and a firm grasp on realities. He knew that Germany needed above all things to consolidate her new-won unity. Realizing as he did the latent dangers of Germany's position, with no natural frontiers to east or west to guard against possible attack from France and Russia, he felt that Germany should be well-

armed, but he did not believe that Germany should engage in ambitious foreign policies. So long as he remained at the helm of the ship of state, German foreign policy was conservative, aiming chiefly at the maintenance of the then-existing European political situation.

Bismarck was forced from power by the young Emperor William II in the year 1890, and it is then that Imperial Germany began its policy of expansion which culminated in the Great War. However, we must be careful to understand the facts of the case if we are to get a clear idea of what actually occurred. The notion that in 1890 Germany deliberately began plotting the conquest of the world, with Kaiser Wilhelm the arch-villain of the plot (as is still widely believed), is an absurdity of war-hysteria and propaganda. The truth of the matter is that Kaiser Wilhelm was a rather flighty personality, well-meaning but torn between romantic dreams of German greatness and common-sense warnings against the dangers which an expansive foreign policy might involve. Unfortunately, he kept the warnings well hidden but voiced his romantic dreams in flamboyant speeches which inflamed German ambitions and alarmed Germany's neighbors.

German public opinion was by this time getting into a mood which needed curbing rather than spurring. The chief reasons for this state of mind were intense patriotic exuberance and increasing economic prosperity. The attainment of political unity after centuries of disunion and weakness, and the sudden rise to a leading position in Europe, made Germans glow with pride and exultation. Patriotic optimism stressed the bright spots in Germany's past. The glories of Old Germany were acclaimed, while

darker days were forgotten. All this was natural and might not have been harmful if Germany's leaders had kept their feet on the ground. Unhappily, Germany's rapid rise to power and prosperity swept most of Germany's spokesmen into the prevailing tide of boundless optimism. Germany's economic development, in particular, was truly extraordinary. In the forty-three years which elapsed between the founding of the German Empire and the outbreak of the Great War, Germany underwent a prodigious economic transformation, changing from a mainly agricultural country to one of the leading industrial nations of the world. This implied a vast increase in wealth and in population. In 1870 there were about 40,000,000 Germans; in 1914 there were nearly 70,000,000.

And this, in turn, produced a natural trend toward an expansive foreign policy. Germany, having become a "Great Power," aspired to a "place in the sun" proportionate to her new greatness. Unluckily for herself, Germany found her path blocked by grave difficulties. The hard fact was that Germany had come late into the game of empire. While she had lain disunited and impotent, other peoples had moulded the course of world-history. Europe had crystallized into nations just as patriotically self-conscious as Germany herself, and some of these nations had staked out most of the desirable spots in other parts of the world as colonial domains which they were determined to retain. Germany was thus faced by a firmly established world-situation, and it should have been clear to her that any attempt to alter this general situation would inevitably alarm all the "satisfied" Powers and

draw them together in mutual sympathy against the common disturber.

If, then, Germany was resolved to undertake an expansive foreign policy, her best course would have been to limit her ambitions to certain definite aims, concentrate on these, and try to avoid rousing the fears of all not directly concerned. Germany's obvious line of expansion was through Central Europe and the Balkans to the Near East. Here she could count on a powerful ally—Austria, a country controlled by kindred German elements. Such a policy would, of course, imply the possibility of war with Russia, backed by France, who had never forgotten her defeat by Germany in 1870 and who had allied herself with Russia to obtain protection and possible revenge. However, in such a war Germany might hope to be victorious, provided France and Russia were not joined by England. And, though England would of course not relish a German domination of Central Europe, she might stay neutral if Germany did not threaten her more vital interests—particularly her command of the sea. To placate England should, therefore, have been Germany's constant endeavor. Instead, Germany launched into an aggressive naval and colonial policy which alarmed England and drove her into the arms of France and Russia. Europe became an arena of rival ambitions and clashing foreign policies which culminated in the Great War—and Germany's undoing. Handicapped from the start by too many foes, Germany made fresh enemies by her desperate war-measures, and finally went down in defeat and ruin. *Weltmacht oder Niedergang*—"World-Power or Downfall!" had been Germany's furious battle-cry as

she dashed herself upon her enemies' iron ring. And the answer was: Downfall!

This grim tragedy is too vast for petty causes. To lay Germany's blunders solely at the door of a handful of reckless militarists headed by the Kaiser (as is so often done) is nothing short of an absurdity. Germany's foreign policy could never have been carried on unless it had been approved or acquiesced in by the bulk of German public opinion. And pre-war Germany's state of mind displayed a fanatical pride and self-confidence which had lost all sense of reality and proportion. Believing themselves to be far and away the greatest people on earth, the Germans had come to think that almost anything lay within their power of accomplishment. They were thus in a mood to take big risks.

That mood was induced, not merely by their present power and prosperity, but perhaps even more by a misreading of history and a perversion of racial truth. Gazing backward into the past, the Germans saw visions of that Old Germany which had been the leader of Europe, and soon came to identify the "Holy Roman" with the modern German Empire. They did not stop to consider how times had changed; how other nations had developed, and how they themselves might differ from the Germans of former days. Here is where a genuine understanding of racial realities might have helped to clear their eyes, for it was during the closing years of the nineteenth century that knowledge of racial matters became definite and the importance of biology—the science of race—began to be appreciated.

Unhappily, this new science was, in Germany, quickly

perverted into a weapon of jingo propaganda. A powerful group of national-imperialists, headed by popular writers like Houston Stewart Chamberlain, seized upon biology and prostituted it to their own ends. The Pan-Germans asserted that modern Germany is the seat of the tall, blond race which has been the moving spirit of Western civilization; that this modern Germany is racially almost purely Nordic; and that Nordics outside the German nationalistic group are either unconscious or renegade Teutons who should be brought into the German fold. To any one who has good eyesight and a fair sense of humor, let alone any knowledge of history and racial realities, a single glance at the average modern German is enough to show the absurdity of these assertions. Humor has, however, never been an Alpine characteristic, so the Germans swallowed this propaganda wholesale, and came to think of themselves more and more as a *Herrenvolk*—a "Master-Race."

The truth is, of course, that the Pan-Germans were thinking in terms of national-imperialism instead of race, and that they were using *pseudo*-racial arguments as camouflage for essentially political ends. Instead of being almost purely Nordic, modern Germany is predominantly Alpine in race. Probably not more than two-fifths of all the blood in Germany is Nordic, while unmixed Nordic blood is limited to the extreme north and northwestern parts of the country. It has been estimated that of the 70,000,000 inhabitants of the German Empire in the year 1914, only 9,000,000 were purely Nordic in type.

Indeed, one of the chief results of the late war has been a still further diminution of Germany's Nordic blood.

The past decade has witnessed a drain on German vitality second only to that suffered in the Thirty Years' War. During the four war-years over 2,000,000 German soldiers were killed, and at least 1,000,000 civilians died from war-time causes—especially starvation. Also, the great drop in the birth-rate during the war-period prevented fully 3,500,000 Germans from being born. Statistics for the post-war period indicate further heavy vital losses. The birth-rate, though recovering, is lower than before the war, the death-rate (particularly the infant death-rate) is higher, while disease is much more common. And all signs point to the fact that it is the Nordic portion of Germany's population that is suffering the heaviest losses. The late war, like other wars, took a disproportionate toll of Nordic life, while post-war economic and social conditions are less favorable to the Nordic than to the Alpine elements. The social classes hardest hit by the present deplorable financial situation are precisely those that contain the most Nordic blood. Everywhere it is upper and middle classes (particularly the professional and intellectual classes) who are ruined, half-starved, and unable to raise families. On the other hand, the racially mixed working classes of the cities and towns are, generally speaking, in less dire straits, while the mainly Alpine peasantry is relatively prosperous, well-fed, and raising plenty of children.

In fact, the same process is going on in Germany to-day that went on during and after the Thirty Years' War: a decline of the Nordic as compared to the Alpine stock, and an elimination of the more intellectual and cultured elements of both races in favor of those with tougher

fibre and lower living standards, able to survive under hard and squalid conditions of life. These changes in the character of Germany's population are of far greater and more lasting significance than financial matters like the mark and reparations which engross most of the world's attention. I well remember a rather grim chat with a German industrialist when I was in Germany last year. We were discussing Germany's economic and social troubles. "You know," said he, "I'm fundamentally an optimist. Things look pretty black, but in the long run they'll come better, because our people can stand anything. We Germans can take a lot of punishment; we're just too tough to kill. A process of ruthless selection is now going on—a brutal struggle in which the fittest to the new conditions will survive. There may be less 'culture,' but there'll be more 'guts.' The French are making a big miscalculation. They hope to break us; instead, they're getting us in trim. If they want to make us Germans a supremely tough people, they're going about it in just the right way." He was a large, thick-set man, with big teeth and a "hard-boiled" laugh. As I watched him, I thought that he was a very good type of the New Germany that he had in mind.

Whatever may be the final outcome, Germany's immediate prospects are troubled and uncertain. The Versailles Treaty imposed upon Germany conditions more drastic than any before laid upon a beaten nation in modern times. By the terms of the Versailles Treaty, Germany lost outright fully one-tenth of her pre-war area and population—a loss of over 27,000 square miles of territory and more than 7,000,000 people. This involved

the loss of much of her mineral wealth, especially iron and coal—the sinews of industrial life. Besides, Germany lost all her colonies and many other things like shipping and wealth invested abroad. She was also assessed a tremendous war-indemnity. Lastly, she had to submit to a prolonged military occupation of much of her remaining territory by her late enemies and to general measures of supervision and control which restrict her sovereignty. In fact, Germany cannot to-day be considered an independent nation. This situation all Germans bitterly resent. Disarmed as they now are and surrounded by well-armed and watchful neighbors, few Germans believe that defiance of the Versailles settlement is now possible. Nevertheless, they consider the present situation intolerable, and they are determined sooner or later to recover full independence and a revision of the Versailles settlement in one way or another.

This determination will probably survive even fresh misfortunes. Whatever their shortcomings, the Germans are not decadent. On the contrary, they are an unusually tough combination of Alpine and Nordic stocks, both racial elements having been rigorously selected by long periods of ill-fortune. Present-day Germany may lack much of the high-spirited individuality and initiative that old-time Nordic Germany displayed, but in return she has the Alpine's dogged tenacity and willingness to obey the commands of masterful ruling minorities. That was the secret of Imperial Germany's disciplined power before and during the late war. The chances are that a similar régime in Germany will ultimately arise.

CHAPTER VII

DISRUPTED CENTRAL EUROPE

BETWEEN the open plains of Northern Europe and the broken mountain country of the Balkan Peninsula lies the great inland basin of the Danube. The Danube river-basin is the heart of Central Europe. It is a well-defined geographical area. Bounded on every side by highlands or mountain-ranges, it possesses a distinct general unity. Internally, however, the Danube basin is divided into two portions of unequal size. The smaller western portion is mainly hilly or mountainous country; the larger eastern portion is a vast plain.

Nature thus seems to have designed the Danube basin to be politically either one nation or two nations in more or less intimate association. That has, in fact, been the tendency during much of its history—a tendency which was fairly well realized in the "Dual" Empire of Austria-Hungary. But the recent break-up of that empire at the close of the late war reveals dramatically the presence of other factors hostile to the geographical trend. If the Danube basin had been isolated by more inaccessible barriers, political unity would probably have been a certainty. The Danube basin, however, lies in the heart of Europe, and its natural boundaries, while well defined, have not been sharp enough to keep out penetration from all sides. The result has been a confused series of invasions, conquests, and settlements which have overlaid natural unity

with human diversity. Instead of being inhabited by one or, at most, two races building up a home-made culture and political organization, the Danube basin has been a battle-ground of diverse stocks, streaming in from different directions and seeking either to conquer their rivals or to annex their particular part of the Danube basin to homelands lying beyond its natural frontiers. These conflicts of race, language, and nationality have disrupted the half-formed political unity of the Danube basin more than once in the past, and they have just done it again. The peace treaties which closed the late war shattered the Dual Empire of Austria-Hungary and remade the Danube basin into a political crazy-quilt, with frontiers running in defiance of geography and economics, and only imperfectly corresponding even to those divisions of language and nationality which were the excuse for making the new borders.

Of the Dual Empire two diminished remnants are left: the Republic of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary. The Dual Empire was one of the largest and most populous states in Europe. It had a total area of 260,000 square miles and a population of 52,000,000. Of this total, Austria possessed about 116,000 square miles of territory with 29,000,000 population, while Hungary had 125,000 square miles with 21,000,000 people. In addition, there was the dependency of Bosnia-Herzegovina—a federal territory held in common by the two halves of the empire, with an area of 20,000 square miles and about 2,000,000 population. Contrast these figures with the present situation: the Republic of Austria has an area of 32,000 square miles and a population of 6,500,000, while the

present Kingdom of Hungary has an area of 35,000 square miles and a population slightly under 8,000,000. In other words, as a result of the late war, Austria has lost three-fourths of her territory and four-fifths of her population, while Hungary has lost over two-thirds of her territory and almost two-thirds of her population. These lost lands and people have gone chiefly to Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Poland, and Rumania—states which we will discuss in subsequent chapters, since they are linked with Eastern Europe or with the Balkan Peninsula as well as with the Danube basin. In the present chapter we will limit our survey to Austria and Hungary, which are distinctly Danubian states.

The foundations of Austria and Hungary were laid in the period following the fall of the Roman Empire. In that same period likewise originated the germs of their present misfortunes. The fall of Rome was followed by centuries of turmoil. All over Europe mighty movements of population took place. And nowhere were these movements more violent than in the Danube basin. Wave after wave of conquest and migration swept across its broad surface, causing endless complications. Race, speech, and culture became overlaid and confused.

The racial changes were especially sweeping. In very ancient times the Danube basin and the adjacent mountainous regions were alike occupied by populations belonging to the round-skulled Alpine race. Later on, blond Nordic tribes seem to have expelled the Alpines from most of the Danube basin, though the surrounding highlands appear to have remained largely in Alpine hands. This was particularly true of the mountainous region to

the northeast—the region known as the Carpathians. In the Carpathian highlands the Alpines steadily amassed strength and numbers until, in the period following the fall of Rome, they burst out in all directions as the Slav-speaking peoples. In a previous chapter we saw how the Slavs overran the lands now known as Eastern Germany, Poland, and Western Russia. But while this was going on, another great Slav tide surged from the Carpathians over the Danube basin and into the Balkan Peninsula, which was thereby transformed into the predominantly Slav land that it has ever since remained. For a time the whole of Central and Eastern Europe became one vast Slavdom stretching unbroken from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea.

This Slav supremacy was, however, of short duration. From east and west two new streams of conquest set in which soon deprived the Danube basin of its Slav character. Out of the remote East came a series of Asiatic nomad hordes, of Finnish, Turkish, and Mongolian blood. These wild horsemen, ranging far and wide on their shaggy ponies in quest of plunder, found the Hungarian plains (so like their Asiatic homelands) particularly attractive. Slaughtering or enslaving the Slavs, they settled down as masters. The last of these Asiatic invaders were the Magyars, or "Hungarians," who absorbed their nomad predecessors and built up a powerful state which was to endure. Such was the origin of modern Hungary.

While the Asiatic nomads were overrunning the Hungarian plains from the east, the other stream of conquest already referred to was flowing from the west down the valley of the Danube. These western conquerors were

the Germans. Having occupied western Europe after the fall of Rome, the Teutonic Nordics turned their arms eastward, and the conquest of the Danube valley was merely part of the great eastward movement which was redeeming their old German homelands from the Slav invaders. The Germans and the Magyars presently collided with one another. After much fierce fighting they divided the Danube basin between them, the boundary being practically that which exists between Austria and Hungary to-day. This frontier is clearly traced by nature, being the place where the river Danube leaves the hilly country of Austria and enters the great Hungarian plain. Thus the Danube basin was partitioned between two conquering stocks: the Nordic Teutons and the Asiatic Magyars.

This dual conquest of the Danube basin had important consequences. In the first place, it dealt a terrible blow to the Slavs. The Slav world was thereby cut in twain, the Slav peoples of the Balkans being thereby sundered from the main body of their kinsmen by a broad band of Germans and Magyars. Politically and culturally, the cleft remained absolute. Racially, however, the situation was not so definite. Here emerges a second point which must be remembered: the way in which, throughout the Danube basin, race-lines are blurred and cross-cut by non-racial factors like language, culture, and national consciousness. Neither the Teutonic Nordics in Austria nor the Asiatic Magyars in Hungary destroyed the earlier populations. Instead, they imposed themselves as conquerors and ultimately intermarried extensively with the subject elements. For this reason both

the Austrians and the Hungarians became racially mixed peoples, pretty thoroughly crossed by various racial elements. To be sure, the Teutonic and Magyar strains remained dominant and gave the political and cultural tone to their respective countries; nevertheless, the physical type and temperament of both stocks rapidly altered. The Austrian Germans differ distinctly from their kinsmen even of South Germany, and differ still more widely from the pure-blooded Teutonic Nordics of North Germany. As for the Magyars, they underwent an even profounder transformation. The modern Magyars are so saturated with Alpine and Nordic blood that they have lost most of their ancestral Asiatic traits and have become almost wholly "European" in appearance.

Throughout the Middle Ages, Austria and Hungary grew in power and prosperity. As yet they were entirely independent of one another, their political interests lying in different directions. Hungary was concerned chiefly with east European or Balkan matters, while Austria became linked more and more closely to Germany. Austria's fortunes presently came to be guided by a famous princely family, the House of Habsburg. The Habsburgs gradually raised Austria from a frontier district to the most powerful German state and made their capital, Vienna, one of the chief cities of Europe.

Habsburg Austria steadily prospered, but Hungary was destined to be stricken down by a terrible foe—the Turks. At the close of the Middle Ages the Ottoman Turks burst into Europe, overran the Balkan Peninsula, and then attacked Hungary. In the fateful year 1526, the flower of the Hungarian nation was annihilated in a

great battle and Hungary fell under Turkish rule. For nearly 200 years Hungary was a Turkish province. Then the Habsburgs drove out the Turks, but for the Hungarians this meant little more than a change of masters, since they now fell under Habsburg sway. Hungary was only the shadow of its old self. The best of the Hungarian stock had been killed by the Turks or had fled into exile, and when the Austrians expelled the Turks, the land lay half-depopulated. Herein was the root of Hungary's later misfortunes. Down to the time of the Turkish conquest the Hungarian plains had been inhabited almost entirely by a "Hungarian" people—that is to say, by a population which, though of mixed Magyar and European blood, was Magyarized in speech and culture, and therefore felt itself Magyar in nationality. Only in the mountainous border districts had the old Alpine populations kept their Slav speech and self-consciousness. After the Turkish conquest, however, the situation radically altered. The non-Magyar mountaineers descended into the half-deserted plains, turning many regions once Magyar into Slav-speaking areas. Indeed, the Habsburg rulers of Hungary intensified this process by systematic colonization, inviting in settlers from many lands, who turned parts of Hungary into racial checker-boards, with almost every village differing in blood, customs, and language from its neighbor.

The Magyars hated their Habsburg masters and longed for their old independence. However, Austrian rule did promote Hungary's material prosperity. The Danube basin is an economic whole, and now that it was politically united the natural economic tendencies could work

unchecked. Down to the middle of the nineteenth century the Habsburg Empire was in some respects the most powerful state in Europe. Steadily expanding, it annexed many territories lying outside the Danube basin, parts of northern Italy, Poland, and the Balkans being included within its frontiers. Furthermore, through its historic connection with Germany, it was the leading German state.

The nineteenth century, however, raised up an enemy to the Habsburg Empire which was destined to be its undoing. This enemy was not a rival state but an idea: the idea of Nationality. The nineteenth century has often been called the Age of Nationality. All over Europe men began thinking in nationalistic terms, and desiring to remould their political institutions on nationalistic lines.

Right here we should understand the true meaning of Nationalism, and should closely distinguish it from Race, with which Nationalism is so often confused. Nationalism is, at bottom, a *state of mind*. Nationalism is a *belief*, held by a large number of persons, that they constitute a "Nationality"; it is a sense of *belonging together* as a "Nation." This "Nation," as visualized in the minds of its believers, is a people organized under one government and dwelling together in a distinct territory. When the nationalist ideal is realized, we have what is known as a body-politic or "State." But a state need not necessarily be a nation; its subjects may not possess national feeling. National feeling may be aroused by many things like blood-kinship, political association, language, culture, religion, or geography. Some of these elements must be present to make a nationality, but a strong national feeling may arise

even though some are absent. Blood-kinship ("Race") is one of the strongest factors which can go to make up a nation. It is not indispensable, but its absence is always a hidden weakness, which may reveal itself at any time. It will undoubtedly become increasingly important for harmonious national life as men realize its full significance and come to think more and more in racial terms. However, that must not obscure the fact that Race and Nationality are, in themselves, two distinct things. Nationality is a state of mind. Race, on the other hand, is a physical fact, which may be accurately determined by scientific tests such as skull-measurement, hair-formation, and color of eyes and skin. In other words, Race is what people physically *really* are; Nationality is what people politically *think* they are.

The difficulty for the Habsburg Empire was that it took account neither of Nationality nor of Race. It was an old-fashioned "Empire," founded on the principle of loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty and on certain geographical tendencies, chief among these being the natural unity of the Danube basin, which promoted the material prosperity of its inhabitants. To the principle of Nationality, in particular, the Habsburg Empire was not merely indifferent but positively hostile. Its ideal was the old Roman Empire, and the Habsburg monarchs called themselves "Emperors," and considered themselves the successors of the Roman Caesars. They long governed as absolute rulers, supported by a nobility, a bureaucracy, an army, and an established church, all "imperialist" in spirit, drawn from all parts of the empire yet united in common loyalty to the Emperor.

On this old-fashioned dynastic empire the principle of nationality worked like a powerful explosive. Region after region began thinking "nationally," glorifying its particular language and culture, demanding local self-government or even dreaming of independence. In the year 1848 a series of revolts broke out, the most serious being the rebellion of Hungary. This was only natural, because, as already stated, the Magyars had always disliked Habsburg rule, and had never given up hopes of independence. After much bloody fighting these revolts were put down and the Habsburgs re-established their absolute government. But within twenty years a series of fresh misfortunes forced them to change their policy. Their old rival, Prussia, expelled Austria from Germany and transformed Germany from a loose federation into a modern nation-state. The rising tide of Italian nationalism likewise drove the Austrians from their north Italian provinces and forged Italy into another nation-state. Meanwhile, nationalist movements in other parts of the Habsburg Empire steadily grew in strength.

Weakened by these disasters, the Habsburgs bolstered up the tottering empire by compromise. Unable to resist entirely the nationalist principle, they took the two leading nationalities into partnership. In the year 1867, the Habsburg realm was transformed into the "Dual Empire" of Austria-Hungary. Though preserving certain common institutions like a single army, navy, and diplomatic service, the two halves of the empire were politically distinct. In Austria the Germans, and in Hungary the Magyars, were put in command to control the lesser nationalities such as Czechs, Croats, and Rumanians.

Under this system Austria-Hungary lived for half a century, until the Dual Empire was destroyed at the close of the late war.'

It is interesting to speculate whether Austria-Hungary might have survived if the war had not taken place. Because the Dual Empire did in fact die in the war is not necessarily proof that it would have died anyway.¶ Despite the nationalist disorders which racked its frame, the Dual Empire was a real political organism possessing many qualities that tended to keep it together. For one thing, the geographical unity of the Danube basin created ties of self-interest which were growing rapidly stronger as the country became more industrialized and its inhabitants more interlaced by economic co-operation. Also, there was the old "imperialist" feeling of the powerful upper classes, and the almost fanatical loyalism of the populations of certain provinces like Tyrol, where historic devotion to the Habsburg dynasty survived unchanged. Lastly there were other unifying factors, less capable of exact definition, yet none the less existent. It must be remembered that the Habsburg Empire was not a sudden or recent creation; that, on the contrary, it was the product of many centuries of growth. Its inhabitants, therefore, were not just so many Germans, Slavs, Magyars, and Rumanians, dropped down haphazard upon the map; they had all been modified by long-standing political, economic, and cultural association. These factors may have been subtle, yet they were certainly present. Any one who knew Austria-Hungary before the war will remember the distinctive "Austrian atmosphere," so intangible yet so self-evident wherever

you crossed the Austrian frontier. You could not precisely lay your finger on it, but you knew that it was there.

Of course, Austria-Hungary might have exploded even without the shock of the Great War, and at best it would have had to pass through a long and troubled transition period. Austria-Hungary could probably never have become a strong, harmonious nation-state, made up as it was of many national and racial elements. Still, some formula for such a loose federalism might have been devised by which these elements could have subordinated their nationalistic differences to their common economic interests.

However, it was not to be. The war destroyed the Dual Empire and the peace treaties cut Central Europe into a number of little nations. The results have been deplorable. Conditions in Central Europe to-day are far worse than they were before the war. Nationalistic passions have become even more inflamed, while economic considerations have been absolutely disregarded. Few treaties have ever been drawn more stupidly than those which pretended to "re-settle" the Danube basin. Mr. Lloyd-George, one of the chief treaty-makers, later confessed his error when he exclaimed ruefully: "We have Balkanized all that part of Europe!"

Lloyd-George stated the bald truth. That geographical unity, the Danube basin, has been slashed by a network of frontiers which are not merely fortified political borders bristling with soldiers but are also tariff-walls that strangle trade and kill prosperity. Raw materials are cut off from their factories, factories are cut off from their natural

markets, rich harvests are kept from starving cities; yet so fanatically jealous are the new nations of one another that they are ready to keep themselves poor if they can thereby prevent their neighbors from growing rich. That is, indeed, good "Balkan" doctrine, as we shall see in a later chapter when we come to examine the affairs of those troubled lands. Meanwhile, let us here observe what has happened to post-war Austria and Hungary—the diminished remnants of the Dual Empire.

We have already seen how both countries have shrunk in area and population, these cessions involving also the loss of most of their raw materials and other sources of wealth. Austria and Hungary have alike passed through terrible times since the war. Austria rapidly collapsed into bankruptcy and the impoverishment of her city population, as Germany is now doing. Hungary had an even worse experience. She was cursed with a Bolshevik revolution which developed into a bloody reign of terror and ended with a combined counter-revolution and foreign intervention, leaving her half ruined and utterly disorganized. Though alike afflicted by misfortune, it is interesting to observe how different are the attitudes of the two peoples, the Austrian Germans being apparently broken in spirit, whereas the Magyar spirit is most emphatically unbroken. This difference in attitude is due partly to racial differences in the two stocks and partly to the fact that the Austrian Germans never possessed a real national consciousness while the Magyars have been a true nationality for centuries.

We have already seen that Old Austria was in many ways a survival from another age. With its ideals founded

on Roman and Mediæval Imperialism, it was a sort of political dinosaur living on in an increasingly nationalist Europe. Though Austria was trying to adapt itself to modern conditions, the Great War caught it in transition, and it perished. Now Old Austria centred in the German-speaking provinces, its heart being the capital-city—Vienna. The Austrian Germans were practically untouched by nationalism. They were not, and never had been, a "nation." Instead, they were the favored element in a dynastic empire. Their political creed was, therefore, not national patriotism, but rather a curious blend of feudal and imperial loyalty to the reigning House of Habsburg. This attitude was most marked in Vienna. Habsburg Vienna, like ancient Rome, was an "imperial" city; its inhabitants prided themselves on being citizens of the capital of the Habsburg Empire, with its traditions stretching back through the Middle Ages to the Roman Cæsars. They were distinctly "cosmopolitan" in spirit—and they were also cosmopolitan in blood, because Imperial Vienna had for centuries attracted people not only from all parts of the Habsburg Empire but from all parts of Europe. The Viennese show their varied ancestry by their lively quickness as well as by their superficial instability, both being characteristic of highly mixed populations.

Such was the people upon whom descended the catastrophe of 1918. Almost without warning their empire was shattered and the Habsburgs disappeared. This sudden disaster acted like a blow in the solar plexus. The Austrian-Germans were stunned—paralyzed. Then came fresh misfortunes: financial collapse, bankruptcy, starva-

tion. Beneath the force of these terrific blows the Austrian spirit broke. No more amazing transformation has probably ever occurred than that between the Vienna of ten years ago and the Vienna of to-day. The soul of the city has basically altered, and "Imperial" Vienna is as dead as the Cæsars. Few Austrians even dream of regaining their former greatness. The Viennese, in particular, have renounced their past, have resigned themselves to their loss, and limit their hopes to a modest future. One feels of the Viennese that here is a people which has ceased to struggle; which has, so to speak, "thrown up the sponge."

The past being not only dead but buried, the interesting question arises as to what shall be German Austria's future. The catastrophe of 1918 left the Austrian Germans in a sort of political vacuum. Of course, as always happens in such cases, the Austrian Germans began casting about for new gods to take the place of the old. Never having possessed a national consciousness of their own, the "nationality" artificially imposed upon them by the peace-treaties seemed to most Austrians little short of an absurdity. Feeling that the "Republic of Austria" was a mere paper creation which could not stand alone, the overwhelming majority of the Austrian Germans instinctively turned to the idea of political union with their kinsmen to the northward, their programme being the entry of German Austria as a federal state, a sort of second Bavaria, into the German *Reich*. This seemed the most natural thing to do, not only owing to present circumstances but also because German Austria had formed part of the old Germanic Federation down to the year 1866, when, as the result of a war between Austria and Prussia, the loose-

knit Germanic Federation had been transformed into a modern nation-state from which Austria had been excluded. In addition to this historic reason, the Austrian Germans also felt that their desire to join their German kinsmen was based on clear moral right, because the peace treaties had been drawn ostensibly according to the principle of "self-determination." The Austrian Germans, however, were in for a rude awakening. Their plea to be allowed to join their German kinsmen was sternly denied by the victorious Entente Powers, particularly by France. The Austrian Germans were given clearly to understand that union with Germany would under no circumstances be permitted; that logic must yield to Allied self-interest; and that the principle of "self-determination," however fine in theory, did not apply to the vanquished.

Thus thrown back upon themselves, surrounded by hostile neighbors, and with no patriotic faith to give them moral strength, the Austrian Germans fell into despair, covered their debts by inflating their currency, and plunged into a slough of misery and bankruptcy from which they were rescued only by the unique expedient of an international receivership. This is one of the most interesting experiments which have been tried in post-war Europe. It began in the autumn of the year 1922, when Austria was granted an international loan supervised by the League of Nations. At that moment Austria's situation seemed hopeless; she was bankrupt and literally starving. Her government had solemnly warned the world that it could no longer carry on and that, unless something were speedily done, collapse and probably chaos would ensue. The loan averted bankruptcy, stabil-

ized the currency, and improved the general economic situation. Austria is to-day in fairly good shape, its inhabitants enjoying an increasing measure of moderate well-being. Vienna, in particular, has been saved from threatened ruin and is fast reasserting its position as the natural financial and commercial centre of Mid-Europe.

But all this has to be paid for, and the price is a practical loss of independence. We must remember that Austria is no longer an independent state; that it has passed under international control exercised by the League of Nations. The real ruler of Austria is the League, acting through its commissioner in Vienna. The commissioner is an able Dutchman who uses his power most tactfully. He is not formally part of the Austrian Government, his position being "merely" head of the League Commission to protect the international loan. But, of course, in reality he has the last word, because he makes the loan payments which alone keep Austria from bankruptcy, and since these payments are made monthly he has the power to close the purse-strings if the Austrian Government should decline to follow his recommendations.

It is really an extraordinary situation, this spectacle of a people only a few years ago the heart of a great empire now fallen under an international receivership. Nothing like it has been seen since Lord Cromer became "financial adviser" to the bankrupt Khedivial Government of Egypt a little less than half a century ago. So far, the strange experiment has proved a success. But even should it continue to be a success, that should not blind us to the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Austria we have a people with no real national consciousness, whose historic

past has suddenly been shorn away. In the dark days before the League took control it is literally true that nobody cared whether the "Republic of Austria" lived or died. In this frame of mind, the Austrians were quite ready to barter away an independence for which they cared nothing in return for financial assistance coupled with international control. This situation cannot be duplicated anywhere else in Europe. To peoples with real national consciousness, loss of independence is a supreme disaster. Therefore, even if other peoples should be tempted by suffering to follow Austria's example, the chances are that they would try to shake off foreign control as soon as their condition had slightly improved, while from the very beginning they would not give that moral assent which alone could insure the lasting success of the undertaking.

Assuming that German Austria does acquire enough economic strength and political stability to exist as an independent state, what is to be its future? This raises one of the most interesting and important questions that the Europe of to-morrow will have to face. The blotting out of Austria's past leaves something like a clear field and opens up several possible lines of development.

The most likely possibility still seems to be ultimate union with Germany. Not to-day, of course: the veto of the victors in the late war is absolute, while in addition Germany's present condition is so bad that few Austrians would under existing circumstances care to join Germany even if the Entente veto were removed. Even the leaders of the "Pan-German" party in Austria, the champions of political fusion with the *Reich*, admit frankly that their

programme is "*Zukunftsmusik*"—"music of the future." Yet sooner or later the chances are that Germany will regain stability and strength, while the diplomatic line-up in Europe shifts almost from year to year. Should Austria get the chance to join Germany under such altered conditions, would she do so?

The chances are that she would. History, language, culture, and to a lesser degree blood-kinship and geography, all point that way. However, it is not a certainty. Another possibility presents itself: the possibility that German Austria may continue to stand alone and may ultimately develop an individual political consciousness, part national, part international, which will make of Austria a permanently neutralized state—a sort of second Switzerland. Although the Austrians do not to-day possess a national consciousness, they have long had a local consciousness and a culture in many ways distinct from that of their kinsmen of the *Reich*. Also, it must not be forgotten that their racial make-up differs somewhat even from their south German neighbors', and differs markedly from that of North Germany. This shows clearly in the Austrian temperament, particularly the temperament of the Viennese. If Austria should remain independent for even ten or twenty years, these factors might engender a real national consciousness on the Swiss model. Such an Austria would probably be safe from attack, because it would menace no one, while its neighbors are so jealous of each other that they might welcome a neutral Austria in their midst.

Even these two alternatives do not exhaust the list of possibilities. German Austria might conceivably join

Hungary in some form of partnership, thereby reproducing the old Dual Empire on a small scale. Again, Austria might join some future "Danube Federation" or Danubian customs-union, should the states of Central Europe ever be able to harmonize their political and economic interests. Or, lastly, Austria may fly to pieces and be absorbed by its various neighbors. Which of these things will happen no one can say. The important point to remember is the fluid condition of Austria's state of mind, which makes any one of these various developments a possibility.

Utterly different is the situation in Hungary. Unlike Austria, Hungary was one of the first states in Europe to acquire a national consciousness. Hungary's national life runs back for a thousand years, and its people feel an intense national patriotism. The Magyars are an unusually high-spirited folk. The fierce, warlike blood of their nomad ancestors still runs hot in their veins, and despite extensive intermarriage the Magyar stock differs perceptibly from the other Central European peoples. It is really extraordinary to see how boldly the Magyars confront ill-fortune. No broken spirit here! Partitioned, impoverished, burdened with debts and war-indemnities, disarmed by the peace treaties and surrounded by watchful enemies, the Magyars grimly refuse to resign themselves to their present fate and sternly resolve to right what they consider to be the wrongs inflicted upon them. High and low, rich and poor, noble and peasant, the Magyars denounce the peace-treaties and swear to obtain their revision in one way or another. Everywhere one sees maps contrasting Hungary's pre-war and post-war

frontiers, these maps further bearing the significant words: *Nem! Nem! Sohar!* ("No! No! Never!")

This does not mean that Hungary is likely to start a war to-morrow. Though high-spirited, the Magyars are also an intelligent people, and their present leaders are capable men who understand the situation. They know that for the time being little can be done. But they will also tell you frankly that the Hungarian people will not permanently endure conditions deemed intolerable. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that Magyar bitterness is constantly exasperated by the plight of their brethren who have passed under foreign rule. Nearly one-third of the whole Magyar stock (about 3,000,000 people) to-day lives in Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, or Rumania, where their lot is a hard one. In Czechoslovakia the Magyars seem to be less harshly treated, but in Jugoslavia and Rumania they are badly persecuted, the position of national minorities in those two countries being probably the worst in Europe. And of course every story of injustice and suffering leaks across the frontiers (however closely guarded), further inflaming Magyar determination to aid their persecuted kinsmen.

All this is well known to Hungary's neighbors. Fearing the Magyars' fierce fighting qualities, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania, who have alike profited so largely at Hungary's expense, have formed an alliance (the so-called "Little Entente") the main object of which is to uphold the peace-treaties, preserve intact the new frontiers, and keep Hungary down. For the moment the task is easy: the peace-treaties forbid Hungary to have more than the skeleton of an army, while the Little En-

tente Powers can arm as much as they choose—and are, in fact, armed to the teeth. But how about the future? The Little Entente knows that the Magyar spirit is unbroken and that some sudden shift in European politics may give Hungary her chance of revenge. This naturally alarms and exasperates Hungary's neighbors, and tempts them to think of "preventive measures." The exceptionally cool-headed leaders who guide Czechoslovakia's destiny apparently frown on such proposals, but in Yugoslavia and Rumania sentiment is less restrained. In both the latter countries there is an influential body of opinion which would like to smash the Magyars and practically wipe Hungary off the map.

Thus we see a vicious circle of mutual hatred which may at any time plunge Central Europe once more into war. And we must also remember that to the southward lies the Balkan Peninsula—a veritable powder-magazine of national feuds. A spark struck in the Balkans could easily touch off an explosion which would shatter Central Europe as well. Meanwhile Central Europe fails to attain either true peace or prosperity. The situation is frankly bad, and there are few signs of real improvement.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ALPINE EAST

CONDITIONS in Eastern Europe can be described in two words: complexity and instability. This is true not merely of the present but also of the past. Nature herself is primarily responsible. Eastern Europe is a vast plain stretching from Germany across Russia to the Ural Mountains. Furthermore, Eastern Europe is itself only part of a larger whole, because the Urals are no true barrier and beyond them lie the even vaster plains of Siberia, which go clear to the Pacific Ocean. Indeed, Eastern Europe is really a borderland between Europe and Asia, and partakes of both continents in its geography, its climate, and the character of its inhabitants. For ages it has been the scene of vast racial movements. These endless plains with their long, navigable rivers invite migration. There countless tribes and nomad hordes of diverse races have wandered, meeting and mingling their blood. In Eastern Europe race-lines tend to become blurred, its inhabitants being mostly of mixed stocks. This has, however, not resulted in a uniform mixture. The land is so vast, the climates are so varied, and the migrations have come from such different directions, that the populations of different regions vary widely from one another in racial make-up, though with a good deal of border-crossing. This combination of wide migration and varied local race-mixture has likewise produced a complex overlapping of languages,

religions, and cultures, while the interplay of all these factors has resulted in profound instability—especially in political matters. States and “empires” have arisen rapidly—and as rapidly disappeared. Here and there populations have developed a national consciousness and have therefore crystallized into “nations.” But even they lack the stability of western nations: their territories are not separated from their neighbors’ by natural frontiers, and they often contain within their political borders elements which have not been assimilated into the national life. Eastern Europe is thus a world still in the making, where frontiers are still fluid and where great political changes may yet take place.

Over the greater part of this immense area one basic factor has long been active—the spread of Alpine blood and Slav speech. For the past thousand years the Alpine Slavs have been expanding over Eastern Europe, so that they to-day form the common element in the various racial and national combinations which have taken place. This is the outstanding point to remember in Eastern Europe’s complex history. In previous chapters we have observed the great outpouring of the round-headed Alpine Slavs from their Carpathian homeland westward into Germany and southward through the Danube basin to the Balkans. Let us now follow this same movement northward and eastward into what is to-day Poland, Russia, and other east-European regions.

When the Slav masses began pouring over Eastern Europe, they found a land generally level but diversified by climate into wide, treeless prairies, dense forests, deep swamps, and half-desert plains. The forests and swamps

lay to the north, with a cold climate and heavy rain or snowfall. South of the forest belt began the open country—at first fertile prairie but gradually shading off to the southeast into less fertile plains with diminishing rainfall until, on the borders of Asia, they became waterless deserts. These southern deserts and arid plains (known as “steppes”) were already occupied by Asiatics—Turkish or Mongol nomad hordes moving in from Asia. The rest of Eastern Europe was then sparsely inhabited by blond Nordic tribes, mingled in the far north with Asiatic Finnish stocks which had wandered in from Siberia.

Such was the land into which the migrating Slavs made their way, a little over a thousand years ago. What followed was, not so much a conquest as a confused interpenetration. The Slavs were split up into a multitude of independent groups, while the native Nordic and Finnish populations were equally unorganized. After a certain amount of obscure fighting, the newcomers and the older elements seem to have rapidly mingled, the more numerous Alpine Slavs contributing the largest share in the new racial combination. The steady Alpinization of Russia and Poland, together with its gradual and mainly peaceful character, has been proved by numerous studies of ancient burial-mounds and old Russian and Polish graveyards. The prehistoric burial-mounds contain the bones of a long-skulled population unmistakably Nordic in type. Alpine round-skulls do not become frequent in Russian and Polish burial-places until about 900 A. D. Thereafter the proportion of round-skulls increases rapidly until in a few centuries it becomes the prevailing type, thus showing the steady replacement of the Nordic by the

Alpine racial element. Racial change, however, varies widely with different regions. This is clear not only from historical studies but also by the appearance of the existing population. Not only in their head-forms but also in their complexions, modern Russians and Poles show the effect of varied Alpine and Nordic crossings. The original Slavs were (like all distinctly Alpine peoples) a round-skulled, thick-set, rather dark-complexioned folk. Such is to-day the prevailing type in Southern Russia and Poland, as it also is in the Slav homeland, the highlands of the Carpathians. But in Northern Poland, and even more in Northwestern Russia, a great deal of Nordic blood survives, showing itself in the blond and reddish-blond types so common among the Polish and Russian peasantry of those regions. At the same time, it should be noted that pure Nordic types are rare: so prolonged and general has been the intermingling of racial stocks that in most living individuals Nordic characteristics are found associated with Alpine traits like round skulls and thick-set bodies, thus forming what scientists call "disharmonic combinations." Again, in Northern Russia, the population shows distinct signs of an admixture of Asiatic Finnish blood.

And this by no means describes the whole of Eastern Europe's complex racial make-up. Parallel to the expansion of the Alpine Slavs has gone a series of invasions by Asiatic nomads, mostly Turks and Mongols, who have several times turned back the Slav advance and who have also sown much Asiatic blood among the Eastern European peoples. Asiatic types are to-day not infrequent in Poland and are much more common in Russia, particularly in Southern Russia, where there is much

Asiatic blood. The Russian temperament is clearly part Asiatic in character. That old saying, "Scratch a Russian and you find a Tartar," contains a deal of truth.

Besides the Asiatic strains which have become absorbed in the general population, there exist other Asiatic elements which still remain distinct. Such are the Mohammedan Tartars of Eastern and Southern Russia, kept apart from the surrounding population by barriers of religion and culture. The same is true of the large Jewish population of Poland and Western Russia. The Russian and Polish Jews are a very mixed stock, widely different in type and temperament from the Jews of Western Europe and the Mediterranean basin. These east-European Jews of Russia, Poland, and Rumania together form the so-called "Ashkenazim" branch of Jewry, the west-European and Mediterranean branch being known as "Sephardim." The racial make-up of the Ashkenazim is decidedly complicated. The largest element in their make-up consists of various Alpine strains, acquired not only from the Alpine populations of Europe but also from distant relatives of the European Alpines such as the Armenians and kindred round-skulled stocks of Western Asia. The Ashkenazim possess very little of the old Semitic Hebrew blood. On the other hand, they have a strong Mongolian infusion due to intermarriage with the Khazars, a Mongoloid Asiatic tribe once settled in Southern Russia which was converted to Judaism about a thousand years ago, and was thereafter absorbed by intermarriage into the Ashkenazic stock. It is from the Khazars that the dwarfish stature, flat faces, high cheekbones, and other Mongoloid traits so common among east-European Jews seem to be

mainly due. The mixed racial make-up of the east-European Jews shows plainly in the wide varieties of physical appearance and temperament which appear in the stock, this extreme variability frequently producing very unusual "disharmonic combinations."

One other feature in Eastern Europe's racial make-up should be noted: the ruling aristocracies which have appeared at various times. The inability of Alpines to erect strong states of large size is well illustrated by the Slavs. In practically every case where large, powerful, and enduring states have arisen among the Slav peoples it has been primarily due to a masterful ruling minority differing considerably in race from the Alpine masses. The best example of this is Russia, which from the very beginning of its history has been ruled by minorities chiefly of non-Alpine blood.

Such is the racial and geographical background of Eastern Europe. To describe in detail all the human groupings which have arisen as a result of these varied racial combinations, cross-cut as they have been by political, cultural, and religious factors, would make a book in itself. Let us therefore confine ourselves to a brief survey of the three most important east-European peoples: the Russians, the Poles, and the Czecho-Slovaks. From this survey a good general idea of east-European conditions can be obtained.

We will begin our survey with the Czecho-Slovaks, because this people (divided, as its name implies, into two branches) forms a natural link between Central and Eastern Europe. A glance at the map makes this clear. The

country of the Czecho-Slovaks is a long ribbon of territory running across East-Central Europe almost due east and west. The Czechs inhabit the western portion, the regions known as Bohemia and Moravia, which thrust their mountainous bulk far to the westward, dividing the German plains to the north from the Danube valley to the south. Bohemia, the more westerly of the two regions, is likewise the larger and more important. It is a great plateau in Europe's very heart, ringed about with mountains. Bohemia's dominating position, overlooking as it does both the flatlands of Germany and the Danube valley, has given it the significant title of "The Citadel of Europe."

Moravia, a transition land of hill and plateau, is the link connecting Bohemia with the Slovak country to the eastward—the rugged highlands of the Carpathians, which sweep like a vast bow southeastward for hundreds of miles, dividing the Danube basin from the limitless east-European plains. We now see how geography itself has made the Czecho-Slovaks the link between Central and Eastern Europe. Bohemia seems at first sight to be geographically part of Central Europe. What binds it racially to Eastern Europe is the fact that the only easy entrance to Bohemia is from the east. On its other sides Bohemia's mountain walls rise almost unbroken, and when (as in ancient times) these mountains were clothed with primeval forest they formed an impenetrable barrier to large-scale human migration.

Bohemia's history begins with its settlement by the Czechs. This settlement was part of the great expansion of the Alpine Slavs which took place shortly after the

fall of the Roman Empire. The Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia are the Slavs who migrated due west from the Carpathian homeland. The Slovaks are their kinsmen who stayed behind. These Slovaks, backward and isolated as they have remained, have kept much of the primitive Slav physical type and temperament. However, even the Czechs are to-day racially nearer to the original Slavs than are most of the modern Slav peoples of the east-European plains such as the Poles and Russians, because the Czechs have not come in contact with so many racial elements. The only considerable mixture that the Czechs have undergone has been with Germans. When the Czechs first entered Bohemia they found the country thinly populated with Teutonic Nordics. These the more numerous Czech invaders soon overwhelmed and absorbed. To this early cross the blond traits which appear in the Czech peasantry are mainly due. The Slav strain, however, remained predominant, so that a glance at the present population is enough to show that the modern Czechs are mainly Alpine in race. The extremely round heads, thick-set bodies, and dark hair and eyes so common among the Czech peasantry unquestionably represent the primitive Slav type. The Czech middle classes have more Nordic blood, this being due largely to the later period of German domination. For Bohemia, the western outpost of Slavdom, has been under German control during much of its history. The trend of affairs in Central Europe made this inevitable. When the Czechs invaded Bohemia they formed merely the middle of the great Slav wave which was also rolling over Germany to the northward and up the Danube valley to the south. But presently

the Germans counter-attacked in their great eastward march which rapidly reconquered the German plains and also pushed down the valley of the Danube. The Czechs thus became isolated in their mountain bastion, surrounded by Germans on three sides and connected with the Slav world to the eastward only through Moravia. And presently the Germans began to filter into Bohemia. At first, this movement was a peaceful one. The Czech monarchs, anxious to increase their country's prosperity, welcomed German merchants and artisans who brought to Bohemia their industry and higher civilization. This process of Germanization went on much faster when the old Czech kings died out and were succeeded by a dynasty of German origin. Presently Bohemia and Moravia were connected politically with the Mediæval German Empire and seemed in a fair way to be completely Germanized.

In the later Middle Ages, however, there came a violent reaction. The Czechs awoke to national self-consciousness and began a fierce fight to preserve their national life. The terrible Hussite Wars, though religious in form, were in fact mainly a Czech nationalistic revolt against encroaching Germanism, which was checked for a century. Nevertheless, the Czechs had not gained complete independence, and they presently fell under the rule of the most powerful of the Germanic states—Habsburg Austria. Against Habsburg rule the Czechs soon revolted, their revolt marking the start of the terrible Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), which devastated the whole of Central Europe. This time the Czechs lost. The Habsburgs (who here represented Germanism) took a bloody vengeance upon the rebellious Czechs. Bohemia and Moravia were

half depopulated, while the old Czech nobility was entirely rooted out, their estates being given to foreigners, mostly Austrian Germans. Thus deprived of their natural leaders, the oppressed Czech peasantry sank into a political and cultural stupor which looked like death. Outwardly the land became entirely German, the Czech language being spoken only by peasants.

However, the nineteenth century, that awakener of dormant nationalities, roused the Czechs from their long slumber. A vigorous nationalist revival began, and the increasing economic prosperity which Bohemia then enjoyed favored the rapid growth of a Czech middle and educated class which furnished able leaders to the national revival. Step by step, despite stubborn opposition, the Czechs drove the German minority from their privileged positions and won a large measure of political control. The long struggle, however, aroused increasing bitterness on both sides. The German minority, infuriated by Czech successes and alarmed for its future, openly preached secession from Austria to the German Empire, while the Czech nationalists demanded what amounted to independence: the formation of Bohemia and Moravia as a fully self-governing state wherein they, as the majority, might Slavize the Germans. When Austria refused these demands, the Czech nationalists began planning the break-up of Austria and full independence, fixing their hopes on Russia as their possible liberator.

Bohemia and Moravia were thus full of race-hatred, secessionism, and general unrest when the Great War broke out in 1914. The Czech nationalists hailed the war as their opportunity. Most of the present leaders of

Czecho-Slovakia, such as President Masaryk and Mr. Beneš, were in exile, and these exiled leaders hastened to proclaim their devotion to the Allied cause against the Germanic Empires. The Czechs rendered the Allies good service. When forced by the Austrians to do military service, the Czechs surrendered wholesale, disrupting the Austrian armies. In return, the Allies recognized the Czech claims to independence, and the peace-treaties set up the present Republic of Czecho-Slovakia as a sovereign state.

Czecho-Slovakia has an area of about 54,000 square miles with a population of 13,600,000. As its name implies, it contains not only the Czechs but also their kinsmen the Slovaks. The country forms a long, narrow band stretching across East-Central Europe. This elongated form is one of Czecho-Slovakia's chief weaknesses. Its frontiers are largely artificial and would be hard to defend against attack. Internally, Czecho-Slovakia's main problem is the lack of harmony between the various elements of its population. This is a very serious matter. Of the total population only about three-fifths (8,700,000) are Czecho-Slovaks. There are over 3,000,000 Germans, 800,000 Magyars (Hungarians) 500,000 Ruthenians, or "Little Russians," and fully 600,000 of other nationalities. None of these minorities are really reconciled to the new situation, and they are thus possible sources of trouble, singly or in combination. The powerful German minority in particular, concentrated as it is mainly in Bohemia and thereby in physical touch with the German *Reich*, is bitterly discontented and makes no secret of its hope to join Germany some day.

The situation is made still more serious by the disputes which have arisen between the two sections of the dominant group—the Czechs and the Slovaks. Despite their common origin, there are many differences between them. Losing touch with one another almost at the start, their paths diverged widely and they grew asunder. Unlike the Czechs, the Slovaks have had no political or cultural development worth mentioning. Isolated in their mountains, the Slovaks have remained primitive and backward. For centuries they have been under Hungarian rule, and they have never come in contact with western civilization as the Czechs have done. Also, their territory is poor and barren compared with the Czech lands, which are not only fertile but possess much mineral wealth which has formed the basis of a prosperous industrial development.

The Slovaks are thus very much the "junior partner" in the new concern. Among other things, they are far less numerous than the Czechs, numbering only a trifle over 2,000,000 as against the Czechs' 6,500,000. Nevertheless, the Slovaks possess a distinct local consciousness and assert their claims to consideration. During the late war, when both elements were struggling for a common cause, the Czech leaders promised the Slovaks a large measure of local self-government. Independence once gained, however, the Czechs proceeded to erect a strongly unified state, declaring this to be vital to the country's safety in view of its exposed frontiers and discontented minorities. But this angered the Slovaks, who declared that they had been tricked. The breach was further widened by the economic damage inflicted upon the Slovaks

by the new frontiers. Slovakia's natural market is Hungary. Its rivers and valleys run into the Hungarian plain, and along these natural avenues the Slovaks sent their agricultural and forest products which are Slovakia's sole wealth. The new frontier (which was also a tariff-wall), however, cut off Slovakia from Hungary, and at the same time did not open the Czech lands to Slovak products, because the Czech territories are divided from Slovakia by rugged mountains which make transportation difficult and costly.

So the quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks goes merrily on. Indeed, there are all the makings of an unusually fine family row, for both sides show their kinship by a common obstinacy and tactlessness characteristic of the stock. The chief differences between them are that the Czechs are well-educated, prosperous, and open to modern ideas, whereas the Slovaks are mostly illiterate, poor, and intensely conservative. Neither side makes it easy for the other. The Slovaks regard the Czechs as rich relatives who put on airs and bully their poor relations in intolerable fashion. The Czechs look down on the Slovaks as ignorant, dirty, narrow-minded "country cousins," who must be cleaned up and civilized before they can be given much of a say in running the country. I still smile when I recall the indignant outburst of a Czech when I recounted to him the grievances that a Slovak had recently told me. "Those Slovaks!" snorted the Czech disgustedly. "They make me tired. 'Liberty,' Indeed! The first thing they'd better do is to get de-loused!"

This Czech-Slovak quarrel is a most pressing problem. If it continues, the Slovaks may develop a real "nation-

alism" of their own and instead of demanding merely self-government may plot secession and independence. This is by no means an impossible contingency. For one thing, it would be in line with a political tendency observable among all Slav peoples—the tendency to local particularism. Throughout their history the Slavs have tended to form small political units and have rarely combined in large states except under the pressure of foreign foes or the compulsion of able rulers. But, unless the Czechs and Slovaks do grow together, "Czecho-Slovakia" can hardly survive. A rebellious Slovakia would become one more "minority," playing in with the other minorities against the dominant Czechs. Indeed, statistically speaking, the Czechs themselves would become a "minority," because without the Slovaks they would form less than one-half of the total population. Czecho-Slovakia would thus become a second edition of pre-war Austria, and would in the long run almost certainly suffer the same fate.

The most hopeful aspect of the situation is the presence of some very able leaders, notably President Masaryk and Mr. Beneš, who have displayed great skill in guiding the ship of state. No one can meet and talk with these men without being impressed by their intelligence and statesmanlike common sense. Their wisdom is shown in both domestic and foreign policy. Despite the dangerous temper of the minorities, these are more liberally dealt with in Czecho-Slovakia than in almost any other European country, the Czech leaders realizing that their minorities are too numerous to be crushed and that the only hope of reconciling them lies in moderation. In their foreign

policy the Czech rulers have been cautious and pacific, knowing that if a new explosion should occur in Europe, Czecho-Slovakia, with its exposed frontiers and domestic instability, would be one of the first to suffer.

These wise policies have given Czecho-Slovakia a calmer and more prosperous post-war life than any other country of Central or Eastern Europe. At first sight, indeed, Czecho-Slovakia's future seems already fairly secure. But when one looks below the surface the future appears less certain. Czecho-Slovakia's success has thus far been primarily due to a triumph of able leadership over great inherent difficulties. The more one sees of Czecho-Slovakia, the more one feels that its present rulers are very far above the level of their followers. The average Czech politician or official seems just about as narrow-minded, short-sighted, and intolerant as the politicians and officials of other eastern European and Balkan lands. When Beneš and Masaryk go, will they be replaced by statesmen of equal calibre? On the answer to that question, the fate of Czecho-Slovakia will largely depend.

Turning from Czecho-Slovakia to Poland, we encounter typical east-European conditions: a country without natural frontiers, with a very mixed population, and with languages, religions, and cultures overlapping in extremely complicated fashion. In other words, we find in Poland those conditions of complexity and instability characteristic of Eastern Europe. Poland's past has been a troubled and a tragic one, while Poland's future is menaced by ills similar to those which have caused its previous misfortunes.

The tragedy of Poland is rooted in its geography. Save on the south it has never known the protecting and preserving advantage of natural frontiers. Consequently its political boundaries have shifted and re-shifted as its fortunes rose or declined. And every shift has meant new complications.

The Polish people centres in the inland plains which are drained by the river Vistula. This centre of Polish settlement is shaped like a huge oblong, its southern base resting upon the Carpathian Mountains, Poland's only natural frontier. Along that border the line between Poles and non-Poles is fairly clear. Elsewhere, however, the Polish nucleus shades off into regions inhabited partly by Poles and partly by peoples of other nationalities. In these debatable regions, which stretch west, north, and especially east, and which together form a vast area nearly four times as large as the nucleus of Polish settlement, Polish and non-Polish elements are intermingled in various proportions. The reasons for this complicated situation can be explained only by a glance at Polish history.

The original Poles formed part of the great Slav wave which descended from the Carpathian highlands and inundated Central and Eastern Europe. Originally almost pure Alpines in race, the Poles absorbed a certain amount of Nordic blood from the rather sparse Nordic population which then occupied the Vistula plains, though this Nordic infusion was nowhere strong enough greatly to modify the ancestral Alpine type. The primitive Poles could not be called a "people"; they were a loose mass of small tribes with very slight political cohesion. What welded the Poles into a people with a national consciousness was the

pressure of foreign foes—especially the Germans. We have already noted the great eastward movement of conquest and colonization which the Germans undertook at the beginning of the Middle Ages. It was the Poles who checked the German "March to the East." Among the Poles there arose a dynasty of able chieftains who welded the petty tribes of the Vistula plains into a state strong enough to block the German advance. For about two centuries this early Kingdom of Poland was strong and fairly prosperous. During that period the Poles not only became a nationality but also developed a distinct culture based upon western ideals. This latter fact is a matter of great importance because the Poles were thereby clearly marked off from the Russian Slavs to the eastward. Poland took its Christianity from Rome and thus entered the pale of western civilization. Russia, on the other hand, was converted from Constantinople and became part of Greek Orthodox Christianity and Byzantine Greek civilization. With different faiths and cultures, the Poles and Russians followed divergent paths and presently became bitter rivals for the leadership of Eastern Europe.

However, this rivalry was still in the future. The Russians were as yet too disunited and backward to count for much, while Poland's first national experiment ended in failure. Its ruling dynasty having lost its vigor, Poland broke up into several principalities. In this condition of mutual weakness, Poland and Russia both fell victims to a terrible invasion by the Mongol Tartars. These fierce Asiatic nomads swept like a hurricane over Eastern Europe. Russia was stamped flat under the Mongol hoofs

and remained for centuries under Asiatic control—with lasting effects upon its blood and culture. In Poland the Mongol tide soon ebbed, but it left the land desolated and with Asiatic strains in its population which are visible even to-day.

So weakened had Poland now become that it not only lost ground to the Germans on the west but was also threatened by a new foe from the north—the Lithuanians. The Lithuanians were a group of tribes of primitive Nordic stock who from time immemorial had dwelt among the forests and marshes north of Poland along the Baltic Sea. Unlike the other peoples of Eastern Europe, these warlike barbarians clung doggedly to their ancestral paganism and had remained entirely outside the pale of civilization. Emerging from their forests, the Lithuanians now ravaged both Poland and Russia. At last the Poles agreed to make the Lithuanian leader their King if he would become a Christian and unite the two countries under his sceptre. This he did in the year 1386—a notable date, because under his able rule the combined state of Poland-Lithuania rapidly rose to power. The next two centuries, indeed, are Poland's golden age. Poland-Lithuania became the strongest state in Eastern Europe. The Germans were defeated and huge tracts of Russia were conquered and partially colonized, the Russian inhabitants being reduced to serfdom under Polish-Lithuanian landlords. It was during this same period that the great Jewish immigration took place. At first welcomed and encouraged by the Polish Kings, the Jews flocked in from every side, settling in the towns in such numbers that the Poles at length checked this immigration. However,

the Polish Jews thrived and multiplied, and Poland became thenceforth the numerical centre of the Jewish race.

The Lithuanian dynasty produced a series of able rulers, but after about two centuries the dynasty died out and with its extinction Poland-Lithuania fell into rapid decline. The turbulent and factious nobility (which had always given trouble) seized control and set up a government which was little better than legalized anarchy. The Crown became a mere shadow, while the nobles, split into warring factions, plunged the land into endless confusion. The decadent state, with its vast outlying territories, inhabited by oppressed and rebellious alien elements like Russians and Germans, and with its cities full of unasimilated Jews, became a mere helpless hulk, inviting aggression by more powerful neighbors. And unfortunately for Poland, as it got weaker its neighbors grew stronger. To the westward stood Germanic Prussia, to the southward was Habsburg Austria, while to the eastward Russia at last found herself with Peter the Great, and made ready to regain those Russian lands which Poland and Lithuania had conquered during Russia's time of trouble. Having beaten Poland in several wars and thus discovered her full weakness, Russia, Prussia, and Austria decided to wipe her out altogether. There followed the famous Partitions of Poland (1772-1795) by which Poland disappeared from the map. Russia got the lion's share of the booty, Prussia and Austria receiving smaller, yet valuable, portions.

However, the political extinction of Poland did not solve the Polish problem. The anarchic Polish state died, as it deserved to die; but the Polish people lived. The

very depth of their misfortunes roused the Poles to a fresh national consciousness. Accordingly, the nineteenth century witnessed an intense national revival in all the sundered branches of the Polish stock. Despite their best efforts, Russia and Prussia failed to de-nationalize their Polish subjects. Austria never seriously attempted to de-nationalize her Poles, permitting them a large measure of local self-government. Thus the "Polish Question" continued to vex the politics of Eastern Europe and remained a source of chronic trouble and unrest.

Then came the Great War, which ended by re-creating a Polish state almost as large and populous as mediæval Poland. This result, however, was quite unexpected and was mainly due to an unlooked-for event—the Russian Revolution. When the war began, Polish independence was scarcely mentioned in Europe, while the Poles themselves were divided as to what attitude they should assume. To some Poles Russia was the supreme foe, to other Poles Germany was the most hated enemy. As for Russia, it had very definite ideas on the Polish question, its intention being to seize both Prussia's and Austria's Polish territories and thus bring all Poles under Russian dominion. Had Russia stood by its allies until the end of the war, this would undoubtedly have happened, France and England having agreed that Russia should receive Prussian and Austrian Poland as the spoils of victory. But Russia broke down in 1917, went Bolshevik, and made peace with the Germanic Empires at the most critical moment of the war. Thenceforth the western Allies considered Soviet Russia their enemy, both on account of its desertion of the common cause and on account of

its Bolshevik propaganda which sought to disrupt the Allied nations as part of the Bolshevik programme of "World-Revolution."

Under these circumstances the restoration of Polish independence naturally suggested itself to the western Powers. The Peace Conference, therefore, erected a Polish state to serve as a check on both Germany and Russia, and to keep these two countries from possibly combining to upset the peace-treaties which had been framed largely at their expense. France, in particular, pressed this policy to its logical conclusion. The French argued that since Poland was to be restored primarily to watch Germany and Russia and to keep them apart, she should be made as strong as possible in order to do her work well. That naturally appealed to the Poles. The Poles had never forgotten their old dream of supremacy in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, they demanded frontiers which went even beyond the "historic Poland of 1772." Acting on the old saying: "It's a poor rule that doesn't work both ways," the Poles advanced two utterly contradictory sets of arguments for the same end. Said the Poles: All territories which to-day contain any considerable number of Poles must be Polish, in accordance with the "principle of nationalities." But, likewise, all territories which formed part of the old Polish state, whatever their present population, must also be Polish, to square with other "principles" like "historic justice," and, failing those, "strategic necessity." Lastly, Lithuania was regarded as "Polish" as a matter of course. Such were the claims which the Poles pressed at the Peace Conference which re-made the map of Europe.

The Poles got by no means all they wanted, but they got enough to make the New Poland a very large and populous state. Poland to-day has an area of nearly 147,000 square miles (considerably larger than the British Isles) and a population of over 27,000,000. These territories are mainly fertile and contain much mineral wealth, so that Poland has the possibility of both a prosperous agricultural and industrial life.

Superficially, Poland might seem to have bright prospects. Actually, her prospects are very far from bright. Poland owes her new independence primarily to a lucky turn in European politics, and she has attained her present frontiers not only through the peace-treaties but also by a series of successful aggressions against her neighbors. Poland has "gotten away with" these aggressions through French backing, France regarding Poland as the keystone of her system of alliances, and thus favoring Poland in every way. But Poland's successes have left a legacy of foreign and domestic problems very ominous for the future. Having not only quarrelled but fought bloodily with every one of her neighbors, Poland has not a friend in Eastern Europe. Universally disliked and widely hated, Poland is to-day surrounded by a ring of potential enemies. Even her former partner, Lithuania, has been infuriated by Poland's seizure of Lithuania's chief city, Vilna—about the most barefaced act of aggression that has occurred anywhere since the war. As for Russia and Germany, Poland's most powerful neighbors, they are precisely her most embittered opponents. Poland's present frontiers are a standing challenge to both nations, which they will tolerate just so long as they have to—and not one moment longer.

Furthermore, in addition to these external dangers, Poland is afflicted with grave internal troubles ominously like those which brought Old Poland to decline and ruin. Poland's frontiers are far-flung, but they contain many large and rebellious minorities, while the Poles have already begun to quarrel among themselves as of yore. Of Poland's 27,000,000 inhabitants only a trifle more than half are of Polish blood. The balance of the population consists of over 2,500,000 Germans, nearly 4,000,000 Jews, 4,000,000 Ruthenians, or "Little Russians," and more than 1,500,000 of other nationalities—principally White Russians, Great Russians, and Lithuanians, with a few Czechs and Slovaks thrown in for good measure. None of these minorities likes Polish rule, and the Poles are doing their best to make them like it still less by oppressing them as harshly as the Poles themselves were oppressed by their former Russian and German rulers. Meanwhile the Poles are quarrelling fiercely among themselves, Polish politics being enlivened by riots, assassinations, and kindred disturbances. Furthermore, Poland's big army and other governmental expenditures have plunged her into debt and debased her currency, which is now practically worthless. In fine: although the New Poland has been running less than ten years, conditions begin more and more strongly to resemble those of the "historic Poland of 1772," when Old Poland was partitioned among her neighbors. Unless the New Poland mends her ways, her neighbors may well partition her again. But will Poland mend her ways? Events thus far strongly suggest that the Poles are the Bourbons of Eastern Europe—"learning nothing and forgetting nothing."

All things considered, New Poland seems to be a pretty poor life-insurance risk.

Beyond Poland lies Russia—vast and incalculable. This immense region of huge forests, boundless prairies, and illimitable plains is the borderland of Europe and Asia. Here diverse races have wandered, fought, and mingled, producing strange blends and equally strange contrasts of blood, temperament, and ideals. Despite all the thought and investigation devoted to it, Russia remains essentially unknown, not merely to foreigners but even to Russians themselves. Many Russians frankly admit that the soul of Russia is still an enigma—a mystery. Bolshevism is merely the last of a long series of strange Russian developments which have surprised the world—and Russia probably has other startling surprises yet in store.

The constant factors in Russian history are Alpine blood and Slav speech, which have been spreading eastward and northward for more than a thousand years. Yet these factors are merely the binding strands in a tangled skein. We commonly speak of Russia as a unit; yet true unity Russia has never known. Leaving aside the various non-Russian tribes and peoples which dwell within Russia's borders, the Russian stock is divided into three main branches differing distinctly from one another in blood, temperament, culture, and speech. These three branches are usually called the "Great," "Little," and "White" Russians respectively. Although probably much reduced in numbers by the frightful disasters of the last ten years, the total Russian stock must to-day

number well over 100,000,000. Of these fully 60,000,000 are Great Russians, while over 30,000,000 are Little Russians—this figure including the "Ruthenian" populations under Polish and Czecho-Slovak rule. The White Russians, numbering somewhere between 5,000,000 and 10,000,000, are to-day politically divided between Russia and Poland. It was this diversity of the Russian stock (as well as the idea of their eventual unity) which prompted the title assumed by the former Russian monarchs: "*Czar of all the Russias.*"

The Great Russians are not merely the most numerous but also the dominant branch of the Russian stock. It is they who form the core of modern Russia and who have colonized its outlying dependencies like Siberia. They inhabit the forest zone of modern Russia and extend well into the rich prairie belt to the southward until they merge with the Little Russians. Racially the Great Russians are a cross between Alpine Slavs and the earlier Nordic population, mixed in varying proportions with Asiatic elements. The Nordic strain is strongest to the northwest near the Baltic Sea, fading out gradually inland. However, Nordic traits are widespread, as is shown by the blond and reddish-blond types that are so frequent among the Great Russian population. These Nordic characteristics are usually found in "disharmonic combination" with Alpine and Asiatic traits, thus proving the racially mixed character of the stock. Pure Nordic types are rare save among the upper classes, which are composed largely of Scandinavian and German elements that have entered Russia in comparatively recent times.

The Little Russians centre in the southwest and, as already stated, are not all included within Russia's political frontiers, a large section of the Little Russians living under Polish rule while a small fraction is found in Czecho-Slovakia. The Little Russians have much less Nordic blood than their Great Russian kinsmen but contain more Asiatic strains in their racial make-up, this being due to their prolonged contact with Mongol Tartar and Turkish nomads who often overran their territories. The Little Russians' political disunion and other misfortunes have kept them relatively backward and have given their Great Russian cousins the leadership in Russian affairs. Even more backward, however, are the White Russians, who inhabit the swamp and forest regions of Western Russia. Racially the White Russians have kept closest to the primitive Alpine Slav type. They have never developed a true national consciousness or even a distinctive culture. During the Middle Ages they fell under Polish rule and many of them are to-day included within Poland's new political frontiers.

These three branches of the Russian stock represent distinct crystallizations of invading Alpine Slavs with diverse racial elements in different regions. Russia's early history is an obscure welter of petty tribes over an immense area. Significantly enough, the beginnings of political cohesion were due, not to the Russians themselves but to a foreign ruling element—the Scandinavians. Back somewhere in the dim past adventurous Scandinavian Nordics discovered a trade-route across Western Russia and established commercial contact between their Baltic homeland and Constantinople, then the capital of

the Byzantine Greek Empire and a centre of civilization. Despite their small numbers, these masterful Norse Vikings easily kept in order the petty tribes along the rivers which formed their trade-highway, and as time passed the natives came to regard the strangers as arbiters in their endless intertribal quarrels. Becoming more and more influential, the Norsemen established themselves firmly at several points and at length founded a real state at Kiev, a natural centre in Southwestern Russia situated on the great river Dnieper—the water-route to the Black Sea and Constantinople. The legend of the founding of Kiev is quaintly significant. The story goes that the local tribes were so afflicted by domestic feuds and raids by their neighbors that they invited a famous Viking chief to be their ruler. Their invitation is said to have run as follows: "Our land is great and has everything in abundance, but it lacks order and justice. Come and take possession and rule over us."

Whether or not the legend states the exact facts of the case, certain it is that about a thousand years ago a Norse chief named Rurik did become ruler of Kiev and built up a state which soon became powerful and which laid the foundations of Russian nationality and civilization. It is also noteworthy that the early political centres in northern Russia, like Novgorod and Pskov, lay likewise on the Scandinavian trade-route and seem to have been mainly due to Scandinavian influence.

Kiev long remained the heart of Russia and, owing to its contact with Constantinople, Kiev took its Christianity and civilization from the Byzantine Empire. This is a fact of great importance. We have already seen how

Poland's conversion from Rome brought the Poles within the pale of west-European civilization. Russia, on the other hand, became Greek Orthodox in faith and Byzantine in culture. The breach between the two halves of Christendom went deep, friendly intercourse between them being impossible. Therefore, when Russia became Orthodox she cut herself off from the West and looked eastward for her ideals.

And presently this first link which bound Russia to the East was followed by other links of a very unfortunate character. From their earliest days the Russians had been harassed by Asiatic nomads raiding up from the arid plains that stretched southeastward into Asia. These raids grew steadily more violent until they culminated in the terrible Mongol invasion which marks a sinister epoch in Russian history. The Mongols were hideously cruel, destructive barbarians whose sole ideas were bloodshed and plunder. Sweeping across Russia like a cyclone, they reduced it to ruin and impotence. The budding civilization of Russia was stamped flat under the terrible Mongol hoofs. Kiev was destroyed and all southern Russia depopulated. Only in the forests of the north, beyond the sweep of the Mongol horse, did Russia survive. But it was a barbarized Russia, entirely cut off from the civilized world and subject to Mongol domination. Instead of advancing, Russia retrograded, turning away from Europe toward Asia. Both Mongol blood and Mongol ideas penetrated Russia. And this penetration was degrading, because the Mongol Tartars were bloodthirsty barbarians with nothing to offer except savage ideals of violence and despotism. The Mongol influence upon Rus-

sia has been profound and lasting; to it many, if not most, of the unlovely traits of the modern Russian character seem to be due. "Scratch a Russian and you find a Tartar!" is no idle phrase.

Slowly Russia regained strength and at length a new political centre arose in north-central Russia at Moscow, where a dynasty of able rulers conquered the other Russian principalities, shook off the Mongol yoke, and became the powerful "Czardom of Muscovy." This increase of political strength, however, was not accompanied by any corresponding increase in culture. Down to about two centuries ago Russia remained barbarous and backward, cut off from Western civilization, and more Asiatic than European in its manners and ideals. Russia's political life, in particular, was thoroughly Asiatic in character. The Czars of Moscow had the outlook of Tartar Khans; they were arbitrary despots who were often ferocious tyrants. Thus Russia lived on, a hermit nation; ignorant, fanatically devoted to a degraded Orthodoxy, and steeped in a barbarous mixture of half-forgotten Byzantine culture and Asiatic ideas borrowed from the Tartars.

Suddenly, dramatically, the situation changed. Peter the Great became Czar and determined to "open a window to the West" and let in the light of civilization. Peter was a man of tremendous energy and iron will. He hated half-measures and insisted that he be instantly obeyed. Accordingly, he tried to jump several centuries and ordered Russia to become westernized overnight. But his subjects hung back. Ignorant and fanatical, they clung doggedly to their old ways and refused to embrace a civi-

lization which they did not in the least comprehend. This resistance, however, merely infuriated Peter and hardened his resolution. As much a tyrant as any of his predecessors, opposition seemed to him criminal and intolerable. Accordingly, he not only opened a window but dragged Russia by the hair of the head clear out of its dark house into the Western sunshine, and since he could get little aid from his subjects he imported multitudes of Westerners to act as drill-masters and carry out his orders.

This policy, begun by Peter and continued by his successors, westernized Russia—on the surface. Within a short time Russia looked pretty much like a Western nation. The newcomers from Western Europe (mostly Germans and Scandinavians) together with many Russians converted to the government's policy gave Russia a veneer of Western civilization and formed a ruling class which was almost a caste apart. Beneath this veneer, however, Old Russia lived on, the bulk of the Russian people, especially the peasants, remaining almost untouched by Western influences. Henceforth Russia became more than ever a land of strange contrasts and conflicting ideas, where new and old, east and west, Europe and Asia, jostled, fought, and illogically combined.

These contrasts and conflicts were nowhere better revealed than in Russian political life. Despite its westernizing policy, the Russian Government remained at heart un-westernized. Its spirit was still that of the Tartar Khans, even though it wore European clothes and built railroads. The Russian Government, in fact, tried to borrow the material equipment of Western civilization and fit it to half-Oriental ideals. This experiment, however,

created difficulties which led ultimately to disaster. Though outwardly Russia became a great World Power, inwardly she was torn by mental and spiritual conflicts which grew sharper as time went on. Imperial Russia was thus a giant with feet of clay. Not only did the Russian masses remain instinctively hostile to westernization, but the upper classes quarrelled among themselves. Those Russians who became truly westernized in spirit began demanding that Russia adopt the liberal ideals as well as the material improvements of Western civilization. This, however, the despotic government refused, and the liberal protesters were sent to Siberia. That embittered the liberals and made them revolutionists, while revolutionary agitation in turn further infuriated the government and increased its persecuting activity. More and more Russia became a house divided against itself, and consequently broke down whenever faced by a real test. The preliminary break down took place under the strain of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, when Russia fell into revolutionary turmoil. The old régime just managed to save itself and restore order, but below the surface Russia went on seething and the social foundations were badly shaken. Then came the far heavier strain of the Great War—and Imperial Russia collapsed. The old order being hopelessly shattered, the extreme revolutionary elements took advantage of the chaotic confusion, established their Bolshevik dictatorship, and plunged Russia into a hell of class war, terrorism, poverty, cold, disease, and famine.

Into the horrors and failures of Bolshevism I do not propose to enter. They are well known and need no de-

tailed discussion here. What is not so well known is the important fact that the present Bolshevik government, though differing widely in its economic aims, is in its spirit and political methods strikingly like the old imperial government which it replaced. The outstanding characteristics of the Bolshevik régime are violence and despotism. But those were precisely the outstanding characteristics of the old imperial régime. Russia has thus merely changed tyrants, one despotism having been followed by another. The main outcome of the revolution has been a cracking of the Western veneer which had been imposed upon Russia by Peter the Great. Much of the material equipment borrowed by Russia from the West has been destroyed, while the former upper classes (largely of Western origin) have been killed or driven into exile. The real losers by the revolution are the truly westernized elements who had worked for a Russia westernized in spirit but who now see their illusions shattered. In fact, the revolution was largely a revolt against westernism. In many ways Russia is to-day farther from Europe and nearer to Asia than she has been since Peter opened his "window to the West."

What will emerge from the obscure and troubled transition period through which Russia is passing no one can say. Yet one word of caution is distinctly needed. Many persons imagine that because Russia is a land of huge size, vast natural resources, and immense population, something "great" and "constructive" must necessarily arise. Such persons are thinking in terms of quantity rather than quality. The more we look at Russia's past and Russia's racial make-up, the more we are led to suspect that Russia may not be really great, but merely

big—which is something very different from true greatness. To-day, as in former days, Russia appears as a complex, unstable mass of diverse bloods, tendencies, and ideas. This of course makes possible startling and interesting developments, but it also works against creative, constructive progress. Russia has given birth to many brilliant individuals, but as a people, what has Russia done? This distinction should be clearly kept in mind. Because a stock produces talented writers and artists is no necessary proof that it possesses high political and social capacities. Russian history has been the story of mixed populations dominated by a succession of masterful ruling minorities mainly of foreign origin. Now, no people of high political initiative and creative capacity would be likely to leave the direction of their political and economic life so continuously and so generally in the hands of foreign masters. It is therefore only fair to judge the Russians, not so much by what they have said as by what they have done—or rather, by what they have failed to do.

Brilliancy of thought combined with failure in action is characteristic of the Russians—as it is of many mixed stocks. This is instinctively recognized by Russians themselves. Russian novels are full of attractive young heroes full of ideas who start out to do great things but soon slack off and end in futile melancholy. Russian life seems to be typified in those stimulating yet inconclusive conversations so beloved by Russians, which go on all night long over innumerable cigarettes and cups of tea, and which end at dawn with everybody tired, everything discussed—and nothing settled!

CHAPTER IX

THE BALKAN FLUX

THE Balkans are the "Wild East" of Europe. Abode of half-barbarian peoples fired by crude ambitions and cursed by savage blood feuds, the Balkans are a permanent political storm-centre lying like a perpetual thunder-cloud on Europe's southeastern horizon. Here the late war began, and here new wars may well arise. In fact, the most ominous feature of the situation is that, as a result of the late war, Europe's "Wild East" has spread far beyond its former borders. Instead of being confined to the Balkan Peninsula, as it was before 1914, it now stretches over most of east Central Europe, which has been both politically and spiritually "Balkanized."

The Balkan Peninsula is the easternmost of the three great projections which jut out from the continent of Europe southward into the Mediterranean Sea. Much larger than Italy and somewhat larger than Spain, the Balkan Peninsula differs from them in both its shape and its internal structure. To begin with, it is separated from the European land mass, not by definite mountain chains like the Alps and Pyrenees, but by broad rivers and marshy plains. Again, the Balkan Peninsula is neither a plateau like Spain nor a well-defined land like Italy, but is rather an irregular mass of rugged highlands criss-crossed by short mountain ranges which run in every direction and break up the land surface into many disconnected regions.

Lastly, the Balkan Peninsula is closely connected with both Europe and Asia. Geographically speaking, it is merely the European section of a Eurasian land bridge, divided from the Asiatic section (the peninsula of Asia Minor) by a water rift in places only about a mile wide.

Geographical location and internal structure combine to make the Balkan Peninsula a region of contending forces. A border-land between Europe and Asia, streams of human migration have poured into the Balkans from both continents. Indeed, though geographically part of Europe, the Balkan Peninsula is more open to Asiatic than to European penetration, because its rivers and valleys run eastward or southward while its mountains run in ways which hinder communication with the north and west. Thus turning its back on Europe and looking toward Asia, the Balkan Peninsula has continually invited settlement from Asia, and it is therefore only natural that Asiatic races, religions, and cultures should have invaded the Balkans at various times, while it is equally natural that Europe should have fiercely resisted these Asiatic invasions. Thus fated to be the border-land and battle-ground of two continents, the Balkans have been predestined to chronic turmoil and unrest.

The one thing which might have averted these misfortunes would have been the rise of a strong, stable people which could have welded the Balkans into a political unity and kept out foreign invaders. But that was made almost impossible by the peninsula's internal structure. Broken up by its mountains into many distinct regions more or less isolated from one another, it was not suited to political unity. The Balkan peoples have, therefore,

naturally tended to form many separate groups, and every new stream of invasion has tended to concentrate in some particular region instead of spreading widely over the peninsula. That has made the situation steadily more complex by adding new groups sharply marked off in blood, speech, religion, and culture. In the course of time, to be sure, these various factors have spread and blended. But they have done so only partially and very unequally. Strange combinations have resulted; race, language, religion, and culture have become criss-crossed in truly extraordinary fashion. Thus a sort of vicious circle has been set up: instead of evolving toward unity and stability the Balkan Peninsula has become ever more disunited and unstable—which has made it less able to resist foreign invasions—which have further increased disunion and instability. The significance of all this can be grasped by a glance at Balkan history.

The earliest inhabitants of the Balkans whom we can identify with reasonable certainty were of Mediterranean stock. They occupied the southern part of the peninsula in very early times, though they seem to have dispossessed still earlier stocks of whom practically nothing is known. It was these slender, dark-complexioned Mediterraneans who were the primitive Greeks, and who created the prehistoric civilizations of Crete and Mycenæ. About 3,000 years ago a series of Nordic invasions occurred which changed the situation. These Nordics conquered the southern Balkans and settled down as masters. Homer describes the first results. Homeric Greece was ruled by an upper caste of tall, blond Nordics, the mass of their subjects being small, dark Mediterraneans. Later on a

partial fusion of the two races produced the "Hellas" of classic times, and created the brilliant civilization which is Hellas' undying glory. However, it is interesting to note how essentially "Balkan" was the situation. The broken character of the country prevented political union. Ancient Greece was divided into many small states inhabited by Mediterraneans and Nordics in varying proportions and differing markedly from one another in temperament and culture. Disunion was, in fact, Hellas' undoing. Classic Greece tore itself to pieces by its domestic quarrels and fell under the rule of its northern neighbors. These neighbors were vigorous tribes of Nordic stock, akin to the Nordic invaders of Greece, who had settled the northern portion of the Balkan Peninsula, and had been welded into a powerful state (Macedon) by a dynasty of able rulers culminating in Alexander the Great. Alexander founded a mighty empire stretching far into Asia, but it broke up with his death, and the Balkans again fell into confusion until conquered by Rome.

Rome gave the Balkans political unity and peace, but when Rome declined, the Balkans were overwhelmed by misfortunes which have continued to the present day. A series of barbarian invasions swept the Balkans from end to end, destroying classic civilization and wiping out most of the old population. These barbarian invaders were of various racial stocks, some being of European and others of Asiatic blood. Alpine Slavs were the most numerous element, and it is Slav blood which has ever since been the predominant Balkan strain. However, the Slavs formed separate groups, mixed with the older populations and with Asiatic invaders in varying proportions,

and therefore formed no cement of political cohesion. Meanwhile, the older population had stood its ground at various points, especially at Constantinople, which became the seat of the so-called Byzantine Empire—Greek in speech and culture though extending into Asia Minor, and inhabited by a very mixed population. Throughout the Middle Ages the Balkans were torn by complicated struggles between the Byzantines and the various Slav peoples. As the Byzantine Empire declined, the Slav groups built up barbarian “empires” of their own, though they soon broke down into the chronic Balkan turmoil.

Then, about 500 years ago, Byzantines and Slavs were alike overwhelmed by a mighty wave of Asiatic conquest—the Ottoman Turks. For centuries the Balkan Peninsula lay under Turkish rule. But the Turks never succeeded in giving the Balkans peace or prosperity. On the contrary, they merely introduced new complications and sowed the seeds of future troubles. Turkish domination bore within itself the germs of decay. Most terrible of conquerors, the Turks were the poorest of assimilators. They remained a mere Asiatic army camped on European soil, and never succeeded in impressing either the Mohammedan religion or their Turkish language upon the mass of their Christian subjects. What the Turks did was to degrade and brutalize the Balkan peoples. The Turkish conquest everywhere destroyed the strongest and best elements of the population, who perished on the battlefield or went into exile. The remnants of the upper classes embraced Mohammedanism in order to keep their privileges, and thus became merged with their conquerors.

The mass of the population, deprived of its natural leaders and reduced almost to slavery, sunk to the level of an oppressed peasantry significantly called by their Turkish masters "Rayah"—"cattle." What civilization they had possessed vanished, though memories of better days lived on in legends which glorified the past into a sort of Golden Age and formed the basis of those extravagant national and imperial claims that have so afflicted the Balkans in modern times.

Such was the situation when Turkish power had so crumbled that the Balkan peoples began one after another to regain their lost independence. So artificial had been Ottoman rule that as the Turkish tide receded the old landmarks reappeared above the flood, muddy and damaged by long immersion but substantially the same, and the Balkan peoples resumed their old lives once more.

They *resumed* their old lives. Note that well. It is the key to the whole story. The Balkan peoples are not "young," as we are apt to think. They are very old; in fact, so many Rip Van Winkles aroused from a long sleep with all their mediæval racial characteristics and political aspirations practically unchanged. For them the last five centuries have been a dream—or a nightmare. One thing only do they remember—their "glorious pasts," and they are each determined that their special past shall live again. But this made inevitable a resumption of the old quarrels before the Turks came, when the Balkan peoples had fought each other for centuries, and during that long period had each gained a short-lived Balkan supremacy. This shows clearly in the rival claims which are to-day put forward. Because a province belonged to

a certain mediæval Balkan Empire, it must go to the particular state which to-day bears the same name, and since some districts belonged to all those empires in turn, the rival claims form a veritable Gordian knot which can be cut only by the sharp sword of war. Truly, among the Balkan peoples "a thousand years is but a day!"

All this is somewhat hidden from Western eyes by the fact that the Balkan peoples have acquired a superficial knowledge of Western political ideas, and have learned to clothe their thoughts in Western phrases like "nation" and "race." The Balkan peoples, however, pervert the true meaning of such terms into mere jingo propaganda. The truth of the matter is that these peoples are not yet "nations" in the Western sense; they are, rather, groupings of kindred clans or tribes, with primitive political ideas and with aims handed down from the crude mediæval past. What each of the Balkan peoples hopes in its heart of hearts is to dominate the whole of the Balkans and eventually to destroy its rivals by "converting" the conquered peoples to its particular language, church, and way of thinking. That is what makes Balkan quarrels so ferocious; each people realizes that its very life may be at stake, and is therefore ready to fight its opponents' imperialistic aspirations to the death.

The primitive character of the Balkan peoples shows not only in their foreign policies but also in their domestic politics. Despite high-sounding constitutions and elaborate parliamentary forms copied from Western models, Balkan politics are crude and backward. Power is usually in the hands of some masterful individual or dominant group which "makes" elections and rules by a combina-

tion of "strong-arm" methods and bribery. As for the "Opposition," it often refuses to play the parliamentary game, preferring instead to sulk or plot revolution. Under such conditions neither side hesitates to use violence and assassination to gain their respective ends. Fortunately, other aspects of Balkan life have improved faster than its politics. Intellectually and culturally, considerable progress has been made since emancipation from Turkish rule, and an upper class has developed, some of whose members are finely educated, cultured persons with high ideals. As yet, however, such persons are too few in number and too far above the popular level to exercise much effect upon political life. The masses are still thinly veneered barbarians, with the virtues and vices common to that stage of human evolution. These primitive folk are capable of sudden and intense outbursts of boundless fanaticism and savage cruelty unknown, or at least very rare, among more developed peoples.

All this gives the key to the great Balkan upheaval of 1912-1913, which was the climax of a century of struggle against Turkish rule. In 1912 the Christian Balkan states at last succeeded in combining against the hereditary Turkish foe. But no sooner was the Turk defeated than the victors quarrelled fiercely over the spoils. There followed the Second Balkan War—a ferocious death-grapple which ended in the despoiling and humiliation of Bulgaria, hitherto the leading Balkan state, by the other Balkan peoples. The Treaty of Bucharest which closed the war was an attempt permanently to kill Bulgaria's ambitions by surrounding her with a ring of aggrandized and watchful enemies. To this end the other important

Balkan states, Serbia, Rumania, and Greece, concluded an anti-Bulgarian league.

The so-called "Peace" of Bucharest was thus no peace. It was merely a whetting of knives. Anticipating a probable next war, all parties began to consolidate their territorial gains by the process known as "extirpation." This process consisted in the rooting out or forcible conversion of hostile minorities, thus attempting to make national lines correspond with political frontiers and to assure the fanatical loyalty of the whole future population within any given state border. The ruthlessness with which these persecutions were conducted scandalized the outside world and enormously envenomed Balkan hatreds. The wretched victims of "extirpation" streamed into their respective motherlands by the hundred thousand, and there sowed broadcast the seeds of fury and revenge. Each Balkan people swore to crush the accursed foe and erect its special greatness upon his ruin.

Such was the poison-gas of unslaked hatreds and gnawing ambitions which inflamed the Balkans at the outbreak of the Great War. In fact, that war began in an attempt of Austria-Hungary to crush the nationalistic aspirations of Serbia to annex its kinsmen who lived under Austrian rule. Once more the Balkans became a battleground, and once more unwise peace treaties sowed the seeds of future strife. Bulgaria, which had joined the Central Empires and shared their defeat, was punished even more severely than she had been after the Balkan Wars. Serbia and Rumania, which had chosen the winning side, were given large slices of disrupted Austria-Hungary and thus expanded beyond the Balkans into

Central Europe. Greece, which had also joined the Allies, was rewarded with territories both in the Balkans and in Asia Minor. Such were the treaty settlements at the close of the Great War. Yet already the Greek "settlement" has broken down, and few unbiassed observers believe that the other arrangements will last. The truth of the matter is that the Balkans are still in flux and that almost anything may happen. When we come to consider the Balkan states separately we shall see how profoundly unstable conditions are at the present time. Before doing so, however, let us pause to remember that Balkan instability arises, not merely from superficial matters like badly drawn peace treaties, but even more from fundamental factors like the lay of the land and the nature of its inhabitants. Once again, let us remember that the Balkans have always been a border-land where races, religions, languages, and cultures have met and fought in endless turmoil. The present Balkan peoples are not yet true nations, and they are certainly not races, but rather combinations of widely varied racial elements mixed in different proportions. Alpine Slav blood is the largest single factor in their racial make-up, but it is so intermingled with other strains and so cross-cut by non-racial factors like language, religion, and culture that it forms no real bond of union between the Balkan peoples. Bearing in mind these underlying truths, let us now glance at the several Balkan states as they stand to-day.

Our survey had best begin with Yugoslavia, the enlarged successor of Serbia and to-day the most powerful Balkan state. The name Yugoslavia means "Land of the South Slavs," and symbolizes the political union of the various

branches of the south Slav stock. The Jugoslavs are descended from tribes of Alpine Slav blood which settled the northwestern Balkans shortly after the fall of the Roman Empire. These tribes were closely related in blood and speech, but the broken character of the regions in which they settled marked them off into groups politically distinct from one another. And presently the physical barriers which separated them were reinforced by barriers of religion and culture. The southern tribes (the ancestors of the Serbs) took their Christianity from Constantinople, and became Greek Orthodox in faith and Byzantine in culture. The tribes living to the northward or along the coast of the Adriatic Sea (the ancestors of the Croats and Slovenes) were converted to Christianity from Rome and took their culture from the European West. The result was that the Serbs looked east while the Croats and Slovenes looked west, neither branch of the Yugoslav stock having much to do with the other.

The Croats and Slovenes soon lost their independence. The Slovenes were subjugated by the Austrian-Germans, the Croats fell under the rule of the Hungarians, while the tribes of the Adriatic coast came under Italian influence exercised by the Venetian Republic. The Serbs remained independent but were divided into several petty states and played a minor part in Balkan history until the latter part of the Middle Ages, when an able chieftain named Stephen Dushan united the Serb states, overran most of the Balkan Peninsula, and built up an "empire." Dushan's empire was, however, short-lived. It fell to pieces after his death and the fragments were soon afterward engulfed by the tide of Turkish conquest.

Dushan's empire is important only as it forms the basis for modern Serb dreams of Balkan domination. Note that Dushan's empire never included the Croats and Slovenes. It was thus purely a Balkan, not a "Jugoslav," state.

The Turkish conquest not only destroyed the flower of the Serb stock and reduced the remainder to an oppressed peasantry, but also caused a religious split which still exists. In the highlands of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a mountainous region lying between Serbia proper and the Adriatic, a large part of the population was converted to Islam, and became fanatical Moslems who lost all sense of kinship with their Serb brethren. On the other hand, a few Christian Serbs fled to the inaccessible crags of Montenegro, just south of Bosnia, and there maintained a wild independence which the Turks were never able to break. It was the Montenegrins who for centuries kept alive the old Serb traditions. This was perhaps the chief reason why the Serbs were the first Balkan people to throw off the Turkish yoke, a little over a century ago. Modern Serbia started as a small state with a rude peasant population, but it slowly grew in power and prosperity, although its progress was hindered by the turbulence of its political life.

As Serbia grew, she began to dream of her former greatness and to aspire to unite all the Serbs in a single national state. As matters then stood, more than half the Serbs remained under Turkish rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the west and in Macedonia to the south. Also, Montenegro remained separate and independent. Furthermore, as time went on, Serb ambitions grew still greater. No longer content with the idea of uniting all the Serbs, Ser-

bian nationalists began to dream of including the Croats and Slovenes in a larger south Slav unity. Thus the ideal of "Yugoslavia" was born. But this naturally alarmed Austria-Hungary, whose very existence would be threatened by any such development. Since Serbia was the champion of the Yugoslav idea, Austrian policy aimed at keeping Serbia down. The quarrel gradually became a deadly feud which presently got involved in the general tangle of European politics that preceded the Great War. Serbia was backed by Russia and openly plotted to disrupt Austria-Hungary, and establish Yugoslav unity on its ruins. But Austria-Hungary was backed by Germany and thus felt strong enough to risk crushing Serbia at the first opportunity. Then came the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. From them Serbia emerged victorious and confident, while Austria grew more alarmed and implacable. In this tense atmosphere the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, by Serb nationalists in June, 1914, caused the explosion of the Great War. After a heroic resistance, Serbia was overrun by the Austro-German armies, aided by the Bulgarians, who joined the Austro-Germans to revenge themselves upon the Serbs for Bulgaria's defeat in the Balkan Wars. However, the victory of Serbia's allies, the Western Powers, not only restored her independence, but also realized her dream of Yugoslav unity. The peace treaties of 1919 erected the present "Yugoslavia," a powerful state, with an area of 96,000 square miles and a population of 12,000,000.

At first sight Yugoslavia looks strong and assured of a prosperous future. In reality, Yugoslavia is rent by grave

internal quarrels and is surrounded by hostile neighbors. Jugoslavia is to-day a state, but she is as yet very far from being a nation. Brought suddenly together after ages of separation and divergent development, the various branches of the south-Slav stock do not fuse. So long as they were politically divided they could sympathize with one another. Now that they all live in the same house they see mutual differences rather than common likenesses. And there are so many varieties of Jugoslavs! Out of Jugoslavia's 12,000,000 population only about 4,500,000 are true Serbs, who dominate the situation and "run" Jugoslavia. But all the other Jugoslavs are more or less opposed to this state of things. The 500,000 Montenegrins object to the way in which their heroic individuality has been arbitrarily merged with the Serbs. The 800,000 Mohammedans of Bosnia and adjacent regions, though Serbs in blood, are sullen and rebellious, their sympathies being with the Turks rather than with their Slav kinsmen. As for the 5,500,000 Croats, Slovenes, and Dalmatians, Roman Catholic in religion and West European in culture, they look down on their Balkan relatives as semi-barbarous heretics and object strenuously to being ruled by Serbs, whom they consider their inferiors. Lastly, there are nearly 1,000,000 Bulgarians, Magyars, and Rumanians to whom the very word "Jugoslavia" is anathema.

The fact is that, as things now stand, the term "Jugoslavia" is a misnomer. The new state should be called "Greater Serbia." It is the Serbs who to-day run the country—and they run it with a heavy hand. A rough, primitive folk, the Serbs have got where they are by fight-

ing, and they think almost solely in terms of force. By a series of successful wars they have built up a strong, unified state. However, they know that this means a ring of hostile neighbors. Accordingly, when the other Jugoslavs talk of turning the new state into a Federation with wide local rights for the various elements, the Serbs denounce such talk as treason. Serb leaders will tell you frankly that they intend to go on governing with the strong hand until they have "made" the other elements into "good Jugoslavs." But the other elements promptly answer that this merely means "good Serbs," and they go on to say that they won't be made into Serbs and that they do not intend to tolerate the rough, tactless Serb soldiers and officials who have been set over them. And this is causing grave difficulties. Already parliamentary government has broken down, the Serbs ruling by a veiled dictatorship, with the Croats and Slovenes suddenly rebellious and with Montenegro and Macedonia full of brigandage and unrest. This cannot go on indefinitely. It seems pretty clear that Yugoslavia must ultimately become a Federal state if it is to endure. Unless the Serbs realize this, the other elements will plot secession—and Yugoslavia will fly to pieces. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia's neighbors watch and wait. Hitherto the chief thing that has kept the Serb-Croat quarrel within bounds has been their common hatred of Italy, which opposed Yugoslav aspirations. If war had resulted, the Jugoslavs might have developed a real national consciousness in the struggle against a foreign foe. But Italy has now compromised her differences with Yugoslavia, so foreign pressure has been relaxed and domestic quarrels flare up unchecked.

Of course, the Jugoslavs may come to an understanding with one another and become a true nation. At present, however, the prospects look rather dubious.

From Jugoslavia let us turn to Bulgaria. Here we find a very different situation. If Jugoslavia is suffering from victory, Bulgaria is suffering from defeat. Yet defeat has not quenched hope. Toughest and stubbornest of all the Balkan peoples, the Bulgars nurse their wounds and await better days.

This attitude springs from their inheritance. Racially the Bulgars are Alpine Slavs crossed with Asiatic Finnish or Turkish blood. That cross has produced a stock noted for patient determination and dogged energy. The Bulgars are great workers—and they can work together. This capacity for "team-play" is a great advantage to the Bulgars, because the other Balkan peoples are so much more prone to internal quarrels. Despite their recent defeats and present misfortunes, the Bulgars may yet outstrip their rivals. It is well to remember their favorite proverb: "The Bulgar on his ox-cart pursues the hare—and overtakes it!"

Bulgaria has had a checkered past. During the Middle Ages the Bulgars played a leading rôle in the Balkans. For centuries they and the Byzantine Greeks fought fiercely for Balkan supremacy. Twice the Bulgars built up powerful "empires," though these presently collapsed into the chronic Balkan turmoil. The Turkish conquest bore harder upon the Bulgars than upon any other Balkan people. So thoroughly were they crushed that less than fifty years ago the Bulgars were an obscure popula-

tion of wretched serfs, exploited to the limit of human endurance, whom the world had so completely forgotten that many Western travellers passed through their land without becoming aware of their existence.

The victorious war which Russia waged against Turkey in 1877 freed most of the Bulgars from the Turkish yoke and set up a Bulgarian state. This new state developed with extraordinary rapidity. Although the Serbs and Greeks had been liberated much earlier, Bulgaria soon passed them both in national progress and became the leading Balkan state. Awakening from their long slumber, the Bulgars recalled their past and determined on a yet greater future. The first step in their programme was the political unity of the whole Bulgarian stock. A large fraction of the Bulgarian people remained under Turkish rule in Macedonia, the central region of the Balkans. Once possessed of Macedonia, the resulting Big Bulgaria would be far and away the most powerful Balkan state. Thereafter Bulgaria might hope to subjugate the other Balkan peoples and expel the Turks from Constantinople, founding a true Bulgarian Empire which would dominate the Near East.

That was Bulgaria's ideal, evolved in the very first years of its political life. Such an ideal appeared absurd for a little peasant state just freed from Turkish servitude. But, if Bulgaria's dreams were great, her waking hours were long, and they were all given up to strenuous endeavor and rigid self-denial. These high hopes became part of the developing national consciousness. They braced every Bulgar to gigantic efforts. The way Bulgaria pinched and taxed herself for nearly forty years

to create proportionately the greatest war machine in the world showed this folk to be possessed of a sombre power and ferocious energy which made the goal seem less impracticable.

At last Bulgaria's hour seemed to have come. In the year 1912 Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece combined against the Turks, who were defeated and driven to the walls of Constantinople. The Balkans were free from Turkish rule. Unhappily, this was merely the beginning of fresh troubles. The victors promptly quarrelled over the spoils—particularly over Macedonia. Bulgaria had gone to war with Turkey for Macedonia and claimed the greater part of it as her reward. But this Greece and Serbia refused. Macedonia has, in fact, been for ages an apple of discord. In the first place, it is the geographical and strategical heart of the Balkans, so that whoever possesses it automatically gains something like Balkan supremacy. In the second place, it is a racial crossroads where all the Balkan stocks meet. The Macedonians are an extraordinarily mixed population, race lines being blurred even more than in other parts of the Balkans. Yet this does not prevent the various Balkan peoples from concocting elaborate "statistics" and other propagandist arguments "proving" the Macedonians to be the blood-brothers of each and every one of them. The tangle of rival claims is thus inextricable. As for the Macedonians themselves, the majority seem to feel themselves Bulgarians, though there are strong Serb- and Greek-feeling minorities, not to mention minor elements like Albanians, Rumanians, Turks, Jews, and Gypsies. The fierce wrangle which broke out among the Balkan states after their victory over

Turkey culminated in a ferocious war in which Bulgaria was defeated. Serbia and Greece divided Macedonia between them and promptly proceeded to expel or forcibly convert the Bulgar-feeling inhabitants. Bulgaria sat by in helpless rage until the Great War gave her a chance for revenge. But Bulgaria again lost, and by the peace treaties was left disarmed before her fully armed neighbors.

Owing to these misfortunes Bulgaria has sunk from her former position of the most powerful Balkan state to a place far below Serbia, Greece, and Rumania—all of whom to-day vastly outstrip Bulgaria in area and population. Bulgaria now possesses only 40,000 square miles of territory and less than 5,000,000 inhabitants. Yet Bulgaria remains a factor to be reckoned with. Certainly, Bulgaria seems to-day to be the most solid of the Balkan states. Her very defeats have left her with a thoroughly Bulgarian population, free from those rebellious minorities which are such dangerous internal weaknesses to her swollen neighbors. Meanwhile the Bulgarian peasant works as hard as ever, and the war losses are being repaired. Who can tell what opportunity may come to Bulgaria through some sudden shift in the strange kaleidoscope of Balkan politics? For, in the Balkans, the one thing certain is—uncertainty!

The story of Greece is perhaps the most dramatic in world history. No other people has probably ever passed through such extremes of glory and decline. Grave though Greece's situation is to-day, it should not be forgotten that the Greek people has endured even greater disasters

in the past—yet has survived. And it is this which lends the Greeks faith in their future.

Modern Greece draws its inspiration from two main sources: Ancient Hellas and the Mediæval Byzantine Empire. This latter source is often overlooked by Western observers, but to Greek minds it is the more important. The ties between Modern Greece and Ancient Hellas are dim and remote. The ties with Mediæval Byzantium, on the contrary, are close and unbroken. Modern Greece may feel itself to be the spiritual heir of Hellas, but it knows itself to be the political heir of Byzantium, and a restoration of the Byzantine Empire is at once the keynote of Greek patriotism and the basis of Greek politics. Greece's political goal is expressed in a phrase: "The Great Idea." Herein Greek aims differ markedly from those of the other Balkan peoples. The aspirations of the other Balkan peoples never stray much beyond the boundaries of the peninsula. The Greek dream, however, is truly imperial in its far-flung horizons. The Great Idea is a revival of Mediæval Byzantium, incarnated in a new Greek Empire seated at Constantinople, which shall embrace both the Balkans and Asia Minor and shall win back the whole Near East to Hellenism.

At first sight the Great Idea may seem mere wild fancy, but when we look closer we see that it is a logical outgrowth of Greece's historic past. When Ancient Hellas declined and finally fell under Roman rule, it did not lose its identity. The Hellenic stock, to be sure, greatly altered, most of the Nordic strains that had formed the ruling class during Hellas' great days dying out, while the Mediterranean strains which survived became con-

siderably mixed with other racial elements. Nevertheless, the Greek language and Greek culture not only maintained themselves in Greece itself but also spread over both the Balkans and Asia Minor, so that when the Roman Empire collapsed in Western Europe and transferred its capital to "Constantinople" (the new name given by the Roman Emperor Constantine to the Greek city of Byzantium) it came into a Greek atmosphere, lost its Latin character, and was transformed into the Greek "Byzantine Empire." With Western Europe sunk in the turmoil of the Dark Ages, the Byzantine Empire became the centre of European civilization. It also became the seat of Eastern Christendom, for about this time Christianity split in twain, the West following Rome while the East adhered to the "Orthodox" Church, which was thoroughly Greek in character. It was the Orthodox Church which converted the Slav invaders of the Balkans, and however bitterly the Slavs fought the Byzantine Empire they nevertheless acquired a Byzantine Greek religious and cultural stamp which could not be effaced. Indeed, this Greek stamp became even more pronounced after the Turkish conquest. To the Turks all their Christian subjects looked very much alike. They therefore considered the Byzantine Greeks as the natural spokesmen for the Christian elements, and the Balkan Slavs welcomed this arrangement since the Greeks were best fitted to stand between them and their Turkish masters. Down to the reawakening of the Balkan peoples about a century ago, religion rather than nationality was the test of men's allegiance, so the Balkan peoples thought of themselves as "Greek Orthodox" and very little else.

We are now in a position to understand the peculiar nature of the Greek "Great Idea," and to realize how it differs from the aspirations of the other Balkan peoples. Those aspirations are all founded on a more or less tribal nationalism. The Great Idea, on the other hand, is based on a religious imperialism. In fact, the Great Idea is essentially cosmopolitan, and is fundamentally opposed to the ideas of both nationality and race. The Greeks have never been able really to adjust themselves to the modern nationalist philosophy. In their heart of hearts they still believe that the Christian inhabitants of both the Balkans and Asia Minor should be one people, spiritually united in the Greek Orthodox Church and politically united in a Greek Empire. Certainly the Greek ideal has succeeded in binding together very different racial elements. The present "Greek" populations scattered so widely over the Balkans and Asia Minor are of many different stocks. Yet they are all ardent supporters of the Great Idea.

When the Greeks revolted against the Turks a century ago they hoped for a general rising of all the Christian elements. In fact, the first outbreak took place, not in Greece itself, but far to the northward in what is now Rumania, which had long been governed by Byzantine Greeks appointed by the Turkish Sultans, and where the educated upper class was then strongly Greek in feeling. However, the revolutionists were quickly disillusioned. The other Balkan peoples, already obscurely stirring to nationalist ideas, refused to move, and the Turks were thus able to concentrate against the Greeks, who were massacred wholesale, and deprived of the privileged posi-

tion that they had heretofore enjoyed. After years of bloody fighting, Western Europe intervened and set up an independent Greek state, but this state was so small and weak that in Greek eyes it was little more than a mockery of their hopes. The majority of the Greeks were left outside its frontiers, mainly under Turkish rule.

Under these circumstances the larger aspects of the Great Idea fell into the background. The Greeks had to confine their efforts mainly to building up their new state as a nucleus for later efforts. This was a slow and difficult task. Until the beginning of the present century Greece played a minor rôle in Balkan affairs. Her first real chance came when the Balkan states made their alliance against the Turk in the year 1912. From both the Balkan Wars which ensued Greece came out the big winner. With a minimum of loss she doubled her territory and population, her chief conquest being southern Macedonia with its great port-city of Salonika—next to Constantinople the richest prize in the Balkans. These remarkable successes fired the Greeks with wild enthusiasm and brought the Great Idea once more to the front. Then came the Great War, which brought to Greece an extraordinary series of successes and failures. For a moment it looked as though the Great Idea was to be realized. The Peace Conference seriously considered giving Greece Constantinople, and, though this was finally denied her, Greece was given a large slice of Asia Minor including the great port-city of Smyrna. At that dramatic hour Greece appeared to have become the leading state not only of the Balkans but of the whole Near East. The peace treaties had virtually condemned Turkey to death and, with the

destruction of her arch-enemy, Greece might well hope to establish something very like the empire of her dreams.

Suddenly, almost without warning, Greece was plunged from her pinnacle of triumph to the depths of defeat. A shift of European politics left her unsupported, the Turks made a desperate rally, and the Greek armies in Asia Minor were broken. The Greek cause suffered the most terrible disaster that had befallen it since the Turks wiped out the Byzantine Empire 500 years before. The very foundations of Hellenism in Asia Minor were destroyed, for the Turks, determined to make any fresh attack impossible, proceeded to root out the whole Greek population. Fully 2,000,000 Asiatic Greeks were either massacred or driven as starving, diseased refugees to their distracted motherland. The situation was made still worse by the political disturbances which broke out in Greece itself. Filled with fury and despair, the Greeks vented their rage upon one another. Greek politics are habitually turbulent, and Greece is to-day rent by bitter factional disputes.

Unless Greece speedily pulls herself together she may suffer still further losses. The Balkans are a primitive land where the weak usually get short shrift. Greece still has things worth taking, and there are those quite ready to take them. Not only would Bulgaria jump at the chance to seize the tongue of Greek territory (taken from Bulgaria by the peace treaties) which bars Bulgaria from the Mediterranean, but Jugoslavia is also to be feared. Though technically Greece's friend, Jugoslavia looks longingly at southern Macedonia and Salonika, possession of which would give Jugoslavia a Mediterra-

nean outlet and clinch its Balkan supremacy at one and the same time. When I was last in Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital, I heard much talk about Salonika, and some Serbs made no bones of stating that they would seize it if a good opportunity offered.

Greece thus stands to-day in a very dangerous situation. In many ways she is worse off than Bulgaria. Yet, here again, no one can predict with certainty what the morrow may bring. In the Balkans fortune's wheel turns swiftly, political combinations shift with amazing suddenness and startling surprises may be in store.

Finally, let us consider Rumania, the fourth important Balkan state. Rumania is the link between the Balkans and both Central and Eastern Europe. Geographically she lies mainly outside the Balkans, but historically she has been so closely connected with Balkan affairs that she forms a logical part of the Balkan area.

Of all the Balkan states Rumania gained most by the Great War. The peace treaties more than doubled her pre-war territory and population, so that to-day she exceeds even Yugoslavia in size and wealth. With her present area of 122,000 square miles (larger than Italy), her population of over 17,000,000, and her rich agricultural and mineral resources, Rumania looks almost like a first-class Power. However, as so often happens in the Balkans, appearances are deceptive. In reality, Rumania's very gains have produced such grave internal problems, and made such bitter foreign foes that Rumania's future is extremely troubled and uncertain.

The Rumanians themselves are a curious folk. They

illustrate the power of language and culture to form a national consciousness out of varied racial elements. The Rumanians are obviously of extremely mixed racial origin. Alpine Slav blood seems to be the largest element in their make-up, though there is also a considerable infusion of Mediterranean blood, together with diverse Asiatic strains. Nevertheless, the Rumanians speak a Latin language and proudly consider themselves full-fledged members of the "Latin Race" (there being, of course, no such thing).

How, then, do we find a Latin-speaking folk living along the lower Danube in the southeastern corner of Europe, hundreds of miles from the other Latin-speaking peoples? The Rumanians themselves explain the mystery by claiming to be the descendants of Roman colonists planted north of the Danube by the Emperor Trajan after his conquest of that region in the second century A. D. Racially this does not mean much, because Trajan's colonists were undoubtedly a miscellaneous lot of provincials with very little "Roman" blood. But culturally the picturesque legend probably does give the reason for the persistence of Latin speech along the lower Danube. Flooded though these regions were by all sorts of barbarian hordes for centuries after the fall of Rome, the Latin-speaking population possessed cultural traditions superior to their conquerors and, as so often occurs in such cases, converted the conquerors to their speech and customs. Precisely what happened we do not know, for the Rumanians do not appear as a distinct people until well into the Middle Ages, when we find them settled both in the fertile plains north of the Danube and in the

adjacent highlands of Transylvania. They were not a warlike folk and were mostly subject to foreign masters, but they were extremely persistent and prolific, and they took advantage of the devastating wars which raged about them to spread steadily east, north, and west, settling large sections of Hungary and of Southern Russia—especially the province known as Bessarabia. The Turks conquered the Rumanians as they did the other Balkan peoples, but the Rumanians were so far from the seat of Turkish Power that they were governed indirectly by Byzantine Greek viceroys appointed by the Sultans. These tributary provinces, lying north of the Danube, formed the nucleus for the later Kingdom of Rumania. As Turkish Power declined it seemed for a while that the Rumanians of the Danube plains would be annexed to Russia, which did succeed in getting Bessarabia early in the nineteenth century. But the Rumanians, like the other Balkan peoples, were now awakening to national consciousness, and after many difficulties the people of the Danubian plains (excepting Bessarabia) succeeded in escaping Russian annexation, threw off their vassalage to Turkey, and established an independent Kingdom of Rumania.

This Rumanian state was not very large, but so fertile was its soil and so dense its population that it rapidly grew in importance and prosperity. Like the other Balkan peoples, the Rumanians began dreaming of a great future and eyed with increasing impatience the sight of millions of their kinsmen under Russian and Hungarian rule. Until the outbreak of the Great War, however, such dreams of a "Greater Rumania" had little chance

of coming true. Rumania's "unredeemed" kinsfolk were subjects of first-class European Powers—Austria-Hungary and Russia. Furthermore, these Rumanians lived intermixed with other populations, which added grave difficulties to Rumanian annexation even had this been politically possible. Rumania therefore contented herself with encouraging nationalistic movements among the Rumanians of Hungary and Bessarabia, her active foreign policy being mainly directed to Balkan affairs, where she was dealing with nations of her own size. In fact, Rumania's sole accession of territory before 1914 was her annexation of the Bulgarian district known as the Dobru-dja when Rumania joined Greece and Serbia, and shared in the despoiling of Bulgaria after the Second Balkan War. Rumania thus gained a province with no Rumanian inhabitants. It rounded out her Black Sea frontage very nicely, but it made Bulgaria her bitter enemy.

When the Great War began Rumania adopted an attitude of canny neutrality. By the year 1916 Rumania made an excellent bargain with the Allies, obtaining their promise of Austria-Hungary's Ruman-inhabited territories, and entered the war on the Allied side. At first it looked as though Rumania had made a bad bet. The Rumanian armies were quickly beaten and the Kingdom of Rumania was overrun by Austro-German, Bulgarian, and Turkish forces. Then occurred an event which, for Rumania, turned out to be a great piece of luck—the Russian Revolution. Bolshevik Russia became the enemy of the Allies. Therefore, when the Allies won the war, Rumania claimed not only the Austro-Hungarian provinces that had been promised her but Russia's province

of Bessarabia as well. The Allies finally agreed, and Rumania thus fulfilled her wildest dreams.

However, Rumania's gains contained germs of trouble. Even the pre-war Rumania had been none too stable, her social system suffering from grave defects. The chief element of stability had been the fact that the great bulk of the population was Rumanian. Such was the country which suddenly swelled to more than twice its pre-war size, annexing a whole series of powerful, rebellious minorities, and thereby making powerful embittered foreign enemies who would be almost certain ultimately to make trouble. Of post-war Rumania's 17,500,000 inhabitants only about 11,500,000 are Rumanians. Furthermore, it must be remembered that of these 11,500,000 Rumanians, only 6,500,000 live in pre-war Rumania, the balance being "redeemed" Rumanians formerly subjects of Austria-Hungary and Russia. This is important, because the "redeemed" Rumanians differ in many ways from those of the former kingdom, and have already had some lively political tiffs with their kinsmen. It is this none too stable Rumanian *bloc* which has to hold down nearly 2,000,000 Magyars (Hungarians), over 1,000,000 Russians, nearly 1,000,000 Jews, 500,000 Serbs, 500,000 Germans, and fully 1,000,000 of lesser national groups such as Bulgars, Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Gypsies. Thus far Rumania's handling of her minorities has been characterized by brutality tempered by bribery. Rumanian politics have always been corrupt, and official corruption seems to have increased rather than diminished since the war. These things not only weaken the government but give encouragement to foreign enemies. And Rumania

certainly has dangerous foreign foes. First and foremost stands Russia, which has never forgiven what it considers to be Rumania's "robbery" of Bessarabia, and which will certainly try to get it back again—perhaps with interest. Then there is Hungary, stricken to her very heart by Rumania's new frontiers. Again there is Bulgaria, which has not forgotten Dobrudja. Lastly, there is Serbia, to-day allied to Rumania through common dislike of Hungary, but dissatisfied over its boundary with Rumania, which leaves so many Serbs inside Rumania's frontiers. Nowhere in Eastern Europe has Rumania a real friend. The Rumanians often call themselves "the Latin islet in the Slav ocean." They instinctively distrust all Slavs—and the Slavs have no love for them.

CHAPTER X

THE NEW REALISM OF SCIENCE

SCIENCE is giving us a new world. Few persons will question the truth of that statement. But how many of us realize all that it implies? We may think that we do. We see science evoking a series of marvellous inventions which affect every phase of our daily lives. New sources of material energy are tapped and harnessed to innumerable machines obedient to our will. A recent survey of mechanical development estimates that the amount of work done by machinery in the United States alone would demand the toil of 3,000,000,000 hard-driven slaves. Nature's hidden powers yield themselves as at the touch of a magician's wand. Time and distance alike diminish, and the very planet shrinks to the measure of human hands.

Science thus continually gives us new powers, new tools, new playthings. Very important, to be sure. Yet, how much more important is the new knowledge which science gives us about ourselves. That is what really matters! Had science merely given us a new material world without telling us what sort of people we truly are and how we may adjust ourselves to our novel surroundings, we would be like children playing with lighted matches in a powder-magazine, and would almost certainly blow ourselves and our new domicile to fragments. That is just what many students of present-day affairs

are afraid of. The late war is merely one warning of the perils which beset us, and it may be that we are destined to go "rattling back into barbarism."

Our best (perhaps our only) safeguard against so melancholy a fate is the scope of the scientific movement, which goes so much wider and deeper than we ordinarily suppose. The same movement which gives us the airship and the radio is also presenting us with a new outlook and philosophy of life. It is forcing us to re-examine ourselves and our relations with one another. More and more, forward-looking men and women the world over are coming to realize that the vast increase in knowledge which has occurred during the last few decades requires a thoroughgoing reconsideration of ideas and view-points—what a philosopher has well termed "a re-valuation of all values."

Every well-informed observer of contemporary events knows that this process is to-day in full swing. Throughout the civilized world the most cherished ideals are being scrutinized, while no institution, however venerable, escapes the fire of criticism. Much of this criticism is, to be sure, so ignorant and so destructive that we are often tempted to fear lest the social fabric give way under the strain. Other civilizations have perished in similar crises; why may not our civilization go down as well? The answer is that it may, but that its chief chance of successful survival lies in the one factor which distinguishes our age over past times. This great new factor is the spread of exact knowledge, inspired by and infused with *the scientific spirit*.

The spirit of science is a desire for *truth* so strong and

so compelling that prejudices and preconceptions are burned away, leaving the mind crystal clear to perceive the significance of fresh knowledge and adjust it harmoniously to knowledge already acquired. This means a mental attitude both free and flexible, capable of progress by methods at once steady and sure.

Here is something really new in human history! Hitherto Man has not only known comparatively little but has tended to misinterpret the little that he knew. On slender fact-bases he has reared elaborate theories, fine-spun from his logic and imagination, and he has then crystallized these theories into beliefs so dogmatic and intolerant that they have blinded his vision and closed his mind. Society has thus continually ossified, and the few free souls who sought truth with single-hearted devotion have usually been crushed by the prejudice and passion aroused at the mere thought of examining matters which had become cherished faiths. Human progress has thus far been like a series of lava-flows: at first moving with hot haste, yet soon cooling into a rigidity which might be broken or worn down but which could not be kept long in motion. Now, for the first time, we have in the scientific spirit a force capable of maintaining steady and consistent social progress. Its passion for truth can keep us going, while its insistence on proving and testing each step of the way can keep us going right. A society genuinely imbued with the scientific spirit and using scientific methods could neither ossify nor run wild. It would thereby avoid both reaction and revolution—those twin ills that have so afflicted mankind.

How shall we characterize the outlook and philosophy

of life enjoyed by those whom the scientific spirit has touched and transformed? It can be expressed in one word: *Realism!* This new realism of science must not be confused with the narrow materialism which rejects all not evident to the senses as vain or non-existent. Scientific realism recognizes the most intangible as well as the most palpable; it demands reality, yet understands that reality is infinitely varied; it seeks truth, knowing that truth manifests itself in countless ways. The genuine disciple of science has a bold mind but a humble heart. All that he insists upon is a recognition of the fact that the most disturbing truth is better than the most cherished error. Thus fortified, he is neither cast down by failure nor puffed up by success. His sense of balance and proportion is never obscured. Our age has discovered powers and secrets of nature that our forebears never knew. But our age has also awakened a passion for truth such as the world has never seen. Other ages have sought truth from the lips of seers and prophets; our age seeks it from scientific *proof*. Other ages have had their saints and martyrs—dauntless souls who clung to their faith with unshakable constancy. Yet our age has also its saints and martyrs—heroes who can not only face death for their faith, but who can also *scrap* that faith when facts have proved it wrong. There, indeed, is courage! And therein lies our hope.

This matchless love of truth, this spirit of science which combines knowledge and idealism in the synthesis of a higher *wisdom*, as yet inspires only a chosen few. Most of us are still more or less under the spell of the past—the spell of passion, prejudice, and unreason. It is thus

that ideas and ideals clearly disproved by science yet claim the allegiance of multitudes of worthy men. The dead hand of false doctrines and fallacious hopes lies, indeed, heavy upon us. Customs, laws, and institutions are alike stamped deep with its imprint. Our very minds and souls are imbued with delusions from whose emotional grip it is hard to escape. Mighty as is the new truth, our eyes are yet blinded to its full meaning, our hearts shrink instinctively from its wider implications, and our feet falter on the path to higher destinies.

This path we must essay to tread. It may be that we shall fail, that we shall fall into some abyss of disaster lurking by the way; nevertheless, we cannot stop where we are, nor can we turn back toward our simpler past. Science has given us a new world, and to that new world we must adapt ourselves or perish, as all living beings who do not fit themselves to new conditions must perish. Our task is only just begun. Scientific knowledge, hitherto employed mainly in material discoveries and mechanical inventions, must be increasingly applied to our institutions—and ourselves. Tremendous changes in our laws, our politics, and our social relations are inevitable. All these matters are the products of past times. They no longer fit present conditions and will have to be radically changed. Yet such changes, if made in the scientific spirit and according to scientific methods, can be effected in an entirely stable and progressive manner. In other words, they should be, not revolutions, but *evolutions*. That is the way science works when it is given a chance. Think, for example, of the sweeping transformations in abstract ideas that have taken place during the past few decades—

and all without shattering upheavals. There is no fundamental reason why the same cannot be accomplished in politics or institutions, provided the necessity for action be sufficiently clear and the will to act sufficiently strong.

The chief reason for hoping that such a process will occur is the way scientific knowledge is being spread and popularized. In past times knowledge was confined to a few learned individuals quite out of touch with their fellows. To-day knowledge is being extended by a numerous class of scientists, is intelligently appreciated by millions of educated persons throughout the civilized world, and is increasingly respected by the masses of the population. When a sufficient number of us come to realize that we need no longer be the sport of blind forces, but that we now know enough to control our destiny, we may expect marvellous developments of all kinds—at least among the more intelligent and forward-looking peoples.

These developments will include in their scope not only our material surroundings, institutions, and social relations, but also, most emphatically—ourselves. "The proper study of mankind is Man!" That famous line, coined by a poet long ago, now takes on its full significance. For the first time in his history, Man begins really to know himself and to appreciate the solemn fact that within him lies the power to make or mar his destiny. Science's greatest achievement has been its discovery of those laws of life on which, in the last analysis, all human activity depends. By these discoveries our ideas concerning human nature have been radically altered. Hitherto we have usually believed that human beings were born

pretty much alike, and that how they developed depended mainly upon their surroundings, these surroundings being both natural, like soil and climate, and man-made, such as the laws, institutions, customs, and ideals prevailing in the various human groups. Believing such theories, men have for ages devoted their best efforts to changing conditions, without studying closely the sort of people to whom these conditions were to be applied.

How the discoveries of modern science have altered this traditional attitude! We now know that the basic factor in human affairs is not men's surroundings but the qualities of men themselves, and that these qualities are inborn, not grafted on by outward circumstances. In other words, a man's heredity is of more fundamental importance than his environment in determining his course in life, because environment can only bring out the qualities that he has inherited.

Furthermore, we know that, instead of being born very much alike, men are born infinitely unlike. During the long ages of its existence mankind has differentiated into an amazingly wide range of types differing from one another in inborn characteristics. These human types, known as races, differ not only in outward appearance but also in mind, temperament, and capacity. Of course, within the racial groups a similar differentiation has gone on, so that each human stock produces individuals ranging in hereditary endowment all the way from the idiot to the genius. Nevertheless, the members of each race inherit certain physical, mental, and moral traits which together form a generalized race-type that descends from generation to generation, persists under

all sorts of surroundings, and determines more than anything else what sort of persons the members of the race will be, how they will act, and what they will do. Thus the most vital element in human affairs is seen to be the racial factor, and the fundamental aspect of the new scientific realism is racial reality.

In the preceding chapters we have investigated the racial factor in European affairs, and we have observed how this factor, though often obscured by other matters, underlies the entire course of events. We have seen how even such powerful influences as geography and climate are not so important in shaping a country's destiny as the blood of its inhabitants, while the institutions, customs, and doings of peoples are mainly the result of their racial make-up. We have studied the three European races (Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterraneans) and have been impressed by the way the fortunes of the various European countries have depended primarily upon this great underlying factor, which has subtly yet surely moulded every phase of national life, from manners and ideals to politics and institutions. How the racial interpretation of history clarifies and vitalizes the record of human events! So many mysteries explained; so many riddles solved; such seemingly tangled situations become simple and understandable! And all this because we are at last looking at things in terms of basic reality.

For Americans such a survey of European affairs is of special significance, because America is racially an offshoot of Europe, the vast majority of its population being of European blood. And surely nothing reveals more strikingly the supreme importance of race than the story

of America itself. If environment rather than heredity were the basic force in human affairs, here was a unique opportunity of proving it. Coming into novel surroundings, the Europeans who migrated to the New World should, according to the environmentalist theory, have rapidly developed into beings vastly different from their kinsmen in Europe. Especially should the differences which marked the newcomers while they were in their European homes have quickly disappeared, their changed environment fusing them into one or more genuine new types. Yet nothing of the kind has occurred. Instead, the races have persisted in the New World as they have in the Old, displaying the same temperaments and acting in much the same way. As good examples of this, observe the United States, French Canada, and Mexico respectively. The United States, settled overwhelmingly by Nordics, developed a thoroughly Nordic national life, with ideals and institutions plainly corresponding to those which Nordics have always produced wherever they have established themselves. On the other hand, French Canada, being settled by colonists mainly of Alpine French stock, became a typical Alpine land, instantly recognizable as such to any one acquainted with the Alpine element in France or in other parts of Europe. What a contrast between New England and Quebec! Yet these two regions adjoin one another and are not very different in climate or other natural features. As for Mexico, the Spanish colonists established a society which was originally a faithful counterpart of their racially Mediterranean homeland, and such changes as have since occurred are traceable almost wholly to the influence of the native Indian elements.

To no country has knowledge of racial realities come as a greater blessing than to America, because only our present awakening to their supreme importance promises to save America from perils which were beginning to threaten the whole fabric of its national life. The United States was founded by men of Nordic stock; its institutions, ideals, and culture are typical fruits of the Nordic spirit. These are the things which make "America." Yet only so long as America remains predominantly Nordic in blood will these things endure. History shows conclusively that as the blood of a nation changes, so does every phase of the national life; it proves beyond the shadow of a doubt that if the United States should cease to be a mainly Nordic land, *our* America would pass away.

Only of late years has this vital truth been widely realized and its full significance appreciated. Until recently the average American had slight knowledge of racial matters. Influenced by the old idea that environment rather than heredity is the chief factor in human affairs, most Americans professed an easy optimism, confident that America could quickly weld all comers, of whatever origin or traditions, into the fabric of American national life. This attitude was strengthened by the way in which, during the greater part of the nineteenth century, millions of immigrants were, generally speaking, thus assimilated.

However, as time passed, American optimism began to waver. The stream of immigration shifted its sources, ceasing to come from Northern and Western Europe (where the old-stock Americans had originated) and flowing instead from Southern and Eastern Europe, or even from Asia. New elements came pouring into America: people

strange in aspect, and equally strange in habits and ideas. And the new immigrants did not assimilate as their predecessors had done. Unable to absorb these refractory aliens, America began to show symptoms of indigestion, painfully evident in many ways, from politics to social relations.

For a while American public opinion refused to face facts. The old-fashioned optimism was very attractive. It was so inspiring (and so self-flattering!) to believe that America was a marvellous "melting-pot," wherein all dross would be purged away, leaving only fine gold! In fact, those who first raised warning voices against the trend of things were taken roundly to task, their warnings being stigmatized as "un-American."

Pain, however, is a great persuader, and the pangs of national indigestion presently grew so alarming that the American people had to sit up and do some hard thinking. Forced to face facts, the truth soon became clear and a lot of old notions went into the discard. The first to go was the shibboleth of the "melting-pot." That pet fancy could hold water only while most of our immigrants were North Europeans, people of the same racial stocks as the old colonial population, with the same temperaments, the same inborn impulses, and much the same traditional and cultural backgrounds. Such people could, and did, understand our ideas and institutions; could, and did, sympathize with our ideals; could, and did, rapidly fuse with us and become genuinely part and parcel of ourselves—if not at once, at least after one or two generations.

Far different has it been with the newer immigrant

stocks from Southern and Eastern Europe and from Western Asia. These people, sundered from the older stocks not only by widely different traditions and cultures but also by the even deeper gulfs of race, could not, and did not, fit readily into the fabric of American life. Most Americans used to think that, though the original immigrants might remain largely alien in spirit, the next generation, born in America, would be fully assimilated. We now know that, broadly speaking, this has not been the case. A considerable minority of the newer stocks have, to be sure, adapted themselves fairly well to American conditions and American ideals. But the majority even of the American-born members of these stocks remain more or less alien. They have, it is true, mostly lost their ancestral languages and cultures, speak English, and in many cases profess an ardent Americanism. But the pull of heredity remains, and instinctive reactions of temperament and inborn impulse make their attitude toward America necessarily very different from that of the children of immigrants from North European stocks.

The North European comes to us predisposed by his heredity to understand and to sympathize with the civilization that his kinsfolk have built up in America. The South and East European (and still more the Asiatic) are not thus predisposed. Much of our American life is, to these people, not only incomprehensible but positively distasteful. They react instinctively against such things, and thus tend to become, as one writer has well phrased it, "American citizens but not Americans."

Such is the attitude of what has been aptly termed the "New American." The New American is already

a grave problem that will become graver as time goes on because his attitude tends rapidly to become more positive and aggressive in character. The original immigrant, however incomprehensible or repugnant America may be to him, can content himself with a negative protest, consoling himself by withdrawal into the haven of his particular group, language, and traditions. But his children, discarding such things as they usually do, have no such refuge. Accordingly, they tend to voice their discontent in positive fashion by seeking to change their American environment and mould it to their liking.

However, they soon discover that this is no easy matter. America is not a wilderness plastic to the latest touch; it is a settled country, with traditions extending back three centuries and with a resident population deeply attached to those traditions and determined to develop them along traditional lines. Thus balked in his desires, the New American's discontent increases, and he is apt to broaden his specific dislikes into a general criticism of everything characteristically American, from manners and institutions to the very inhabitants themselves. Here we have the secret of current protests against the "domination" of the older stocks, together with vehement insistence upon America's "hybrid" character. The New American frequently asserts hotly that America is still "in the making," and that there is as yet no real American nationality or civilization. Not long ago a prominent member of an East European racial group stated: "This country is not a 'nation.' It is a gathering together of peoples from every corner of the earth. No one racial group, no matter how early settled in this country, can

furnish more than one note in this vast symphony of peoples." To hear some of these alien protests, one would think that America had no history, no traditions, no coherent fabric of civilization, but that all of us had been dumped down together at Ellis Island a few short years ago!

The rise of the New American has, however, had one rather startling result: it has roused the Old American. Shocked broad awake, the old stock is for the first time developing a real racial consciousness. Hitherto the average American's racial vision did not extend much beyond a perception of such obvious racial differences as those which separated him from the negro, the Red Indian, or the Mongolian of Eastern Asia. Now, however, he is fast realizing that "America" means not only certain ideals and institutions but also a racial stock, which must be preserved if the ideals and institutions which that stock has created are to endure. To the New American's cry that America is still "in the making," and that it should become a hybrid civilization, the Old American answers grimly that America is basically "made"—and that it shall not be unmade.

And the Old American is not merely thinking and talking: he is acting as well. The outstanding feature of his awakening self-consciousness is the immigration legislation of the last few years, culminating in the bill which has recently become law. This law sharply restricts the total number of immigrants and limits such immigration as is permitted chiefly to North Europeans. In other words, the American people has made up its mind that America is going to remain predominantly Nordic in

race, ideals, and institutions. And that decision will stand, because, despite the immigrant flood of the past generation, the American people is still mainly Nordic in blood. Now that the North European stocks have begun to realize that they and their ideals are really challenged by the presence of unassimilated alien elements, they are drawing together in instinctive self-defense and will exert a power that will be irresistible. For, in the last analysis, it is the North European stocks which constitute the predominant force in America. The most cursory analysis of our racial make-up proves this in striking fashion. According to the census of 1920, the white population of the United States was a trifle under 95,000,000. Of these fully 40,000,000 were descended from the old colonial stock (which was of course almost wholly Nordic) while another 40,000,000 were of the same or kindred North European stocks, the majority being either assimilated or in rapid process of assimilation. Only 14,000,000 or 15,000,000 of our population belong to the newer elements from Southern and Eastern Europe and the Levantine fringe of Asia. They are thus in a decided minority, which will be unlikely to gain very much at the expense of the older stocks, now that our gates have been firmly closed against further wholesale immigration. In fact, our immigration-restriction laws are the best proof of Nordic racial ascendancy in America. The passage of those laws was fought tooth and nail, not only by the newer immigrant groups but also by very powerful economic influences like the steamship lobby and industrial interests eager for cheap labor. Nevertheless, the old stock had made up its mind that wholesale immigration

was a menace to America—and the restriction laws went through!

America does not stand alone in this matter. All over the world barriers against wholesale immigration are rising, made necessary by the development of cheap and rapid communication which enables vast masses of population to pour themselves easily into distant lands. More and more, peoples are coming to realize that such immigrant floods are a deadly menace not only to their living standards but also to their very national integrity and racial existence. Beside such supreme values, what does the momentary economic gain of "cheap labor" amount to?

Furthermore, immigration restriction is only one of many new developments which the knowledge of racial values is bringing about in world affairs. Both in their internal politics and their relations with one another, peoples will be influenced more and more by racial considerations. The benefits from such a change of attitude will be enormous. Many false ideas and prejudices which now warp our judgment and hinder progress will be swept away, and we will face our problems with a fresher, keener vision, capable of piercing through surface appearances to the underlying reality. Within each country social ideals and legislation will be increasingly directed to conserving and improving its racial stocks, while across state frontiers men of like vision will co-operate more easily, the realization of kinship in blood and temperament serving to diminish differences in nationality. Already we see the process at work on an international scale among two groups of kindred peoples—the Scandinavians and

the English-speaking nations. Within both those groups war has become practically unthinkable, while their growing sense of racial affinity will tend to draw them still more closely together.

Even between peoples utterly unlike in blood a frank facing of racial facts will be helpful by showing them precisely how they differ and what are the true grounds on which their relations should be based. Nothing is more dangerous than illusions. One of the chief evils of our present political thinking is that we tend to oscillate between a narrow nationalism and an impracticable internationalism. Both doctrines ignore or oppose the racial factor, which logically stands between them, cross-cutting national borders, yet recognizing the divisions which nature has established within the human species. In the long run, nothing is gained by glozing over unwelcome facts or indulging in false sentimentalities. On the contrary, much may be lost, because such an attitude is apt to end in bitter disillusionment, leaving matters worse than they were before. Between peoples, as between individuals, an honest recognition of differences as well as likenesses is the surest basis for a true understanding.

"Know thyself!" Those words of profound wisdom, uttered long ago, were never so significant as they are to-day, when science has revealed to us secrets of life hitherto unknown. Armed with this new knowledge, Man is endowed as never before with power to shape his destiny, and can, if he will, tread his upward path clear-eyed and unafraid.

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
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